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ABSTRACT	  	  In	  today’s	  environment,	  medical	  technology	  is	  rapidly	  advancing	  to	  deliver	  tremendous	  value	  to	  physicians,	  nurses,	  and	  medical	  staff	  in	  order	  to	  support	  them	  to	  ultimately	  serve	  a	  common	  goal:	  	  provide	  safe	  and	  effective	  medical	  care	  for	  patients.	  	  However,	  these	  complex	  medical	  systems	  are	  contributing	  to	  the	  increasing	  number	  of	  healthcare	  accidents	  each	  year.	  	  These	  accidents	  present	  unnecessary	  risk	  and	  injury	  to	  the	  very	  population	  these	  systems	  are	  designed	  to	  help.	  	  Thus	  the	  current	  safety	  engineering	  techniques	  that	  are	  widely	  practiced	  by	  the	  healthcare	  industry	  during	  medical	  system	  development	  are	  inadequate	  in	  preventing	  these	  tragic	  accidents.	  	  Therefore,	  there	  is	  a	  need	  for	  a	  new	  approach	  to	  design	  safety	  into	  medical	  systems.	  	  	  	  This	  thesis	  demonstrated	  that	  a	  holistic	  approach	  to	  safety	  design	  using	  the	  Systems	  Theoretic	  Accident	  Model	  and	  Process	  (STAMP)	  and	  Causal	  Analysis	  based	  on	  STAMP	  (CAST)	  was	  more	  effective	  than	  the	  traditional,	  linear	  chain-­‐of-­‐events	  model	  of	  Failure	  Mode	  Effects	  and	  Criticality	  Analysis	  (FMECA).	  	  The	  CAST	  technique	  was	  applied	  to	  a	  medical	  case	  accident	  involving	  a	  complex	  diagnostic	  analyzer	  system.	  	  The	  results	  of	  the	  CAST	  analysis	  were	  then	  compared	  to	  the	  original	  FMECA	  hazards.	  	  By	  treating	  safety	  as	  a	  control	  problem,	  the	  CAST	  analysis	  was	  capable	  of	  identifying	  an	  array	  of	  hazards	  beyond	  what	  was	  detected	  by	  the	  current	  regulatory	  approved	  technique.	  	  From	  these	  hazards,	  new	  safety	  design	  requirements	  and	  recommendations	  were	  generated	  for	  the	  case	  system	  that	  could	  have	  prevented	  the	  case	  accident.	  	  These	  safety	  design	  requirements	  can	  also	  be	  utilized	  in	  new	  medical	  diagnostic	  system	  development	  efforts	  to	  prevent	  future	  medical	  accidents,	  and	  protect	  the	  patient	  from	  unnecessary	  harm.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Thesis	  Advisor:	  	  Qi	  Van	  Eikema	  Hommes	  Title:	  	  Research	  Scientist	  of	  Engineering	  Systems	  Division	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CHAPTER	  1.	  	  Introduction	  and	  Motivation	  	  
“Learning	  without	  thought	  is	  labor	  lost.	  	  Thought	  without	  learning	  is	  perilous”	  
-­‐Confucius	  	  The	  United	  States	  is	  home	  to	  some	  of	  the	  world’s	  most	  innovative	  breakthroughs	  such	  as	  the	  Human	  Genome	  Project	  [1],	  Hepatitis	  C	  treatment	  [2],	  and	  the	  management	  of	  several	  orphan	  diseases	  [3].	  	  The	  U.S.	  spends	  the	  most	  for	  its	  healthcare,	  amounting	  to	  about	  $2.5	  trillion	  a	  year,	  which	  is	  roughly	  17%	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Gross	  Domestic	  Product	  (GDP)	  [4].	  	  However,	  there	  is	  drastic	  contradiction	  between	  innovative	  technology	  and	  high	  spending,	  and	  the	  overall	  safety	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  care	  provided	  to	  patients.	  	  	  A	  2000	  report	  from	  the	  World	  Health	  Organization	  (WHO)	  ranked	  the	  U.S.	  as	  37th	  in	  the	  world	  in	  overall	  quality	  of	  healthcare	  system	  performance	  [5].	  Most	  of	  developed	  European,	  Asian,	  Middle	  Eastern,	  and	  South	  American	  countries	  are	  ranked	  higher	  for	  overall	  safety	  and	  effectiveness.	  	  The	  U.S.	  is	  listed	  just	  above	  Cuba,	  whose	  GDP	  is	  0.08%	  of	  that	  of	  the	  U.S.	  	  The	  contrast	  is	  stark	  and	  illustrates	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  attain	  safe	  and	  effective	  health	  care	  that	  does	  not	  directly	  result	  from	  high	  spending	  and	  technology.	  	  Further	  studies	  have	  shown	  that	  almost	  30%	  of	  the	  medical	  services	  provided	  in	  the	  U.S.	  are	  ineffective,	  and	  there	  are	  approximately	  98,000	  American	  deaths	  a	  year	  due	  to	  medical	  errors	  in	  hospitals	  [6].	  	  The	  number	  of	  deaths	  due	  to	  preventable	  adverse	  events	  exceeds	  motor	  vehicle	  accidents,	  breast	  cancer,	  and	  AIDS	  related	  deaths	  [6].	  	  “Crossing	  the	  Quality	  Chasm”,	  a	  2001	  report	  by	  the	  Institute	  of	  Medicine	  (IOM),	  indicates	  safety	  as	  one	  of	  the	  six	  main	  elements	  for	  improving	  the	  healthcare	  system	  [4].	  	  Safety	  is	  a	  rich,	  multi-­‐dimensional	  issue	  in	  the	  healthcare	  industry.	  	  This	  thesis	  project	  chose	  to	  focus	  on	  safety	  assurance	  during	  the	  design	  phase	  of	  the	  medical	  system	  product	  development	  process.	  	  	  The	  motivation	  to	  improve	  the	  overall	  the	  system	  safety	  emerged	  from	  one	  of	  the	  author’s	  professional	  experiential	  accounts	  of	  the	  dramatic	  consequences	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  system	  safety.	  	  On	  an	  international	  visit	  to	  a	  large	  hospital	  for	  an	  accident	  investigation,	  several	  medical	  diagnostics	  systems	  failed	  prematurely	  promoting	  potentially	  hazardous	  conditions	  for	  the	  patients.	  	  One	  specific	  situation	  was	  prior	  to	  the	  start	  of	  an	  invasive	  operation	  of	  a	  patient,	  the	  primary	  diagnostic	  system	  failed	  and	  became	  unavailable	  for	  diagnostic	  usage.	  	  	  A	  secondary	  diagnostic	  system	  was	  available	  since	  general	  hospital	  protocol	  requires	  a	  backup	  unit	  for	  emergency	  situations,	  and	  the	  patient	  underwent	  the	  scheduled	  operation.	  	  However,	  during	  the	  operation,	  the	  secondary	  system	  failed	  for	  the	  same	  issue	  and	  the	  medical	  staff	  was	  left	  to	  complete	  the	  procedure	  without	  any	  accurate	  diagnostics	  of	  the	  patient’s	  blood	  status.	  	  This	  provided	  a	  hazardous	  environment	  where	  accidents	  could	  occur,	  and	  the	  patient	  safety	  was	  at	  risk.	  	  Fortunately,	  the	  surgery	  outcome	  was	  successful	  and	  the	  patient	  was	  unharmed.	  	  However,	  the	  medical	  staff	  on	  duty	  discussed	  the	  hazardous	  incident	  with	  the	  author	  and	  colleague	  with	  great	  fervor	  and	  emotion.	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While	  the	  discussion	  was	  entirely	  in	  the	  native	  foreign	  language,	  the	  transcended	  disappointment	  and	  frustration	  of	  the	  system	  was	  not	  lost	  in	  translation	  and	  that	  experienced	  resounded	  deeply	  with	  the	  author.	  	  	  	  Since	  that	  incident,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  professional	  and	  academic	  motivation	  for	  the	  author	  to	  improve	  the	  overall	  safety	  of	  medical	  systems,	  and	  strive	  to	  fulfill	  the	  personal	  goal	  of:	  “Change	  the	  world.	  One	  Patient	  at	  a	  Time.”	  	  Adapting	  a	  new	  systems	  thinking	  approach	  in	  safety	  design	  in	  complex	  systems	  developed	  by	  Professor	  Nancy	  Leveson	  of	  MIT	  [7],	  achieving	  that	  goal	  maybe	  one	  step	  closer.	  	  Motivated	  by	  these	  existing	  challenges,	  this	  thesis	  has	  chosen	  to	  focus	  on	  how	  to	  improve	  the	  safety	  of	  medical	  diagnostic	  systems	  during	  the	  product	  development	  phase.	  	  Safety	  is	  a	  critical	  parameter	  in	  complex	  systems	  that	  affect	  the	  end	  value	  delivery	  to	  the	  user.	  	  Regulatory	  bodies	  such	  as	  the	  U.S.	  Food	  and	  Drug	  Administration	  (FDA),	  and	  the	  Conformité	  Européenne	  (CE)	  establish	  medical	  device	  and	  diagnostic	  regulations	  for	  safety.	  	  	  	  These	  include	  several	  medical	  industry	  standard	  safety	  and	  risk	  management	  techniques	  such	  as	  Failure	  Mode	  Effects	  and	  Criticality	  Analysis	  (FMECA)	  that	  uses	  a	  reductionist	  chain-­‐of-­‐events	  analysis	  approach	  during	  the	  design	  phase	  to	  address	  potential	  safety	  issues	  [8].	  	  While	  these	  techniques	  are	  sufficient	  in	  meeting	  current	  safety	  guidelines,	  they	  predominantly	  focus	  on	  a	  linear,	  reliability	  approach	  for	  addressing	  safety,	  and	  are	  inadequate	  for	  today’s	  non-­‐linear	  complex	  systems.	  	  This	  absence	  of	  a	  systems	  thinking	  approach	  may	  have	  contributed	  to	  the	  recent	  rise	  in	  medical	  device	  recalls	  [9].	  This	  thesis	  applies	  a	  systems	  thinking	  methodology	  called	  Causal	  Analysis	  based	  on	  STAMP	  (CAST)	  to	  an	  accident	  on	  a	  complex	  medical	  product	  [7].	  	  	  Systems	  Theoretic	  Accident	  Model	  and	  Process	  (STAMP)	  is	  a	  new	  systems	  methodology	  that	  approaches	  safety	  as	  a	  control	  problem,	  rather	  than	  a	  reliability	  issue.	  	  A	  gap	  analysis	  is	  performed	  on	  the	  CAST	  results	  with	  the	  standard	  FMECA	  findings	  from	  the	  original	  case	  system	  manufacturer	  to	  investigate	  common	  findings,	  variations,	  and	  discrepancies.	  	  	  The	  research	  question	  that	  this	  thesis	  intends	  to	  answer	  is:	  
“Is	  the	  Systems	  Theoretic	  Accident	  Model	  and	  Process	  (STAMP)	  approach	  more	  
effective	  in	  designing	  safety	  into	  the	  medical	  diagnostic	  systems	  than	  the	  
current	  industry	  standard	  practices?”	  The	  rest	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  organized	  in	  the	  following	  fashion.	  	  In	  Chapter	  2,	  the	  literature	  review	  discusses	  the	  history,	  and	  current	  safety	  regulations	  for	  medical	  diagnostic	  systems	  development.	  	  Furthermore,	  several	  acceptable	  industry	  standard	  practices	  for	  risk	  management	  are	  presented	  and	  their	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses	  of	  each	  method	  are	  discussed.	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  new	  systems	  safety	  methodologies	  of	  STAMP	  and	  CAST	  are	  presented.	  	  Chapter	  3	  discusses	  the	  case	  study	  company,	  the	  case	  study	  system,	  and	  an	  accident	  that	  is	  used	  for	  the	  case	  
	   11	  
study.	  	  In	  Chapter	  4,	  the	  CAST	  analysis	  is	  performed	  on	  the	  case	  accident.	  	  Chapter	  5	  discusses	  the	  potential	  hazards	  uncovered	  from	  the	  CAST	  application,	  and	  the	  new	  system	  safety	  design	  requirements	  and	  recommendations.	  	  A	  gap	  analysis	  between	  CAST	  and	  the	  FMECA	  methodologies	  is	  also	  performed	  in	  Chapter	  5.	  	  In	  Chapter	  6,	  a	  conclusion	  will	  offer	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  thesis,	  and	  provide	  an	  answer	  to	  the	  focused	  research	  question	  while	  offering	  future	  suggestions,	  insights,	  and	  departing	  statements.	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CHAPTER	  2.	  	  Literature	  Review	  	  
	  “We	  can't	  solve	  problems	  by	  using	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  thinking	  we	  used	  when	  we	  created	  
them.”	  	  	  	  	  
-­‐Albert	  Einstein	  	  Product	  development	  is	  a	  complex	  and	  complicated	  process	  requiring	  substantial	  resources	  including	  money,	  time,	  and	  human	  activity.	  	  From	  the	  designer’s	  3D	  CAD	  model,	  to	  the	  factory	  floor	  ramping	  up	  production	  to	  the	  final	  product	  installation	  at	  a	  field	  site,	  a	  holistic	  view	  of	  the	  product	  lifecycle	  must	  be	  taken	  in	  order	  to	  balance	  the	  needs	  of	  various	  stakeholders.	  	  	  As	  products	  become	  more	  complex	  and	  develop	  into	  systems,	  emergent	  properties	  arise	  such	  as	  the	  end	  value-­‐delivery	  function.	  But	  there	  are	  several	  others	  such	  as	  performance,	  quality,	  and	  safety	  that	  also	  need	  to	  be	  considered	  during	  the	  initial	  development	  phase.	  	  	  	  In	  regards	  to	  developing	  new	  medical	  technology	  systems,	  satisfying	  the	  numerous	  complex	  federal	  regulations	  is	  an	  additional	  enormous	  effort	  that	  is	  needed	  for	  product	  market	  introduction.	  	  	  The	  United	  States	  Food	  and	  Drug	  Administration	  (FDA)	  is	  the	  agency	  in	  charge	  for	  medical	  technology	  safety	  and	  effectiveness	  regulations	  that	  protect	  the	  public	  health.	  	  A	  brief	  overview	  is	  provided	  next	  on	  the	  origin	  of	  the	  agency	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  safety	  regulations.	  	  
2.1	  	  The	  History	  of	  U.S.	  Drug	  and	  Medical	  Device	  Regulation	  and	  the	  Birth	  of	  the	  
Food	  and	  Drug	  Administration	  (FDA)	  	  The	  United	  States	  Food	  and	  Drug	  Administration	  (FDA)	  is	  the	  oldest	  consumer	  protection	  agency	  formed	  in	  1906	  [10].	  	  It	  is	  a	  direct	  descendant	  and	  evolution	  of	  earlier	  regulatory	  agencies	  such	  as	  Division	  of	  Chemistry	  (1862),	  Bureau	  of	  Chemistry	  (1901),	  and	  Food,	  Drug	  and	  Insecticide	  Administration	  (1927).	  	  The	  birth	  of	  FDA	  guardianship	  and	  the	  origins	  of	  drug	  and	  medical	  product	  regulation	  began,	  unfortunately,	  with	  a	  massive	  medical	  accident.	  	  	  	  In	  the	  19th	  century,	  individual	  states	  regulated	  food	  and	  drug	  qualities	  for	  the	  public	  welfare,	  with	  significant	  variation	  from	  state	  to	  state.	  	  With	  the	  assistance	  of	  Harvey	  Washington	  Wiley	  (Chief	  Chemist	  of	  Division	  of	  Chemistry),	  who	  helped	  unified	  groups	  to	  prohibit	  adulteration	  and	  misbranding	  of	  food	  and	  drugs,	  the	  1906	  Pure	  Food	  and	  Drugs	  Act	  (aka	  Wiley	  Act)	  was	  approved	  by	  President	  Roosevelt	  [10].	  	  In	  this	  Act,	  the	  Division	  of	  Chemistry	  then	  to	  become	  the	  Bureau	  of	  Chemistry	  was	  charged	  to	  prohibit	  interstate	  transport	  of	  unlawful	  food	  and	  drugs	  without	  regulation	  of	  product	  labeling,	  especially	  on	  drugs.	  	  For	  foods,	  law	  prohibited	  addition	  of	  ingredients	  that	  substitute	  for	  food,	  conceal	  damage,	  pose	  health	  hazard,	  or	  constitute	  a	  filthy	  or	  decomposed	  substance.	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While	  a	  first	  national	  step	  in	  food	  and	  drug	  safety,	  the	  1906	  Act	  was	  limited	  in	  power	  but	  was	  replaced	  by	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  law	  in	  the	  1938	  Food,	  Drug,	  and	  Cosmetic	  Act.	  	  This	  Act	  was	  prompted	  by	  a	  mass-­‐poisoning	  incident.	  	  In	  1937,	  a	  Tennessee	  drug	  company	  marketed	  Elixir	  Sulfanilamide,	  a	  sweet	  raspberry	  tasting	  liquid	  form	  of	  the	  popular	  antibiotic	  sulfanilamide	  [11].	  	  The	  company	  used	  diethelyene	  glycol,	  to	  transform	  the	  normal	  powder	  drug	  into	  liquid	  form	  to	  meet	  market	  needs.	  	  Little	  did	  the	  company	  know	  that	  diethelyene	  glycol	  is	  a	  deadly	  poison,	  and	  normally	  used	  in	  antifreeze.	  	  At	  that	  time,	  there	  were	  no	  required	  toxicities	  testing,	  scientific	  literature	  review,	  or	  animal	  experiments,	  and	  selling	  potentially	  toxic	  drugs	  was	  technically	  legal.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  product	  safety	  conflicted	  with	  another	  constraint-­‐	  the	  desire	  for	  quick	  market	  placement.	  	  The	  company	  quickly	  sent	  shipments	  of	  240	  gallons	  of	  the	  toxic	  elixir	  across	  the	  U.S.	  [11].	  	  	  	  	  After	  a	  few	  unusual	  deaths,	  investigations	  linked	  the	  deaths	  to	  Elixir	  Sulfanilamide.	  	  Once	  its	  toxic	  effect	  was	  discovered,	  the	  FDA	  (evolved	  from	  the	  Bureau	  of	  Chemistry),	  through	  gallant	  efforts,	  recovered	  most	  of	  it.	  	  	  However,	  6	  gallons	  that	  could	  not	  be	  retrieved	  due	  to	  human	  consumption,	  lethally	  poisoned	  over	  100	  people,	  mainly	  children.	  	   	  After	  the	  incident,	  Dr.	  Samual	  Evans	  Massengill,	  the	  firm's	  owner,	  famously	  said	  [11]:	  	  	  
"My	  chemists	  and	  I	  deeply	  regret	  the	  fatal	  results,	  but	  there	  was	  no	  error	  in	  the	  
manufacture	  of	  the	  product.	  We	  have	  been	  supplying	  a	  legitimate	  professional	  
demand	  and	  not	  once	  could	  have	  foreseen	  the	  unlooked-­‐for	  results.	  I	  do	  not	  feel	  
that	  there	  was	  any	  responsibility	  on	  our	  part."	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
-­‐	  S.Massengill,	  Owner	  	  This	  brought	  massive	  public	  outcry,	  and	  Massengill	  eventually	  pleaded	  guilty	  to	  adulteration	  and	  misbranding	  and	  paid	  the	  largest	  fine	  at	  the	  time	  for	  violation	  of	  the	  1906	  Act	  [10].	  	  The	  FDA	  was	  able	  to	  react	  on	  the	  massive	  disaster	  due	  to	  a	  misbranding	  technicality.	  At	  the	  time,	  marketing	  a	  product	  as	  an	  Elixir	  implied	  an	  alcoholic	  solution.	  	  Since	  Elixir	  Sulfanilamide	  contained	  no	  alcohol,	  the	  FDA	  was	  able	  to	  impose	  legal	  authority	  and	  recover	  the	  lethal	  substance	  from	  the	  general	  public.	  This	  labeling	  technicality	  allowed	  the	  FDA	  to	  prevent	  countless	  more	  poisonings.	  	  The	  FDA	  Commissioner	  at	  the	  time	  Walter	  Campbell,	  indicated	  that	  this	  incident	  shows	  how	  essential	  it	  is	  to	  public	  welfare	  that	  the	  distribution	  of	  highly	  potent	  drugs	  should	  be	  controlled	  by	  an	  adequate	  Federal	  Food	  and	  Drug	  law	  
"These	  unfortunate	  occurrences	  may	  be	  expected	  to	  continue	  because	  new	  and	  
relatively	  untried	  drug	  preparations	  are	  being	  manufactured	  almost	  daily	  at	  
the	  whim	  of	  the	  individual	  manufacturer,	  and	  the	  damage	  to	  public	  health	  
cannot	  accurately	  be	  estimated.	  The	  only	  remedy	  for	  such	  a	  situation	  is	  the	  
enactment	  by	  Congress	  of	  an	  adequate	  and	  comprehensive	  national	  Food	  and	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Drugs	  Act	  which	  will	  require	  that	  all	  medicines	  placed	  upon	  the	  market	  shall	  be	  
safe	  to	  use	  under	  the	  directions	  for	  use.	  ...”	  	  
-­‐W.	  Campbell,	  FDA	  Commissioner	  Quickly	  after	  this	  accident,	  the	  1938	  Food,	  Drug,	  and	  Cosmetic	  Act	  was	  approved	  and	  gave	  US	  authority	  to	  oversee	  the	  safety	  of	  food,	  drugs	  and	  cosmetics	  [10].	  Further	  incidents	  gave	  the	  FDA	  power	  to	  access	  and	  verify	  practices	  of	  company	  production	  processes	  and	  quality	  control	  records.	  	  	  	  In	  another	  massive	  medical	  accident,	  the	  sedative	  Thalidomide	  produced	  thousands	  of	  birth	  defects	  in	  Europe	  in	  the	  1960’s	  [10].	  	  While	  this	  drug	  was	  not	  approved	  in	  the	  U.S,	  the	  incident	  led	  the	  initiative	  for	  the	  FDA	  to	  regulate	  efficacy	  as	  well	  as	  safety	  for	  U.S.	  bound	  drugs.	  	  In	  addition,	  further	  amendments	  transferred	  power	  from	  the	  Federal	  Trade	  Commission	  to	  the	  FDA	  for	  the	  regulation	  of	  prescription	  drug	  advertising	  and	  established	  good	  manufacturing	  practices	  guidelines	  for	  the	  drug	  industry.	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  1962	  Drug	  Amendment	  had	  laws	  preventing	  medical	  quackery,	  or	  fraudulent	  medical	  practices.	  	  In	  the	  early	  1970’s,	  there	  was	  another	  massive	  healthcare	  tragedy	  involving	  a	  medical	  device.	  The	  Dalkon	  Shield,	  an	  intrauterine	  device,	  caused	  uterus	  bacterial	  infection,	  which	  induced	  pelvic	  inflammatory	  disease	  in	  U.S.	  women	  [10][12].	  	  	  This	  caused	  thousands	  of	  pregnancy	  complications	  like	  ectopic	  pregnancies,	  infertility,	  birth	  deformations,	  and	  septic	  spontaneous	  abortions,	  let	  alone	  the	  severe	  lingering	  mental	  injury	  [13].	  	  The	  manufacturers	  of	  the	  Dalkon	  Shield	  knew	  there	  were	  safety	  concerns	  of	  the	  product	  and	  questionable	  clinical	  data,	  but	  like	  the	  Elixir	  Sulfanilamide	  case,	  the	  desire	  for	  market	  introduction	  conflicted	  and	  overrode	  any	  safe	  product	  development	  constraint	  [14].	  	  The	  subsequent	  1976	  Medical	  Device	  Amendment	  required	  testing	  and	  FDA	  approval	  of	  medical	  devices	  and	  established	  three	  classes	  of	  medical	  devices,	  each	  requiring	  a	  different	  regulation	  level	  for	  safety	  and	  effectiveness	  [10].	  	  	  Like	  previous	  medical	  regulation,	  it	  was	  catalyzed	  by	  massive	  accidents	  effecting	  thousands	  of	  patients.	  	  	  	  In	  summary,	  the	  history	  of	  the	  FDA	  and	  the	  evolution	  of	  its	  regulation	  of	  medical	  products	  have	  followed	  a	  consistent	  pattern.	  	  The	  agency	  and	  its	  control	  expanded	  in	  reaction	  to	  catastrophic	  accidents	  that	  have	  lead	  to	  unnecessary	  injuries	  and	  deaths.	  	  These	  accidents	  were	  the	  results	  of	  the	  innovative	  scientific	  and	  technological	  solutions	  and	  the	  needs	  for	  business	  profitability.	  	  Today,	  the	  modern	  medical	  technology	  continues	  to	  evolve.	  	  Therefore,	  the	  FDA	  regulation	  for	  safety	  will	  require	  continued	  improvements.	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2.2	  Current	  FDA	  Conditions	  	  In	  today’s	  regulatory	  structure,	  the	  FDA	  is	  under	  the	  Health	  and	  Human	  Services	  Department	  that	  is	  responsible	  for	  establishing	  safety	  regulations	  to	  protect	  the	  U.S.	  population.	  	  According	  to	  the	  official	  FDA	  website	  [15],	  the	  agency’s	  responsibilities	  include:	  	  
• Protecting	  the	  public	  health	  by	  assuring	  that	  foods	  are	  safe,	  wholesome,	  sanitary,	  and	  properly	  labeled;	  human	  and	  veterinary	  drugs,	  and	  vaccines	  and	  other	  biological	  products	  and	  medical	  devices	  intended	  for	  human	  use	  are	  safe	  and	  effective	  
• Protecting	  the	  public	  from	  electronic	  product	  radiation	  
• Assuring	  cosmetics	  and	  dietary	  supplements	  are	  safe	  and	  properly	  labeled	  
• Regulating	  tobacco	  products	  
• Advancing	  the	  public	  health	  by	  helping	  to	  speed	  product	  innovations	  
• Helping	  the	  public	  get	  the	  accurate	  science-­‐based	  information	  they	  need	  to	  use	  medicines,	  devices,	  and	  foods	  to	  improve	  their	  health.	  	  Therefore,	  the	  FDA	  is	  the	  regulatory	  body	  that	  establishes	  the	  safety	  requirements	  for	  medical	  device	  and	  diagnostic	  systems.	  	  According	  to	  the	  FDA	  website,	  over	  $1	  trillion	  worth	  of	  products	  are	  annually	  regulated	  [16].	  	  This	  broad	  and	  deep	  list	  of	  regulation	  responsibilities	  requires	  significant	  human	  resource,	  political	  and	  legal	  support,	  investment	  of	  time	  and	  coordination	  to	  enforce.	  	  	  As	  seen	  in	  the	  organizational	  chart	  in	  Figure	  1,	  the	  agency	  ‘s	  responsibilities	  cover	  areas	  including	  food,	  tobacco,	  and	  medical	  products	  [17].	  	  The	  current	  FDA	  Commissioner	  is	  Margaret	  Hamburg,	  MD	  as	  of	  May	  2009.	  	  
	   17	  
	  
Figure	  1.	  U.S.	  Food	  and	  Drug	  Administration	  Organization	  Chart	  [17]	  	  As	  seen	  in	  Figure	  1,	  under	  the	  overarching	  drug	  area,	  responsible	  areas	  expand	  to	  include	  four	  large	  areas	  of	  tobacco,	  biologics,	  drug,	  and	  medical	  and	  radiological	  devices.	  	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  thesis,	  the	  regulatory	  body	  for	  medical	  diagnostics	  is	  established	  under	  the	  Center	  for	  Devices	  and	  Radiological	  Health	  which	  is	  comprised	  of	  seven	  smaller	  offices	  (as	  seen	  in	  Figure	  2).	  	  The	  Office	  of	  In-­‐Vitro	  Diagnostic	  Device	  Evaluation	  and	  Safety	  (OIVD)	  is	  the	  regulatory	  area	  that	  regulates	  the	  safety	  and	  performance	  of	  the	  case	  study	  system	  in	  this	  thesis.	  	  The	  current	  Director	  is	  Jeffery	  E	  Shuren,	  M.D.,	  J.D	  as	  of	  January	  2010.	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Figure	  2.	  	  FDA	  Center	  for	  Devices	  and	  Radiological	  Health	  Organization	  Chart	  [17]	  	  	  
2.3	  	  U.S.	  FDA	  Regulations	  	  The	  U.S.	  Code	  of	  Federal	  Regulations	  (CFR)	  is	  the	  codification	  of	  general	  and	  permanent	  rules	  published	  annually	  by	  the	  departments	  and	  agencies	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Federal	  Government	  [18].	  	  These	  administrative	  laws,	  categorized	  amongst	  50	  titles,	  cover	  the	  broad	  areas	  of	  Federal	  Regulation	  and	  provide	  safety	  statutes	  for	  various	  agencies.	  The	  titles	  are	  further	  categorized	  into	  Chapters,	  SubChapters,	  and	  Parts.	  	  This	  is	  illustrated	  in	  Figure	  3	  and	  Table	  1	  below.	  	  Regulation	  is	  supervised	  and	  monitored	  by	  administrative	  governmental	  bodies	  such	  as	  the	  Federal	  Aviation	  Administration,	  Federal	  Transit	  Authority,	  and	  Food	  and	  Drug	  Administration.	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Figure	  3.	  	  U.S.	  Code	  of	  Federal	  Regulations	  As	  Figure	  3	  displays,	  Medical	  Devices	  regulations	  are	  categorized	  beneath	  several	  layers	  of	  the	  overarching	  CFR.	  	  Under	  SubChapter	  H:	  Medical	  Devices,	  the	  laws	  can	  be	  further	  decomposed	  into	  33	  distinct	  parts,	  ranging	  from	  Labeling	  requirements	  (Part	  801)	  to	  Quality	  System	  Regulation	  (Part	  820).	  	  This	  information	  is	  tabulated	  in	  Table	  1	  below.	  	  Every	  individual	  part	  can	  be	  further	  decomposed	  to	  subparts,	  but	  was	  omitted	  for	  brevity.	  	  For	  this	  thesis,	  referencing	  regulations	  will	  follow	  the	  general	  nomenclature	  of	  #Title	  CFR	  Part	  (subpart).	  	  For	  example	  for	  Quality	  System	  Regulation	  subpart	  “g”,	  it	  will	  be	  written	  as	  21	  CFR	  820(g).	  	  
Table	  1.	  	  Parts	  for	  SubChapter	  H:	  Medical	  Devices	  	  
SubChapter	  H:	  Medical	  Devices	  Parts	  Part	  800	  -­‐	  GENERAL	   Part	  866	  -­‐	  IMMUNOLOGY	  AND	  MICROBIOLOGY	  DEVICES	  Part	  801	  -­‐	  LABELING	   Part	  868	  -­‐	  ANESTHESIOLOGY	  DEVICES	  Part	  803	  -­‐	  MEDICAL	  DEVICE	  REPORTING	   Part	  870	  -­‐	  CARDIOVASCULAR	  DEVICES	  Part	  806	  -­‐	  MEDICAL	  DEVICES;	  REPORTS	  OF	  CORRECTIONS	  AND	  REMOVALS	   Part	  872	  -­‐	  DENTAL	  DEVICES	  Part	  807	  -­‐	  ESTABLISHMENT	  REGISTRATION	  AND	  DEVICE	  LISTING	  FOR	  MANUFACTURERS	  AND	  INITIAL	  IMPORTERS	  OF	  DEVICES	   Part	  874	  -­‐	  EAR,	  NOSE,	  AND	  THROAT	  DEVICES	  Part	  808	  -­‐	  EXEMPTIONS	  FROM	  FEDERAL	  PREEMPTION	  OF	  STATE	  AND	  LOCAL	  MEDICAL	  DEVICE	  REQUIREMENTS	   Part	  876	  -­‐	  GASTROENTEROLOGY-­‐UROLOGY	  DEVICES	  Part	  809	  -­‐	  IN	  VITRO	  DIAGNOSTIC	  PRODUCTS	  FOR	  HUMAN	  USE	   Part	  878	  -­‐	  GENERAL	  AND	  PLASTIC	  SURGERY	  DEVICES	  Part	  810	  -­‐	  MEDICAL	  DEVICE	  RECALL	  AUTHORITY	   Part	  880	  -­‐	  GENERAL	  HOSPITAL	  AND	  PERSONAL	  USE	  DEVICES	  Part	  812	  -­‐	  INVESTIGATIONAL	  DEVICE	  EXEMPTIONS	   Part	  882	  -­‐	  NEUROLOGICAL	  DEVICES	  Part	  814	  -­‐	  PREMARKET	  APPROVAL	  OF	  MEDICAL	  DEVICES	   Part	  884	  -­‐	  OBSTETRICAL	  AND	  GYNECOLOGICAL	  DEVICES	  Part	  820	  -­‐	  QUALITY	  SYSTEM	  REGULATION	   Part	  886	  -­‐	  OPHTHALMIC	  DEVICES	  Part	  821	  -­‐	  MEDICAL	  DEVICE	  TRACKING	  REQUIREMENTS	   Part	  888	  -­‐	  ORTHOPEDIC	  DEVICES	  Part	  822	  -­‐	  POSTMARKET	  SURVEILLANCE	   Part	  890	  -­‐	  PHYSICAL	  MEDICINE	  DEVICES	  Part	  860	  -­‐	  MEDICAL	  DEVICE	  CLASSIFICATION	  PROCEDURES	   Part	  892	  -­‐	  RADIOLOGY	  DEVICES	  Part	  861	  -­‐	  PROCEDURES	  FOR	  PERFORMANCE	  STANDARDS	  DEVELOPMENT	   Part	  895	  -­‐	  BANNED	  DEVICES	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Part	  862	  -­‐	  CLINICAL	  CHEMISTRY	  AND	  CLINICAL	  TOXICOLOGY	  DEVICES	   Part	  898	  -­‐	  PERFORMANCE	  STANDARD	  FOR	  ELECTRODE	  LEAD	  WIRES	  AND	  PATIENT	  CABLES	  Part	  864	  -­‐	  HEMATOLOGY	  AND	  PATHOLOGY	  DEVICES	   	  	  	  As	  Table	  1	  displays	  there	  are	  various	  categories	  of	  medical	  device	  laws.	  	  While	  all	  regulation	  statues	  are	  critical,	  the	  highlighted	  parts	  relates	  to	  new	  medical	  product	  approval	  process	  (Part	  807),	  and	  the	  safety	  designed	  into	  the	  system	  (Part	  820).	  	  These	  parts	  play	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  this	  thesis	  and	  will	  be	  further	  discussed.	  	  In	  order	  to	  establish	  the	  appropriate	  FDA	  regulatory	  requirements	  for	  U.S.	  market	  release,	  new	  In-­‐Vitro	  Diagnostic	  (IVD)	  product	  is	  classified	  into	  one	  of	  three	  categories	  as	  mandated	  in	  the	  1976	  Medical	  Device	  Amendments	  Act	  under	  21	  CFR	  860	  [19].	  	  The	  classification	  is	  dependent	  of	  the	  product’s	  complexity	  and	  risks	  to	  the	  patient.	  	  The	  higher	  the	  risk,	  the	  more	  stringent	  regulation	  is	  enforced	  on	  the	  device.	  	  These	  categories	  are:	  	  
• Class	  I	  -­‐	  General	  Controls:	  	  	  
o The	  least	  regulated	  medical	  products	  that	  have	  minimal	  potential	  harm	  for	  the	  user/patient.	  	  These	  products	  are	  normally	  simpler	  in	  design,	  and	  may	  follow	  General	  Controls.	  	  General	  Controls	  are	  basic	  regulations	  to	  ensure	  safety	  and	  effectiveness,	  which	  include	  Good	  Manufacturing	  Practices	  (GMP),	  labeling	  regulations,	  and	  enterprise	  registration,	  with	  some	  exemptions	  [19].	  
o Examples	  include	  bandages,	  gloves,	  and	  surgical	  instruments	  	  
• Class	  II	  -­‐	  General	  and	  Special	  Controls:	  	  	  
o Medical	  products	  that	  pose	  more	  safety	  risks	  that	  are	  not	  entirely	  covered	  in	  General	  Controls	  require	  additional	  Special	  Controls.	  	  Special	  Controls	  are	  existing	  methods	  to	  assure	  safety	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  a	  new	  device	  and	  include	  mandatory	  performance	  requirements,	  special	  labeling,	  and	  post-­‐market	  surveillance.	  	  A	  premarket	  notification	  510(k)	  is	  normally	  required	  under	  21	  CFR	  807,	  but	  there	  are	  some	  exemptions	  [19].	  	  
o Examples	  are	  powered	  wheelchairs,	  infusion	  pump,	  and	  infectious	  disease	  genotyping	  assays.	  	  
• Class	  III	  General	  Controls	  and	  Premarket	  Approval:	  	  	  
o This	  class	  requires	  the	  highest	  and	  most	  stringent	  safety	  regulations	  due	  to	  the	  high	  risk	  to	  patient	  safety,	  and	  requires	  premarket	  notification	  510(k)	  and/or	  premarket	  approval	  (PMA)	  under	  21	  CFR	  814.	  	  PMA	  includes	  a	  scientific	  review	  since	  there	  is	  normally	  insufficient	  predicate	  or	  equivalent	  data	  to	  assure	  safety	  and	  effectiveness	  [19].	  
o Examples	  are	  invasive	  pacemaker,	  breast	  implants,	  and	  automated	  external	  defibrillators.	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  There	  are	  many	  exemptions	  and	  overlaps	  of	  the	  various	  classes	  and	  is	  dependent	  on	  the	   inherent	  risk	  of	  medical	  device.	  Figure	  4	   illustrates	  some	  of	   these	   interactions,	  and	   offers	   an	   overall	   view	   of	   the	   FDA	   medical	   device	   classification	   and	   their	  pertinent	  regulations.	  	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  4.	  	  FDA	  Medical	  Device	  Classification	  
*Common	  cases	  are	  shown.	  Some	  exceptions	  may	  apply	  	  As	  Figure	  4	  shows,	  Class	  I	  General	  Controls	  include	  basic	  regulation	  guidelines	  such	  as	  registry	  listing,	  GMP	  and	  labeling	  requirements.	  	  Class	  II	  and	  Class	  III	  devices	  must	  also	  abide	  by	  these	  regulations,	  with	  some	  modification.	  	  For	  Class	  II,	  the	  majority	  of	  new	  products	  must	  submit	  a	  510(k)	  PreMarket	  Notification	  (21	  CFR	  807)	  to	  the	  FDA	  that	  adds	  additional	  rigorous	  testing	  criteria,	  in	  supplement	  to	  the	  general	  controls	  [19].	  Performance	  against	  acceptable	  standards	  is	  conducted.	  	  There	  are	  some	  Class	  II	  devices	  that	  are	  exempt	  from	  510(k)	  regulation.	  	  Some	  Class	  I	  devices	  may	  also	  be	  required	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  510(k)	  regulation.	  	  Class	  III	  is	  for	  medical	  products	  that	  sustain	  or	  support	  human	  life,	  have	  significant	  importance	  in	  preventing	  human	  harm	  or	  present	  potential	  unreasonable	  risk	  of	  injury	  or	  does	  not	  have	  a	  substantial	  approved	  equivalent	  [19].	  	  This	  is	  the	  most	  stringent	  regulation	  and	  requires	  a	  PMA.	  	  This	  includes	  extensive	  clinical	  trials,	  scientific	  review	  boards,	  and	  Investigational	  Device	  Exemption	  [20].	  	  In	  addition,	  there	  are	  class	  III	  devices	  that	  will	  need	  to	  also	  comply	  with	  the	  510(k)	  regulation.	  	  The	  system	  studied	  in	  this	  thesis	  is	  a	  Class	  II	  medical	  diagnostic	  device.	  	  Compliance	  with	  510(k)	  is	  required	  for	  U.S.	  market	  approval.	  	  More	  details	  of	  the	  device	  certification	  process	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  3.	  	  	  	  Since	  the	  Class	  II	  devices	  also	  need	  to	  meet	  performance	  standards,	  the	  1988	  Clinical	  Laboratory	  Improvement	  Amendment	  (CLIA	  88)	  establishes	  the	  analytical	  acceptable	  quality	  standards	  for	  clinical	  laboratory	  testing	  [21].	  	  	  These	  standards	  include	  the	  accuracy,	  reliability,	  and	  timeliness	  of	  results,	  and	  sets	  acceptable	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targets	  for	  total	  allowable	  error	  for	  specific	  assays	  and	  tests.	  	  As	  a	  part	  of	  510(k)	  submission,	  new	  diagnostic	  product	  must	  show	  equivalent	  or	  better	  analytical	  results	  when	  compared	  to	  CLIA	  88	  targets	  to	  be	  considered	  for	  U.S.	  market	  approval.	  	  This	  provides	  a	  level	  of	  quality	  analytical	  performance	  and	  safety	  regulation	  since	  these	  are	  the	  end	  value	  deliverable	  to	  the	  user.	  	  Some	  other	  quality	  clinical	  laboratory	  standards	  include	  German	  RiliBAK,	  but	  for	  the	  case	  study	  system,	  the	  CLIA	  88	  quality	  standards	  were	  used	  for	  analytical	  verification	  in	  supplement	  to	  the	  510(k)	  submission.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  quality	  analytical	  performance,	  FDA	  stipulates	  that	  for	  Class	  II	  or	  III	  medical	  products,	  manufacturers	  must	  establish	  and	  maintain	  procedures	  to	  control	  the	  design	  of	  the	  medical	  product	  [22].	  As	  part	  of	  the	  Design	  Control,	  a	  risk	  management	  plan	  of	  the	  medical	  diagnostic	  system	  must	  be	  conducted	  to	  comply	  with	  regulatory	  guidelines.	  	  	  This	  is	  specified	  in	  Section	  G:	  Design	  Validation	  820.30(g)	  (see	  Table	  1)	  of	  the	  FDA	  Design	  Control	  Guide	  for	  Medical	  Device	  Manufacturing	  [23],	  and	  it	  states	  that:	  	  
“Design	  validation	  shall	  include	  software	  and	  risk	  analysis,	  where	  appropriate”.	  
21	  CFR	  820.30(g)	  Revised	  as	  of	  April	  1,	  2011.	  	  This	  statement	  indicates	  that	  a	  risk	  analysis	  of	  the	  system	  is	  required,	  but	  leaves	  it	  up	  to	  the	  manufacturers	  to	  determine	  how	  the	  risk	  analysis	  should	  be	  performed.	  	  Based	  on	  the	  author’s	  professional	  experience	  in	  medical	  system	  development,	  the	  current	  practice	  is	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  Conformité	  Européenne	  (CE)	  Mark	  process	  of	  risk	  analysis	  that	  is	  established	  in	  the	  International	  Organization	  for	  Standards	  (ISO)	  14917.	  	  CE	  Mark	  is	  the	  European	  regulation	  equivalent	  of	  the	  U.S.	  FDA,	  and	  all	  new	  medical	  products	  must	  approved	  for	  safety	  requirements	  for	  European	  market	  introduction	  [24].	  	  Therefore	  with	  the	  understanding	  that	  if	  a	  new	  medical	  product	  is	  approved	  for	  CE	  Marking,	  the	  FDA	  will	  generally	  accept	  this	  risk	  analysis	  for	  a	  510(k)	  submission.	  	  In	  a	  recent	  June	  22,	  2011	  FDA	  Draft	  on	  Applying	  Human	  Factors	  (HFE)	  and	  Usability	  Engineering	  (UE)	  to	  Optimize	  Medical	  Device	  Design,	  risk	  management	  processes	  consistent	  with	  ISO	  14971	  is	  essential	  for	  a	  successful	  HFE/UE	  analysis	  [25],	  and	  supports	  the	  author’s	  professional	  experience	  and	  current	  industry	  practice.	  	  	  For	  CE	  Mark	  approval,	  recommended	  risk	  analysis	  techniques	  are	  documented	  under	  ISO	  14971:	  Medical	  devices	  –	  Application	  of	  risk	  management	  to	  medical	  
devices	  [8].	  	  The	  document	  states	  that	  the	  intent	  of	  the	  risk	  analysis	  is	  to	  analyze	  every	  step	  for	  the	  chain	  of	  events,	  which	  may	  require	  several	  risk	  analysis	  techniques	  to	  be	  used	  concurrently	  as	  some	  have	  complementary	  features.	  	  These	  techniques	  are:	  	  
• Preliminary	  Hazard	  Analysis	  (PHA)	  
• Fault	  Tree	  Analysis	  (FTA)	  
• Failure	  Mode	  and	  Effects	  Analysis	  (FMEA)	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• Failure	  Mode,	  Effects,	  and	  Criticality	  Analysis	  (FMECA)	  
• Hazard	  and	  Operability	  Study	  (HAZOP)	  
• Hazard	  Analysis	  and	  Critical	  Control	  Points	  (HACCP)	  	  	  
2.4	  Current	  Industry	  Risk	  Management	  Analysis	  Techniques	  	  A	  brief	  overview	  and	  critique	  of	  each	  risk	  technique	  is	  presented	  next.	  
2.4.1	  Preliminary	  Hazard	  Analysis	  (PHA)	  	  The	  preliminary	  hazard	  analysis	  (PHA)	  is	  an	  inductive,	  or	  top	  down,	  hazard	  analysis	  method	  that	  evaluates	  a	  design	  at	  an	  early	  stage.	  	  PHA	  is	  performed	  to	  identify	  hazards,	  associated	  causal	  factors,	  effects,	  level	  of	  risk,	  and	  potential	  mitigations	  measures	  based	  upon	  preliminary	  design	  information	  [26].	  	  The	  only	  basic	  information	  needed	  for	  PHA	  is	  the	  system	  design	  that	  includes	  the	  functional	  flow	  diagram,	  reliability	  block	  diagram,	  critical	  components	  list,	  and	  the	  preliminary	  hazard	  list	  (PHL).	  	  The	  basic	  process	  is	  to	  review	  this	  information	  of	  system	  hardware,	  software,	  functions,	  energy	  source,	  and	  material	  and	  chemical	  compatibility	  and	  identify	  new	  hazards	  with	  a	  linear,	  chain	  of	  events	  approach.	  	  A	  worksheet	  can	  be	  constructed	  to	  document	  PHA	  process	  and	  results,	  and	  below	  is	  an	  example	  used	  in	  military	  systems	  [26].	  	  	  




No.	   Hazard	   Causes	   Effects	   Mode	   IMRI*	   Recommended	  
Action	  
FMRI**	   Comments	   Status	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
*Initial	  Mishap	  Risk	  Index	  (IMRI):	  	  Initial	  accident	  risk	  significance	  with	  probability	  and	  severity	  
estimates	  before	  mitigation	  is	  implemented.	  
*Final	  Mishap	  Risk	  Index	  (FMRI)	  =	  Final	  accident	  risk	  significance	  with	  probability	  and	  severity	  
estimates	  after	  mitigation	  is	  implemented.	  
Figure	  5.	  	  Preliminary	  Hazard	  Analysis	  Worksheet	  Example	  As	  Figure	  5	  illustrates,	  for	  every	  hazard,	  a	  cause,	  effect,	  and	  recommended	  mitigation	  is	  generated.	  	  The	  IMRI	  (defined	  above)	  qualitatively	  measures	  the	  initial	  significance	  of	  the	  risk	  with	  a	  severity	  and	  probability	  determined.	  	  The	  FMRI	  (defined	  above)	  then	  re-­‐measures	  the	  risk	  after	  the	  recommended	  mitigation	  is	  implemented.	  	  The	  process	  is	  continued	  until	  all	  items	  in	  the	  PHL	  have	  been	  covered.	  	  The	  strength	  of	  PHA	  is	  its	  ability	  for	  early	  design	  stage	  analysis,	  and	  identify	  previously	  unrecognized	  hazards	  early	  in	  the	  system	  development.	  	  The	  development	  team	  can	  then	  establish	  guidelines,	  specifications,	  and	  criteria	  to	  be	  followed	  in	  system	  requirements	  and/	  or	  design	  based	  off	  these	  initial	  findings	  [27].	  	  The	  intent	  is	  to	  find	  hazards	  early	  so	  can	  alter	  design	  with	  minimal	  resource	  and	  cost	  impact.	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  One	  clear	  disadvantage	  is	  with	  the	  minimal	  design	  information,	  only	  a	  limited	  hazard	  analysis	  can	  be	  produced.	  	  Without	  lower	  level	  data	  (such	  as	  sub-­‐system	  components,	  functionality),	  a	  comprehensive	  hazard	  analysis	  cannot	  be	  achieved.	  	  Another	  observation	  is	  that	  this	  linear	  methodology	  applies	  a	  reductionist	  view	  where	  a	  single	  failure	  is	  used	  to	  cause	  the	  accident.	  	  The	  worksheet	  is	  even	  structured	  to	  promote	  the	  chain	  of	  events	  model.	  	  As	  stated	  by	  Leveson,	  accidents	  can	  be	  caused	  by	  multiple	  failures,	  and	  therefore	  PHA	  may	  not	  identify	  all	  hazards	  [27].	  	  Additionally,	  the	  worksheet	  above	  does	  not	  provide	  guidance	  on	  how	  to	  find	  the	  causes.	  	  It	  is	  merely	  a	  documentation	  step	  that	  records	  the	  results	  of	  the	  exercise	  of	  the	  system	  analyst.	  	  
2.4.2	  Fault	  Tree	  Analysis	  (FTA)	  	  Fault	  Tree	  Analysis	  (FTA)	  is	  an	  analytical	  and	  graphical	  methodology	  that	  allows	  an	  accident	  or	  undesired	  state	  of	  the	  system	  to	  be	  deductively	  decomposed	  to	  all	  credible	  ways	  that	  the	  undesired	  event	  can	  occur	  [28].	  	  This	  International	  Electrotechnical	  Commission	  (IEC)	  standard	  61025	  is	  a	  reliability	  analysis	  that	  can	  include	  the	  context	  of	  the	  system	  environment,	  operation,	  human	  interaction,	  and	  many	  other	  factors.	  	  There	  are	  two	  applications	  of	  FTA	  with	  the	  most	  common	  being	  a	  proactive	  FTA	  used	  during	  system	  development	  [26].	  	  	  The	  alternative	  is	  after	  an	  accident	  occurs,	  a	  reactive	  FTA	  may	  be	  performed	  to	  illustrate	  the	  leading	  corresponding	  events.	  	  While	  the	  both	  approaches	  use	  the	  same	  methodology,	  only	  the	  reactive	  version	  can	  use	  the	  evidence	  and	  data	  from	  the	  accident	  itself.	  	  	  	  As	  Leveson	  summarizes,	  there	  are	  four	  basics	  components	  of	  FTA:	  	  1)	  System	  Definition,	  2)	  Fault	  Tree	  construction,	  3)	  Qualitative	  Analysis	  and	  4)	  Quantitative	  Analysis	  [27].	  	  Defining	  the	  system	  and	  the	  related	  events,	  conditions,	  and	  their	  interconnections	  is	  first	  needed	  to	  establish	  key	  nodes	  of	  the	  fault	  tree.	  	  Once	  this	  has	  been	  completed,	  a	  fault	  tree	  can	  be	  generated	  using	  the	  system	  definition.	  	  The	  resulting	  fault	  tree	  then	  depicts	  the	  logical	  interactions	  that	  lead	  to	  the	  accident,	  which	  is	  established	  at	  the	  beginning	  top	  node.	  	  A	  basic	  example	  of	  an	  FTA	  was	  generated	  in	  Figure	  6	  using	  the	  standards	  from	  the	  National	  Regulatory	  Commission	  Fault	  Tree	  Handbook	  with	  the	  undesired	  event	  connected	  to	  the	  subsequent	  interactions.	  
	   25	  
	  
Figure	  6.	  	  Fault	  Tree	  Analysis	  Example	  	  As	  seen	  in	  the	  Figure	  6	  example,	  there	  are	  several	  conditions	  that	  were	  needed	  to	  result	  in	  an	  undesired	  event.	  	  Starting	  at	  the	  top	  of	  the	  fault	  tree,	  there	  are	  three	  conditions	  that	  could	  lead	  to	  this	  undesired,	  and	  due	  to	  the	  OR	  gate,	  only	  one	  was	  necessary	  to	  cause	  the	  accident.	  With	  the	  leftmost	  AND	  gate,	  both	  Event	  A	  and	  B	  had	  to	  occur	  in	  order	  to	  potential	  cause	  the	  fault.	  	  In	  the	  center	  OR	  Gate,	  either	  Event	  C	  or	  D	  needed	  to	  happen	  to	  produce	  the	  undesired	  result.	  	  For	  the	  rightmost	  AND	  gate,	  all	  three	  events	  (E,	  F,	  G)	  had	  to	  present	  itself	  to	  catalyze	  the	  higher	  system	  failure.	  	  This	  is	  a	  basic	  example,	  and	  there	  are	  more	  complex	  and	  conditional	  elements	  to	  the	  FTA	  available	  in	  literature	  for	  a	  more	  detailed	  and	  accurate	  analysis.	  	  After	  completion	  of	  the	  fault	  tree,	  both	  a	  qualitative	  and	  quantitative	  analysis	  can	  be	  performed.	  	  The	  qualitative	  analysis	  requires	  defining	  “cut	  set”	  which	  is	  a	  set	  of	  events	  that	  caused	  the	  final	  undesirable	  event	  [26].	  	  This	  is	  similar	  to	  what	  was	  previously	  discussed	  above.	  	  The	  goal	  is	  to	  determine	  the	  minimal	  cut	  sets	  that	  are	  the	  critical	  path	  to	  accident	  [27].	  	  Once	  this	  has	  completed,	  the	  probabilities	  for	  each	  cut	  sets	  can	  be	  aggregately	  calculate	  to	  determine	  the	  final	  probability	  of	  the	  fault	  event,	  assuming	  all	  preceding	  events	  are	  statistically	  independent	  [28].	  	  	  	  Thus,	  some	  advantages	  that	  FTA	  provides	  are	  that	  all	  events	  leading	  up	  to	  an	  accident,	  and	  their	  interrelationships	  are	  illustrated	  in	  a	  graphical	  model	  for	  qualitative	  cause	  and	  effect	  assessment.	  	  Using	  event	  probabilities,	  a	  quantitative	  analysis	  of	  the	  probability	  of	  the	  accident	  can	  then	  be	  determined	  and	  used	  to	  predict	  reliability	  failure	  rates	  such	  as	  mean	  time	  between	  failures	  (MBTF).	  	  This	  in	  turn	  can	  be	  used	  for	  risk	  and	  design	  assessment,	  root	  cause	  analysis,	  and	  a	  decision	  making	  tool.	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One	  disadvantage	  associated	  to	  FTA	  quantitative	  analysis	  is	  that	  it	  takes	  a	  reliability	  engineering	  approach.	  	  The	  calculation	  of	  top-­‐level	  event	  failure	  probability	  is	  based	  on	  the	  lower	  leaf	  nodes’	  random	  failure	  probability.	  	  Complex	  systems	  fail	  due	  to	  both	  component	  random	  failures	  and	  undesirable	  component	  interactions.	  	  Merely	  focusing	  on	  component	  reliability	  does	  not	  ensure	  safety	  [7],	  and	  accidents	  can	  still	  occur.	  	  The	  Mars	  Polar	  Lander	  system	  that	  failed	  its	  landing	  on	  the	  Mars	  surface	  in	  1999	  is	  a	  clear	  example	  that	  highly	  reliable	  systems	  are	  unsafe	  [27].	  	  	  Furthermore,	  it	  may	  be	  difficult	  to	  analyze	  the	  timing	  model	  with	  FTA,	  as	  specific	  sequence	  of	  events	  can	  lead	  to	  hazards.	  	  	  Therefore,	  the	  structure	  of	  FTA	  is	  limited	  in	  analyzing	  and	  identifying	  all	  hazards.	  	  
2.4.3	  Failure	  Mode	  and	  Effects	  Analysis	  (FMEA)	  	  Failure	  Mode	  and	  Effects	  Analysis	  (FMEA),	  another	  IEC	  standard	  (60812),	  is	  an	  inductive	  or	  bottom	  up	  risk	  analysis	  approach	  that	  can	  be	  performed	  on	  a	  detailed	  system	  design.	  	  The	  intent	  is	  to	  identify	  all	  individual	  potential	  failure	  modes	  of	  the	  system,	  subsystems,	  assemblies,	  or	  components	  and	  its	  subsequent	  effect	  on	  system	  performance	  and	  reliability	  [29].	  	  	  Functional-­‐type	  FMEA	  can	  also	  be	  used	  to	  abstractly	  analyze	  failure	  modes	  based	  on	  the	  functional	  adverse	  states	  [26].	  This	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  non-­‐hardware	  areas,	  such	  as	  software	  and	  analyzed	  at	  the	  software	  functional	  level.	  	  	  	  The	  FMEA	  process	  is	  normally	  performed	  during	  the	  development	  phase	  when	  there	  is	  sufficient	  information	  of	  the	  design	  so	  findings	  can	  influence	  its	  development	  for	  product	  and	  process	  improvements	  in	  the	  early	  stages	  [30].	  	  	  Similar	  to	  FTA,	  FMEA	  has	  the	  capability	  to	  include	  reliability	  rates	  for	  every	  failure	  mode	  to	  provide	  a	  quantitative	  analysis	  [26].	  	  Failure	  Mode	  Effects	  and	  Criticality	  Analysis	  (FMECA)	  is	  a	  richer	  alternative	  to	  FMEA,	  by	  also	  incorporating	  a	  critical	  analysis	  (CA)	  by	  defining	  the	  criticality	  and	  detectability	  of	  the	  failure	  mode	  [26].	  	  Some	  basic	  definitions	  necessary	  for	  clarification:	  
• Failure:	  	  Unintended	  operation,	  function	  or	  behavior	  of	  a	  specific	  item	  [26]	  
• Failure	  Mode:	  	  The	  manner	  the	  failure	  occurs	  [29]	  
• Failure	  Effect:	  	  Consequences	  a	  failure	  mode	  has	  on	  system	  functionality,	  operation,	  	  or	  status	  [26]	  
• Risk	  Priority	  Number	  (RPN):	  	  Risk	  ranking	  index	  for	  reliability	  and	  is	  mathematically	  defined	  as	  [26]:	  	   𝑅𝑃𝑁 = 𝑆𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦  ×  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦  𝑜𝑓  𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒  ×  𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔	  	  The	  overall	  methodology	  to	  FMEA	  is	  to	  analyze	  every	  component	  (hardware,	  software)	  or	  functional	  single	  failure	  mode,	  and	  determine	  the	  effect	  on	  the	  higher	  system’s	  reliability	  [26].	  	  This	  is	  where	  detailed	  information	  like	  design	  specifications,	  software	  code,	  and	  schematics	  play	  a	  major	  factor	  since	  analysts	  can	  identify,	  and	  evaluate	  in	  depth	  all	  conceivable	  single	  points	  of	  failure.	  	  The	  output	  of	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this	  analysis	  is	  identified	  failure	  modes,	  system	  effects,	  and	  quantitative	  forecast	  on	  hazards	  and	  risks	  forecasts.	  	  The	  effort	  to	  produce	  a	  comprehensive	  FMEA	  may	  be	  substantial	  based	  on	  the	  product’s	  complexity.	  	  Similar	  to	  PHA,	  a	  worksheet	  is	  generally	  utilized	  to	  provide	  the	  analysis	  structure,	  consistency	  and	  documentation	  [26].	  	  A	  basic	  FMEA	  example	  by	  Ericson	  is	  shown	  below	  in	  Figure	  7	  below.	  	   Failure	  Mode	  and	  Effects	  Analysis	  Component	   Failure	  Mode	   Failure	  Rate	   Causal	  Factors	  Effect	   Immediate	  Effect	   System	  Effect	   RPN	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Figure	  7.	  	  Failure	  Mode	  and	  Effects	  Analysis	  Example	  Worksheet	  	  As	  Figure	  7	  shows,	  it	  captures	  the	  failure	  mode,	  its	  consequences	  (immediate	  and	  system	  effect),	  the	  frequency,	  and	  the	  calculated	  RPN	  value.	  	  The	  RPN	  is	  a	  quantitative	  analysis	  of	  the	  risk	  of	  the	  identified	  hazard	  in	  terms	  of	  severity	  and	  probability	  [26].	  	  As	  mentioned	  earlier,	  there	  are	  adaptions	  to	  FMEA	  such	  as	  FMECA.	  	  	  From	  various	  literature	  research	  and	  supported	  by	  past	  professional	  experience,	  the	  usage	  of	  FMECA	  is	  industry	  standard	  practices	  in	  analyzing	  risks	  in	  new	  medical	  product	  developments.	  	  In	  Figure	  8,	  an	  example	  of	  a	  system	  safety	  FMEA	  worksheet	  is	  provided	  below.	  	  	  	  	  
Failure	  Mode	  and	  Effects	  Analysis	   	  
System:	   SubSystem:	   State:	   	  














Hazard	   Risk	   Mitigation	  
Action	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Figure	  8.	  	  FMEA	  of	  Systems	  Safety	  Example	  Worksheet	  	  While	  FMEA	  is	  useful	  in	  the	  design	  development	  phase	  (also	  known	  as	  dFMEA),	  it	  is	  also	  applicable	  in	  the	  manufacturing	  and	  assembling	  process	  and	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  Process	  FMEA	  or	  pFMEA	  [8].	  	  pFMEA	  similarly	  analyzes	  the	  how	  the	  process	  methods	  affect	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  system	  as	  do	  the	  design	  [26].	  	  	  From	  professional	  experiences,	  this	  is	  a	  common	  tool	  used	  in	  Six	  Sigma	  process,	  and	  generally	  occurs	  in	  the	  Analyze	  phase	  of	  the	  DMAIC	  (Define,	  Measure,	  Analyze,	  Improve,	  Control)	  approach.	  	  	  	  A	  major	  observation	  is	  that	  FMEA	  only	  analyzes	  a	  single	  point	  of	  failure	  and	  not	  multiple	  failure	  combinations	  [27].	  	  As	  mentioned	  earlier	  by	  Leveson,	  hazards	  can	  be	  the	  result	  of	  many	  failures	  and	  events	  other	  than	  failure	  mode.	  	  Furthermore,	  FMEA	  assumes	  systems	  fail	  due	  to	  component	  failure,	  but	  accidents	  can	  still	  occur	  while	  all	  components	  did	  not	  fail	  performing	  the	  designed	  intentions	  (i.e.	  Mars	  Polar	  Lander	  incident)	  [27].	  	  	  Similarly	  to	  FTA	  technique,	  the	  reliability	  aspect	  of	  this	  methodology	  may	  be	  limited	  in	  discovering	  hazards	  in	  a	  system.	  	  	  As	  medical	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technology	  evolves	  and	  becomes	  more	  complex	  and	  integrated	  with	  other	  systems,	  the	  application	  of	  FMEA/FMECA	  may	  not	  identify	  some	  of	  the	  system	  interaction	  hazards.	  	  
2.4.4	  Hazard	  and	  Operability	  Study	  (HAZOP)	  	  Hazard	  and	  Operability	  Study	  (HAZOP)	  is	  a	  risk	  methodology	  that	  assumes	  accidents	  are	  caused	  by	  deviations	  from	  design	  or	  operating	  intentions	  [8].	  This	  IEC	  61882	  method	  provides	  a	  structured	  technique	  for	  identifying	  and	  analyzing	  hazards	  and	  operation	  concerns	  of	  a	  system	  [27].	  	  This	  analysis	  can	  be	  used	  at	  various	  levels	  from	  system	  to	  components,	  and	  from	  the	  abstracted	  conceptual	  design	  phase	  to	  the	  actual	  detailed	  design	  phase.	  	  The	  methodology	  requires	  the	  selection	  of	  the	  expert	  HAZOP	  team	  leader	  and	  multidisciplinary	  team	  that	  uses	  key	  or	  guide	  words	  and	  compares	  it	  to	  a	  list	  of	  system	  parameters	  [26].	  	  This	  can	  be	  illustrated	  as:	  	   Guide	  Word	  +	  Parameter	  =	  Deviation	  	  Parameters	  can	  be	  the	  design	  features	  or	  intents	  between	  various	  components	  such	  as	  temperature,	  vibration,	  or	  software	  data	  flow.	  	  Some	  Guide	  Words,	  provided	  by	  Leveson,	  are	  captured	  below	  along	  with	  an	  example	  using	  fluid	  flow	  as	  a	  parameter.	  	  
Table	  2.	  	  HAZOP	  Guide	  Words	  
Guide	  Words	   Meaning	   Example	  No,	  Not,	  None	   Intended	  result	  does	  not	  happen.	   No	  fluid	  flow.	  More	   Increase	  in	  design	  intent	  occurs.	   Increase	  in	  fluid	  flow.	  Less	   Decrease	  in	  design	  intent	  occurs.	   Decrease	  in	  fluid	  flow.	  As	  Well	  As	   An	  additional	  activity	  occurs	  with	  original	  design	  intent.	   Fluid	  flow	  plus	  Pressure.	  Part	  of	   Only	  some	  of	  design	  intent	  is	  achieved.	   Partial	  fluid	  flow.	  Reverse	   The	  opposite	  design	  intent	  occurs.	   Reverse	  fluid	  flow.	  Other	  than	   Design	  intent	  not	  achieved,	  and	  subsequent	  results	  are	  different	  than	  expected.	   Fluid	  flow	  in	  unexpected	  areas.	  	  The	  team	  then	  brainstorms	  possible	  deviations	  from	  the	  design	  intent	  and	  subsequent	  hazards	  using	  this	  basic	  process.	  	  There	  are	  possible	  combinations	  of	  the	  Guide	  Word	  and	  Parameter	  that	  are	  meaningless,	  and	  should	  be	  discarded.	  For	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documentation,	  a	  constructed	  worksheet	  with	  the	  parameter,	  guideword,	  and	  identified	  hazard	  and	  risk	  is	  generally	  used,	  and	  an	  example	  is	  provided	  below	  from	  Ericson	  in	  Figure	  9	  below.	  	  These	  generated	  results	  can	  then	  be	  used	  to	  implement	  mitigation	  recommendations	  for	  each	  identified	  hazard.	  	  	  	   HAZOP	  Analysis	  No	   Item	   Function	   Parameter	   Guide	  Word	   Consequence	   Cause	   Hazard	   Risk	   Mitigation	   Comments	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Figure	  9.	  	  Hazard	  and	  Operability	  Analysis	  (HAZOP)	  Worksheet	  Example	  	  Similar	  to	  FMEA,	  an	  observation	  made	  was	  that	  this	  risk	  analysis	  performs	  only	  single	  failure	  events.	  	  Multiple	  failure	  events	  are	  not	  analyzed,	  and	  this	  maybe	  a	  constraint	  for	  HAZOP	  utilization	  in	  complex	  systems.	  	  This	  linear	  causal	  chain	  of	  events	  is	  limited	  in	  identifying	  all	  hazards	  in	  the	  system.	  	  
2.4.5	  Hazard	  Analysis	  and	  Critical	  Control	  Points	  (HACCP)	  
	  Hazard	  Analysis	  and	  Critical	  Control	  Points	  (HACCP)	  is	  the	  universally	  accepted	  safety	  assurance	  method	  used	  primarily	  in	  the	  food	  industry	  [43].	  	  	  It	  is	  a	  systematic	  approach	  to	  the	  identification,	  assessment,	  and	  control	  of	  hazards	  during	  the	  process	  and	  preparation	  of	  food.	  Food	  safety	  is	  addressed	  through	  the	  analysis	  and	  control	  of	  biological,	  chemical,	  and	  physical	  hazards	  from	  raw	  material	  production,	  procurement	  and	  handling,	  to	  manufacturing,	  distribution	  and	  consumption	  of	  the	  finished	  product	  [31].	  	  This	  preventative	  method	  is	  designed	  to	  integrate	  food	  safety	  control	  in	  to	  the	  development	  process,	  and	  has	  shown	  more	  effective	  than	  end	  product	  testing.	  	  The	  HACCP	  methodology	  follows	  seven	  basic	  principles	  [31]	  	  
• Principle	  1:	  	  Conduct	  a	  hazard	  analysis	  
• Identify	  significant	  hazards	  that	  are	  likely	  to	  cause	  injury	  or	  illness.	  	  
• Generation	  and	  analysis	  of	  entire	  process	  flow	  diagram	  including	  raw	  materials,	  process	  steps,	  storage,	  distribution,	  and	  final	  preparation	  by	  the	  consumer	  are	  considered	  	  
• Principle	  2:	  	  Determine	  critical	  control	  points	  (CCP)	  
• Identify	  control	  points	  that	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  prevent	  or	  mitigate	  the	  safety	  hazard	  at	  any	  step	  along	  the	  process	  flow	  diagram.	  
• Example	  is	  cooking	  time	  and	  temperature	  of	  raw	  meat	  	  
• Principle	  3:	  	  Establish	  critical	  limits	  
• To	  distinguish	  between	  safe	  and	  unsafe	  conditions,	  critical	  limits	  need	  to	  be	  established	  throughout	  the	  process	  to	  control	  biological,	  chemical,	  and	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or	  physical	  parameters	  in	  order	  to	  prevent,	  or	  mitigate	  potential	  safety	  hazards.	  	  
• Principle	  4:	  	  Establish	  monitoring	  procedures	  
• To	  verify	  effectiveness	  of	  critical	  control	  points,	  monitor	  procedures	  are	  established	  throughout	  the	  process	  for	  each	  CCP.	  
• Monitoring	  examples	  could	  be	  real	  time	  observations,	  and	  or	  quick	  measurements.	  	  
• Principle	  5:	  	  Establish	  corrective	  actions	  
• For	  any	  deviation	  from	  the	  critical	  limits,	  a	  corrective	  action	  needs	  to	  be	  developed	  and	  implemented.	  
• Documentation	  of	  all	  deviations	  and	  subsequent	  corrective	  action	  is	  required.	  	  
• Principle	  6:	  	  Establish	  verification	  procedures	  
• Evaluating	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  overall	  HACCP	  is	  required	  to	  verify	  its	  scientific	  soundness,	  and	  determine	  hazards	  are	  effectively	  controlled.	  
• Performed	  by	  an	  independent	  authority	  or	  third	  party.	  	  
• Principle	  7:	  	  Establish	  record-­‐keeping	  and	  documentation	  procedures	  
• Documentation	  of	  the	  HACCP	  plan,	  critical	  limits,	  corrective	  actions,	  and	  verification	  procedures	  is	  required.	  
• This	  can	  be	  captured	  in	  a	  specialized	  worksheet	  as	  depicted	  in	  Figure	  10	  below	  	   Hazard	  Analysis	  and	  Critical	  Control	  Points	  CCP	   Hazards	   Critical	  Limits	   Monitoring	   Corrective	  Actions	   Verification	   Records	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Figure	  10.	  HACCP	  Worksheet	  Example	  	  As	  mentioned	  earlier,	  HACCP	  is	  predominantly	  used	  in	  the	  food	  industry	  to	  prevent	  contaminated	  food	  to	  reach	  the	  population	  for	  consumption.	  	  During	  the	  thesis	  literature	  review,	  there	  are	  a	  few	  examples	  of	  applications	  of	  HACCP	  outside	  of	  the	  food	  industry,	  but	  those	  found	  are	  applied	  to	  the	  pharmaceutical	  industries	  in	  the	  preparation	  of	  drug	  preparation	  [32][33].	  	  According	  to	  a	  2003	  WHO	  report,	  HACCP	  was	  mentioned	  as	  a	  complementary,	  but	  not	  a	  replacement	  technique	  for	  Good	  Manufacturing	  Practices	  (GMP).	  	  It	  is	  uncertain	  at	  this	  time,	  its	  applicability	  and	  effectiveness	  in	  medical	  diagnostic	  system	  safety	  due	  HACCP	  limitation	  to	  biological,	  chemical,	  and	  physical	  analysis	  constraints.	  	  Another	  observation	  is	  that	  this	  method	  is	  focused	  on	  the	  processes	  of	  the	  system	  only.	  	  This	  may	  be	  an	  additional	  constraint	  of	  the	  technique	  that	  limits	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  identifying	  hazards	  in	  the	  design	  stage.	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2.4.6	  Current	  Industry	  Risk	  Management	  and	  	  Analysis	  Summary	  	  In	  summary,	  there	  are	  several	  techniques	  available	  for	  medical	  diagnostic	  risk	  analysis	  as	  indicated	  by	  ISO	  14971.	  	  While	  somewhat	  effective	  and	  government	  approved,	  the	  FMEA,	  and	  HAZOP	  methods	  take	  a	  reductionist	  perspective	  on	  safety.	  	  This	  approach	  assumes	  system	  accident	  is	  the	  result	  of	  a	  linear	  chain	  of	  events	  from	  a	  singular	  independent	  random	  component	  failure.	  	  These	  methods	  cannot	  identify	  hazards	  when	  the	  system	  safety	  is	  compromised	  without	  any	  component	  failure.	  	  	  	  	  Furthermore,	  FMEA	  and	  FTA	  assume	  that	  safety	  is	  a	  reliability	  issue,	  but	  reliability	  is	  focused	  on	  failures	  and	  failure	  rate	  reduction	  [27].	  	  Increasing	  reliability	  does	  not	  necessarily	  increase	  safety.	  	  	  Safety	  is	  an	  emergent	  property	  of	  systems	  and	  is	  defined	  as	  an	  absence	  of	  accidents.	  	  While	  there	  are	  overlaps	  of	  safety	  and	  reliability,	  accidents	  can	  happen	  without	  any	  components	  ever	  failing.	  	  Conversely,	  components	  can	  fail	  without	  resulting	  in	  an	  accident	  [27].	  	  	  Therefore,	  there	  is	  a	  need	  for	  a	  new	  approach	  to	  safety	  design	  in	  complex	  systems.	  	  Leveson	  developed	  a	  new	  approach	  based	  on	  System	  Theoretical	  Accident	  Model	  and	  Process	  (STAMP).	  	  The	  following	  section	  will	  describe	  this	  methodology	  in	  detail.	  	  
2.5	  Systems	  Theoretic	  Accident	  Model	  and	  Process	  (STAMP)	  	  The	  Systems	  Theoretic	  Accident	  Model	  and	  Process	  (STAMP)	  is	  a	  systems	  approach	  to	  safety.	  	  The	  STAMP	  model	  treats	  safety	  as	  a	  controls	  problem	  and	  views	  systems	  as	  dynamic	  rather	  than	  static	  entities	  [7].	  It	  examines	  the	  hierarchical	  control	  structure,	  and	  monitors	  how	  the	  contextual	  control	  structures	  interact	  to	  maintain	  a	  safe	  state	  and/or	  the	  migration	  to	  unsafe	  states.	  	  Unlike	  the	  previous	  risk	  analysis	  techniques,	  STAMP	  is	  applicable	  to	  complex	  socio-­‐technological	  systems.	  	  The	  technique	  has	  the	  capability	  of	  analyzing	  not	  only	  the	  technical	  risks,	  but	  risks	  associated	  to	  organizational,	  social,	  and	  environmental	  factors.	  	  	  This	  incorporates	  the	  “systems	  thinking”	  mindset	  in	  risk	  analysis.	  	  	  	  As	  mentioned	  previously,	  safety	  is	  an	  emergent	  property	  of	  systems	  from	  the	  interactions	  of	  the	  system	  components.	  	  	  These	  components	  necessitate	  control,	  which	  can	  be	  achieved	  by	  applying	  constraints.	  	  Therefore	  safety	  is	  a	  control	  problem,	  not	  simply	  a	  reliability	  issue.	  	  The	  inadequate	  control	  or	  misapplication	  of	  safety	  related	  constraints	  in	  the	  design,	  development,	  and	  system	  can	  leads	  to	  accidents	  [7].	  	  Accidents	  are	  defined	  as	  undesired	  and	  unintentional	  events	  that	  lead	  to	  human	  injury,	  loss,	  or	  death	  and	  can	  happen	  without	  failed	  components	  and/or	  by	  the	  interaction	  of	  other	  entities	  (human,	  external	  systems,	  environment).	  	  	  The	  STAMP	  approach	  uses	  these	  concepts	  to	  improve	  safety	  and	  prevent	  accidents.	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STAMP	  contains	  three	  basic	  fundamentals	  [7]:	  	  	  
• Safety	  Constraints	  
• Safety	  Control	  Structure	  
• Process	  Model	  	  Safety	  constraints	  are	  derived	  from	  the	  defined	  system	  hazards	  and	  provide	  boundaries	  to	  what	  is	  a	  “safe”	  and	  “unsafe”	  state	  for	  the	  system.	  	  The	  constraints	  are	  established	  from	  higher	  levels	  of	  the	  system,	  and	  if	  successfully	  designed	  and	  maintained,	  the	  system	  maintains	  a	  safe	  state.	  	  If	  these	  constraints	  are	  violated,	  or	  not	  properly	  enforced,	  the	  system	  then	  migrates	  to	  an	  unsafe	  state.	  	  Jens	  Rasmussen	  stated	  that	  systems	  tend	  to	  migrate	  to	  unsafe	  state	  in	  competitive	  and	  environmental	  pressure	  [7].	  	  These	  constraints	  help	  maintain	  a	  safe	  state.	  	  From	  these	  constraints,	  requirements	  can	  be	  generated	  to	  prevent	  the	  system	  from	  entering	  an	  unsafe	  state.	  	  	  	  The	  safety	  control	  structure	  is	  a	  hierarchical	  structure	  of	  control	  loops	  within	  the	  system	  [7].	  The	  hierarchy	  provides	  control	  from	  the	  highest	  level	  down	  to	  lower	  level	  loops	  and	  components.	  	  Figure	  11	  below	  is	  a	  standard	  control	  loop	  defined	  by	  Leveson.	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  11.	  	  System	  Control	  Loop	  	  The	  four	  elements	  (Controller,	  Actuators,	  Controlled	  Process,	  Sensors)	  provide	  the	  basic	  feedback	  loop.	  	  In	  this	  scheme,	  the	  Controller	  receives	  set	  points	  and	  has	  control	  algorithms.	  Once	  a	  command	  is	  received	  from	  an	  external	  entity	  (i.e.	  from	  the	  user,	  master	  controller),	  the	  controller	  runs	  the	  control	  algorithm,	  and	  may	  send	  a	  command	  signal	  to	  the	  actuator	  to	  change	  the	  state	  of	  the	  controlled	  process.	  	  The	  Actuator	  then	  sends	  controlled	  variables	  to	  the	  controlled	  process	  so	  the	  desired	  function	  is	  carried	  out.	  	  The	  verification	  of	  the	  system	  state	  is	  then	  monitored	  by	  the	  Sensors	  element	  via	  measured	  variables,	  and	  this	  information	  is	  sent	  back	  to	  the	  original	  controller.	  	  The	  controller	  then	  compares	  the	  system	  state	  with	  the	  desired	  states,	  and	  determines	  the	  next	  control	  action.	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Process	  model	  is	  the	  logic	  in	  the	  controller	  on	  how	  the	  controlled	  process	  works.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Whether	  it	  is	  the	  human	  user’s	  mental	  images	  of	  the	  system,	  or	  the	  logical	  algorithm	  embedded	  in	  the	  microprocessor,	  the	  process	  models	  illustrate	  representations	  for	  system	  variables,	  its	  effect	  on	  the	  current	  state,	  and	  the	  ways	  to	  change	  the	  state.	  	  The	  process	  model	  provides	  a	  reference	  for	  the	  controller	  to	  figure	  out	  how	  to	  change	  the	  system	  state	  by	  using	  the	  system	  variables.	  	  Accidents	  may	  happen	  if	  the	  process	  model	  does	  not	  accurately	  represent	  the	  actual	  system.	  	  	  	  To	  change	  a	  system’s	  state,	  a	  control	  action	  has	  to	  be	  initiated.	  	  A	  controller	  can	  move	  the	  system	  to	  an	  unsafe	  state	  if	  it	  issues	  one	  of	  the	  following:	  	  
• Incorrect	  control	  commands	  
• Control	  actions	  not	  provided	  
• Incorrect	  timing	  of	  control	  action	  execution	  
• Control	  action	  prematurely	  terminates	  	  With	  these	  above	  concepts,	  STAMP	  allows	  a	  clear	  understanding	  of	  accidents	  by	  understanding	  which	  safety	  constraints	  were	  broken.	  	  It	  also	  illustrates	  the	  causes	  for	  the	  inadequate	  control	  violations	  that	  could	  ultimately	  lead	  to	  improvements	  or	  recommendations	  for	  future	  safety	  analysis	  [7].	  	  Misalignment	  of	  process	  models	  and	  the	  actual	  system	  process	  is	  also	  a	  contributor	  to	  accidents.	  	  With	  STAMP	  defined,	  an	  application	  of	  STAMP	  in	  accident	  analysis	  called	  Causal	  Analysis	  based	  on	  STAMP	  (CAST)	  is	  discussed	  next.	  	  	  	  CAST	  is	  a	  retrospective	  accident	  analysis	  methodology	  that	  uses	  a	  system	  approach	  to	  investigate	  accidents	  by	  analyzing	  the	  control	  structure	  dynamics	  [7].	  	  By	  evaluating	  the	  system	  constraints	  and	  its	  inadequacies,	  CAST	  can	  illustrate	  the	  hierarchical	  cascade	  effects	  that	  a	  constraint	  violation	  has	  on	  the	  system.	  	  Since	  the	  safety	  is	  an	  emergent	  property	  of	  the	  system,	  this	  analysis	  methodology	  can	  improve	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  causes	  of	  accidents.	  	  The	  CAST	  methodology	  follows	  these	  steps	  [7]:	  	   1. Define	  the	  system	  and	  hazards	  in	  the	  accident.	  2. Identify	  system	  safety	  constraints	  and	  associated	  safety	  requirements.	  3. Define	  system	  control	  structure.	  4. Estimate	  the	  events	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  accident.	  5. Analyze	  loss	  at	  the	  physical	  system	  level.	  6. By	  ascending	  and	  descending	  throughout	  the	  system	  control,	  determine	  the	  how	  and	  why	  each	  successive	  higher	  level	  allowed	  the	  inadequate	  control	  to	  continue	  to	  be	  erroneous.	  7. Evaluate	  overall	  coordination	  and	  communication	  contributors	  to	  the	  accident.	  8. Determine	  dynamic	  changes	  in	  the	  system	  and	  the	  safety	  control	  structure	  relating	  to	  the	  loss	  and	  any	  weakening	  of	  the	  safety	  over	  time.	  
	   34	  
9. Generate	  Recommendations.	  	  CAST’s	  unique	  approach	  to	  accident	  investigation	  deters	  blame,	  and	  instead	  investigates	  why	  accidents	  happen	  due	  to	  the	  existing	  control	  structure	  around	  the	  issue.	  	  Rather	  than	  fixing	  symptoms	  of	  the	  system,	  it	  focuses	  on	  the	  real	  cause(s)	  of	  the	  problem	  such	  as	  inadequate	  control.	  	  The	  CAST	  method	  will	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  case	  study.	  	  In	  summary,	  STAMP	  and	  CAST	  methodology	  provides	  a	  system-­‐thinking	  approach	  to	  safety	  and	  risk	  analysis.	  	  By	  treating	  safety	  as	  a	  control	  issue	  rather	  than	  a	  reliability	  problem,	  and	  its	  use	  of	  control	  structures,	  safety	  constraints,	  and	  process	  models,	  it	  has	  been	  able	  to	  identify	  many	  more	  hazards	  than	  standard	  industry	  practices	  previously	  described.	  	  Previous	  applications	  of	  CAST	  and	  STAMP	  to	  case	  accidents	  have	  further	  exemplified	  this	  claim	  in	  various	  industries	  including	  food	  [34],	  pharmaceuticals	  [35],	  and	  aviation	  [36].	  	  
2.6	  Summary	  of	  the	  Hazard	  Analysis	  Methods	  	  As	  this	  chapter	  discusses,	  there	  are	  several	  available	  methods	  that	  assess	  risk	  in	  complex	  processes.	  	  There	  are	  several	  similar	  attributes	  that	  are	  common	  such	  as	  a	  linear	  chain	  of	  events	  model	  in	  the	  FMEA	  and	  PHA	  techniques.	  	  In	  addition,	  there	  are	  some	  critical	  differences	  such	  as	  analyzing	  safety	  as	  a	  control	  problem	  rather	  than	  a	  reliability	  issue.	  	  An	  overall	  comparison	  chart	  of	  all	  the	  risk	  methodologies	  and	  their	  attributes	  was	  generated,	  see	  Table	  3	  below,	  to	  highlight	  the	  similarities,	  and	  differences.	  	  	  	  
Table	  3.	  	  Risk	  Analysis	  Comparison	  Table	  
	   Methodology	  Discussed	  in	  This	  Chapter	  
Attributes	   	   PHA	   FTA	  	   FMEA	   HAZOP	   HACCP	   CAST	  Single	  Failure	  Event	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   	   Yes	  Multiple	  Failure	  Event	  (>1)	   	   Yes	   	   	   	   Yes	  System	  Approach	  Model	  (Organization-­‐Environment-­‐Technical)	   	   	   	   	   	   Yes	  Able	  to	  address	  system	  interaction	  accidents	   	   	   	   	   	   Yes	  Applicable	  in	  Design	  Phase	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   	   Yes	  Applicable	  in	  Operations	  Phase	   	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  Applied	  with	  limited	  system	  info	   Yes	   	   	   	   	   Yes	  Ease	  of	  Application	   Yes	   	   	   	   	   Yes	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  As	  Table	  3	  displays,	  STAMP	  and	  the	  CAST	  approach	  offers	  several	  unique	  attributes	  to	  find	  complex	  hazards	  when	  compared	  to	  the	  standard	  practices.	  	  With	  this	  holistic	  approach,	  the	  practices	  can	  identify	  a	  multitude	  of	  hazards	  that	  normally	  elude	  the	  other	  single	  fault	  or	  linear	  chain	  of	  events	  approaches.	  	  With	  more	  hazards	  discovered,	  more	  mitigation	  can	  be	  designed	  and	  implemented	  into	  products	  to	  make	  it	  safer	  for	  the	  end	  user.	  	  
2.7	  Conclusion	  	  In	  conclusion,	  the	  previous	  sections	  have	  described	  the	  history	  of	  the	  U.S.	  medical	  device	  regulation	  and	  the	  FDA’s	  role	  in	  maintaining	  the	  safety	  in	  numerous	  classes	  of	  medical	  technology.	  	  	  The	  numerous	  historical	  mass	  medical	  accidents	  have	  resulted	  in	  countless	  human	  injuries	  and	  death.	  	  With	  these	  tragedies,	  new	  and	  improved	  safety	  regulations	  for	  drug	  and	  medical	  devices	  were	  developed	  to	  prevent	  these	  accidents.	  However,	  with	  the	  growing	  complexity	  of	  the	  medical	  instruments	  and	  the	  increased	  use	  of	  software	  in	  today’s	  environment,	  the	  current	  regulations	  are	  no	  longer	  sufficient	  in	  maintaining	  safety.	  	  The	  case	  study	  in	  this	  thesis	  will	  illustrate	  this	  point.	  	  Chapter	  3	  provides	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  medical	  diagnostic	  system,	  and	  the	  case	  accident.	  	  Chapter	  4	  applies	  the	  CAST	  steps	  discussed	  in	  this	  section	  to	  the	  accident.	  	  The	  results	  will	  be	  analyzed	  in	  details,	  and	  compared	  to	  an	  industry	  standard	  risk	  technique,	  FMECA,	  to	  verify	  which	  approach	  is	  safer.	  	  	  During	  writing	  of	  this	  thesis,	  it	  is	  noted	  that	  safety	  and	  effective	  FDA	  regulations	  are	  in	  flux.	  	  	  There	  is	  a	  growing	  concern	  on	  whether	  the	  current	  510(k)	  approval	  process	  (as	  described	  above)	  achieves	  the	  goal	  of	  safety	  and	  effectiveness	  for	  application	  to	  the	  U.S.	  population.	  	  This	  is	  due	  to	  a	  recent	  rise	  in	  medical	  adverse	  events	  [37].	  	  In	  the	  June	  2011,	  the	  FDA	  made	  changes	  to	  the	  medical	  device	  approval	  process	  with	  a	  particular	  focus	  on	  updating	  safety	  regulations.	  	  However,	  in	  an	  IOM	  review	  of	  these	  changes,	  they	  recommended	  that	  it	  is	  not	  as	  safe	  and	  effective	  is	  it	  should	  be	  [38].	  	  In	  a	  July	  20,	  2011	  IOM	  letter	  to	  FDA	  Director	  Jeffrey	  Shuren,	  the	  IOM	  concluded	  	  
“…the	  510(k)	  process	  generally	  is	  not	  intended	  to	  evaluate	  the	  safety	  and	  effectiveness	  
of	  medical	  devices	  and,	  furthermore,	  cannot	  be	  transformed	  into	  a	  premarket	  
evaluation	  of	  safety	  and	  effectiveness.”	  
D.Challoner,	  MD	  
Chair,	  Committee	  on	  the	  Public-­‐Health	  Effectiveness	  
of	  the	  FDA	  510(k)	  Clearance	  Process	  	  Therefore,	  uncertainty	  remains	  in	  the	  future	  of	  medical	  device	  and	  diagnostic	  regulation.	  	  But	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  a	  new	  methodology	  of	  evaluating	  safety	  and	  effectiveness	  in	  medical	  technology	  is	  needed.	  	  A	  systems	  thinking	  model	  and	  approach	  may	  fulfill	  that	  unmet	  need.	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  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  thesis,	  the	  FDA	  regulations	  that	  will	  be	  referenced	  will	  be	  those	  documented	  above	  prior	  to	  the	  2011	  changes	  since	  the	  medical	  diagnostic	  case	  study	  was	  approved	  with	  the	  previous	  regulation	  statutes.	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CHAPTER	  3.	  	  Case	  Study	  Overview	  	  
“A	  man’s	  errors	  are	  his	  portals	  of	  discovery”	  
-­‐James	  Joyce	  	  For	  confidentiality	  purposes,	  all	  specific	  information	  of	  the	  case	  study	  system,	  company,	  and	  accident	  will	  be	  generalized	  for	  this	  thesis	  discussion.	  	  A	  case	  study	  will	  be	  performed	  on	  a	  medical	  diagnostic	  system	  that	  analyzes	  a	  variety	  of	  constituents	  in	  patient	  blood	  samples.	  	  The	  medical	  diagnostic	  system	  will	  be	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  “case	  system”	  for	  this	  thesis	  discussion.	  	  The	  case	  system	  was	  developed	  by	  a	  medical	  diagnostic	  company,	  and	  will	  be	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  “case	  company”	  for	  this	  thesis	  discussion.	  	  The	  case	  study	  accident	  is	  an	  FDA	  recall	  notice	  for	  the	  case	  system	  on	  a	  specific	  sensor,	  which	  will	  be	  defined	  as	  “case	  sensor”.	  	  The	  severity	  of	  the	  recall	  is	  global	  with	  the	  potential	  for	  human	  injury,	  and	  death.	  	  
3.1	  Company	  Overview	  	  The	  case	  company	  has	  developed	  several	  medical	  diagnostics	  systems	  for	  over	  the	  years	  with	  successful	  global	  market	  placement.	  	  	  	  
3.2	  Case	  System	  Overview	  
	  The	  case	  system	  is	  a	  blood	  diagnostic	  analyzer	  developed	  by	  the	  case	  company	  that	  measures	  blood	  gas,	  electrolytes,	  and	  oximetry	  within	  human	  whole	  blood.	  	  	  The	  system	  is	  marketed	  in	  point-­‐of-­‐care	  (POC)	  market	  that	  allows	  “bedside”	  diagnosis	  in	  medical	  facilities.	  	  Its	  small	  footprint	  provides	  flexible	  mobility	  to	  allow	  usage	  in	  the	  many	  areas,	  including	  but	  not	  limited	  to	  areas	  in	  the	  emergency	  room,	  intensive	  care	  department,	  operating	  room	  and	  even	  in	  the	  central	  laboratory.	  	  	  The	  case	  system	  has	  been	  well	  received	  in	  the	  global	  market	  and	  continues	  to	  increase	  its	  foothold	  in	  the	  POC	  market	  including	  the	  U.S.,	  Canada,	  and	  European	  Union.	  	  	  By	  providing	  valuable	  total	  solutions	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  clinical	  diagnostic	  needs,	  the	  case	  company	  gained	  the	  position	  as	  an	  innovative	  leader	  in	  critical	  care	  diagnosis.	  	  The	  case	  system	  is	  a	  consumable	  cartridge-­‐based	  system	  that	  allows	  a	  single	  whole	  blood	  sample	  to	  be	  analyzed	  and	  simultaneously	  produce	  various	  analytical	  results.	  	  This	  capability	  provides	  a	  competitive	  advantage	  over	  most	  current	  products.	  	  In	  addition,	  its	  data	  quality	  system	  provides	  the	  user	  a	  virtually	  maintenance	  free	  automatic	  quality	  control	  system.	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  The	  case	  system	  can	  be	  decomposed	  into	  two	  essential	  subsystems:	  	  	  	   1. The	  instrument	  subsystem	  where	  the	  user	  interface,	  data	  processor,	  analytical	  modules,	  fluidic	  pumps,	  and	  network	  connectivity	  reside.	  	   2. A	  consumable,	  disposable	  multi-­‐use	  cartridge	  subsystem	  which	  handles	  the	  physical	  blood	  analyzing,	  chemical	  reagent	  deposition,	  and	  waste	  management	  functionalities.	  	  The	  design	  intent	  of	  the	  case	  system	  was	  that	  the	  user	  would	  be	  able	  to	  install	  the	  instrument	  anywhere	  in	  the	  medical	  facility	  needing	  only	  a	  power	  outlet	  and	  a	  network	  connection.	  	  Once	  the	  instrument	  is	  setup,	  a	  multi-­‐use	  cartridge	  is	  then	  installed,	  containing	  all	  necessary	  reagents,	  calibrations,	  and	  medical	  waste	  containment	  providing	  extended	  continual	  usage.	  	  After	  the	  cartridge	  life	  has	  expired,	  the	  user	  simply	  replaces	  the	  cartridge	  with	  a	  new	  one,	  and	  disposes	  the	  used	  cartridge	  as	  medical	  waste,	  which	  contains	  all	  the	  used	  blood	  samples,	  chemical	  reagents,	  and	  calibrations	  solutions.	  	  The	  case	  system	  is	  operated	  in	  the	  following	  scenario.	  	  The	  users,	  usually	  a	  medical	  technician,	  nurse,	  or	  physician,	  may	  either	  transport	  the	  analyzer	  to	  the	  patient	  or	  bring	  the	  patient’s	  blood	  sample	  to	  the	  analyzer.	  	  The	  freshly	  drawn	  blood	  is	  typically	  contained	  in	  a	  capillary	  tube,	  arterial	  syringe,	  or	  a	  closed	  tube	  container.	  	  The	  user	  selects	  the	  desired	  test	  assays,	  initiates	  the	  sampling	  procedure	  and	  introduces	  the	  sample	  to	  the	  analyzer.	  	  After	  sample	  aspiration	  by	  the	  analyzer,	  the	  user	  removes	  the	  sample	  container,	  and	  results	  are	  obtained	  within	  a	  desirable,	  user	  need	  driven	  timeframe.	  	  After	  the	  test	  results	  are	  provided,	  the	  case	  system	  automatically	  prepares	  itself	  for	  the	  next	  sample	  by	  performing	  necessary	  washes,	  calibrations,	  and	  checks.	  	  The	  average	  turn-­‐around	  time	  for	  sample	  is	  therefore	  minimal,	  providing	  the	  user	  value	  of	  immediate	  diagnosis	  of	  the	  patient’s	  health.	  	  	  	  The	  case	  system	  also	  provides	  the	  user	  the	  unique	  ability	  to	  track	  test	  results,	  instrument	  status,	  and	  monitors	  other	  users.	  	  The	  case	  system	  software	  allows	  each	  system	  to	  connect	  with	  other	  systems	  via	  the	  hospital	  information	  system.	  	  This	  allows	  for	  test	  results	  to	  sync	  with	  the	  hospital	  network	  and	  provide	  remote	  viewing	  of	  patient	  results	  virtually	  anywhere	  in	  the	  hospital.	  	  This	  data	  networking	  enables	  the	  user	  with	  extended	  flexibility	  and	  mobility	  in	  their	  heavy	  work	  schedules.	  	  	  	  As	  mentioned	  in	  the	  Chapter	  2,	  the	  case	  system	  is	  a	  Class	  II	  product	  requiring	  a	  510(k)	  under	  21	  CFR	  807	  for	  U.S.	  market	  release.	  	  A	  510(k)	  requires	  demonstration	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of	  substantial	  equivalency	  (SE)	  to	  other	  legally	  released	  U.S.	  marketed	  device	  [39].	  	  Substantial	  equivalency	  means	  that	  the	  new	  device	  is	  at	  least	  as	  safe	  and	  effective	  as	  predicates	  in	  the	  market.	  	  A	  device	  is	  SE	  to	  a	  predicate	  if	  one	  of	  the	  two	  following	  conditions	  apply	  [39]:	  	  
• New	  device	  has	  same	  intended	  use	  as	  predicate	  and	  has	  same	  technological	  characteristics	  as	  the	  predicate.	  
• New	  device	  has	  same	  intended	  use	  as	  predicate	  but	  has	  different	  technological	  characteristic.	  	  New	  device	  must	  then	  show	  that	  it	  does	  raise	  new	  concerns	  with	  safety	  and	  effectiveness	  and	  demonstrate	  that	  it	  is	  at	  least	  as	  safe	  and	  effective	  as	  the	  legally	  marketed	  device.	  	  A	  device	  may	  not	  be	  marketed	  in	  the	  U.S.	  until	  the	  medical	  company	  receives	  a	  letter	  from	  the	  FDA	  declaring	  the	  device	  is	  substantially	  equivalent	  [39].	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  General	  Controls	  of	  GMP,	  FDA	  registry,	  and	  labeling	  requirements,	  analytical	  performance	  was	  compared	  against	  acceptable	  quality	  standards	  for	  clinical	  laboratory	  tests	  (CLIA	  88)	  in	  several	  internal	  and	  external	  studies.	  	  The	  case	  system	  was	  also	  tested	  for	  analytical	  equivalency	  against	  510(k)	  approved	  predicate	  devices	  for	  every	  analyte	  parameter.	  	  Furthermore,	  a	  risk	  analysis	  was	  conducted	  on	  the	  case	  system	  as	  mandated	  by	  21	  CFR	  820.30(g).	  	  A	  FMECA	  risk	  analysis	  was	  performed	  on	  the	  system,	  and	  covered	  a	  variety	  of	  areas.	  	  The	  resulting	  work	  documented	  potential	  hazards	  and	  associated	  mitigation	  efforts.	  	  	  	  The	  510(k)	  was	  submitted	  to	  the	  FDA	  and	  after	  review,	  the	  FDA	  found	  the	  case	  system	  submission	  complete	  and	  supports	  a	  SE	  decision.	  	  This	  indicates	  that	  the	  case	  system	  is	  at	  least	  as	  safe	  and	  effective	  as	  equivalent	  diagnostic	  analyzers	  released	  to	  the	  market,	  and	  is	  acceptable	  for	  U.S.	  market	  introduction	  [39].	  	  The	  FDA	  sent	  the	  case	  company	  a	  letter	  stating	  substantial	  equivalence	  of	  the	  case	  system,	  and	  the	  case	  system	  was	  subsequently	  released	  to	  the	  U.S.	  market	  later	  that	  year.	  	  
3.3	  Case	  Study	  Accident	  	  The	  case	  company	  issued	  an	  FDA	  recall	  notice	  for	  a	  specific	  reportable	  electrolyte	  capability	  in	  the	  case	  system.	  	  In	  the	  recall	  filing	  documentation	  found	  on	  the	  FDA	  Medical	  &	  Radiation	  Emitting	  Device	  Recall	  website,	  the	  reported	  reason	  for	  the	  recall	  was	  that	  low	  electrolyte	  results	  on	  patient	  blood	  samples	  were	  being	  reported	  to	  medical	  staff.	  	  Secondary	  analysis	  of	  the	  same	  patient	  sample	  on	  an	  external	  reference	  instrument	  indicated	  the	  low	  electrolyte	  results	  was	  erroneous	  and	  was	  outside	  the	  CLIA	  88	  standard	  493.931	  for	  total	  allowable	  error.	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  The	  recall	  was	  initiated	  by	  numerous	  earlier	  medical	  adverse	  event	  reports,	  also	  documented	  by	  the	  FDA	  in	  the	  Manufacturing	  and	  User	  Facility	  Device	  Experience	  (MAUDE)	  database.	  	  The	  following	  is	  an	  example	  from	  an	  actual	  medical	  accident	  documented	  in	  MAUDE	  concerning	  the	  low	  electrolyte	  blood	  result,	  including	  the	  medical	  staff	  reactive	  actions,	  and	  the	  undesired	  consequence.	  	   1. Medical	  staff	  uses	  the	  case	  system	  to	  diagnose	  the	  patient	  status.	  2. Medical	  staff	  suspected	  an	  issue	  with	  the	  low	  blood	  electrolyte	  result.	  3. Medical	  staff	  notified	  case	  company	  of	  suspected	  result.	  4. Medical	  staff	  performed	  standard	  medical	  procedure	  on	  patient	  based	  off	  suspected	  low	  result.	  5. Patient	  reacted	  adversely,	  and	  may	  result	  in	  seizure,	  cardiac	  arrhythmia,	  or	  death.	  6. Subsequent	  testing	  of	  the	  same	  patient	  sample	  on	  an	  external	  reference	  system	  verified	  normal	  electrolyte	  levels.	  	  	  	  As	  regulated	  by	  the	  FDA,	  the	  case	  company	  issued	  a	  recall	  for	  the	  electrolyte	  sensor	  on	  the	  case	  system	  and	  sent	  an	  “Urgent	  Field	  Safety	  Notification”	  letter	  to	  all	  users.	  	  	  In	  the	  letter	  it	  describes	  the	  problem	  and	  instructions	  on	  how	  to	  disable	  the	  electrolyte	  from	  all	  cartridges	  to	  eliminate	  the	  potential	  hazard.	  	  	  The	  case	  company	  invested	  significant	  time,	  money,	  and	  enterprise	  resources	  to	  address	  the	  recall	  issue.	  	  	  The	  author	  had	  direct	  involvement	  in	  these	  activities.	  	  After	  intense	  investigation	  and	  activities,	  the	  recall	  issue	  has	  been	  addressed	  with	  mitigations	  emplaced.	  	  During	  the	  writing	  of	  this	  thesis,	  the	  FDA	  is	  reviewing	  the	  recall	  submission.	  	  	  	  As	  stated	  earlier,	  the	  case	  system	  underwent	  FDA	  approved	  risk	  analysis	  using	  the	  FMECA	  methodology	  finding	  numerous	  hazards,	  and	  implementing	  the	  derived	  mitigations.	  	  However,	  as	  the	  recall	  illustrated,	  despite	  the	  engineers’	  best	  effort,	  some	  hazards	  were	  not	  identified	  by	  standard	  practices	  and	  that	  led	  to	  said	  medical	  accidents.	  	  	  Therefore	  the	  application	  of	  the	  linear,	  reductionist	  technique	  of	  the	  FMECA	  to	  a	  non-­‐linear	  complex	  medical	  device	  system	  was	  inadequate.	  	  A	  new	  approach	  that	  employs	  systems-­‐thinking	  model	  is	  needed.	  	  Next,	  Chapter	  4	  discusses	  the	  application	  of	  a	  systems	  approach	  to	  this	  accident	  using	  the	  CAST	  technique.	  	  	  The	  intent	  is	  to	  investigate	  whether	  the	  STAMP	  model	  could	  have	  discovered	  the	  hazard	  that	  led	  to	  the	  recall.	  	  	  If	  the	  specific	  hazard	  were	  found	  using	  this	  technique,	  there	  could	  have	  been	  mitigations	  in	  the	  design	  phase	  to	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prevent	  this	  accident	  from	  ever	  occurring	  in	  the	  current	  case	  system.	  	  Furthermore,	  additional	  hazards	  may	  be	  identified	  using	  CAST	  that	  was	  not	  found	  with	  FMECA.	  	  Therefore,	  knowledge	  gained	  from	  this	  CAST	  analysis	  may	  be	  used	  for	  future	  medical	  diagnostic	  product	  development	  efforts.	  	  By	  applying	  a	  systems	  model	  to	  risk	  analysis,	  it	  may	  improve	  the	  overall	  safety	  of	  the	  medical	  diagnostic	  system.	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Chapter	  4.	  	  Case	  Accident	  CAST	  Analysis	  	  
“Harmony	  makes	  small	  things	  grow,	  lack	  of	  it	  makes	  great	  things	  decay.”	  
-­‐Sallust	  	  As	  discussed	  previous	  chapters,	  a	  CAST	  analysis	  will	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  case	  system	  following	  the	  CAST	  steps	  outlined	  in	  Chapter	  2	  	  	  
4.1	  	  Context,	  Roles,	  and	  Responsibilities	  	  The	   context	   of	   the	   case	   study	   system	   is	   that	  medical	   diagnostic	   system	  adds	   high	  value	   to	   the	   overall	   medical	   treatment	   of	   the	   patient	   in	   this	   environment.	   	   The	  patient	  is	  nominally	  in	  an	  unstable,	  critical	  condition,	  and	  the	  overseeing	  physician	  orders	  medical	  diagnostic	  monitoring	  to	  observe	  any	  changes	  in	  the	  patient’s	  health	  status	  (i.e.	  specifically	  blood	  condition).	  	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  time	  in	  receiving	   these	   patient	   results	   is	   critical,	   and	   could	   be	   a	   factor	   in	   the	   patient	  outcome.	   	  The	  case	  systems	  are	  continuously	  utilized	  throughout	  the	  patient’s	  stay	  in	   the	  hospital	  or	  until	  doctor’s	  orders	  changed.	   	  Therefore,	   the	  system	  must	  have	  high	  performance	  accuracy,	  uptime	  reliability,	  quick	  time	  to	  results	  and	  utmost,	  the	  safety	  in	  test	  results	  and	  alarms	  that	  have	  direct	  influence	  in	  the	  patient’s	  health.	  	  	  There	  are	   several	   stakeholders	   that	   interact	  directly	  or	   indirectly	  with	   the	   system	  and	  have	  significant	  roles	  and	  responsibilities.	  	  These	  are	  defined	  in	  Table	  4	  below.	  	  
Table	  4.	  	  Case	  Study	  Stakeholder	  and	  Responsibilities	  
Stakeholder	   Responsibilities	  Patient	   The	   passive	   indirect	   value	   stakeholder	   of	   the	   diagnostic	  system,	  and	  source	  of	  the	  system’s	  input	  values.	  	  	  Nurses/Lab	  technicians	   The	   common	   direct	   primary	   users	   of	   the	   system,	   whose	  responsibility	  is	  to	  perform,	  report,	  and	  react	  to	  system	  output.	  Physicians	   Direct	   value	   stakeholders	   that	   adjust	   overarching	   patient	  medical	   decisions	   based	   off	   system	   output.	   	   Also	   infrequent	  users	  of	  the	  case	  system.	  Case	  Company	   The	  developers	  and	  manufacturers	  of	  the	  system.	  Regulatory	  Bodies	   Overseeing	  regulatory	  body	  (FDA,	  CE)	  that	  defines	  and	  enforce	  safety	  regulations	  for	  medical	  diagnostics	  systems.	  	  As	   the	   table	   above	  describes,	   the	   common	  primary	  user	   of	   the	   case	   system	   is	   the	  attending	   nurse	   or	   lab	   technician	   monitoring	   a	   patient’s	   blood	   condition.	   	   The	  nurse’s	   primary	   objective	   is	   the	   treatment,	   safety,	   and	   recovery	   of	   their	   patients.	  	  The	   diagnostic	   system	   should	   effectively	   warn	   the	   nurses	   and	   lab	   technicians	   of	  dangerous	  patient	  health	  conditions.	   	  The	  other	  two	  important	  stakeholders	  in	  the	  hospital	   context	   are	   the	   physicians	   who	   prescribe	   the	   overall	   medical	   treatment	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plan,	   and	   the	   patient	   who	   is	   being	   monitored.	   The	   next	   important	   stakeholder	  within	  the	  value	  web	  is	  the	  case	  company	  who	  designs	  and	  manufactures	  the	  case	  systems.	   	  Additionally,	   the	   regulatory	  bodies	  are	  also	   important	   stakeholders	  who	  oversee	   healthcare	   safety	   by	   establishing	   rules	   and	   standards	   for	   healthcare	  products.	  	  
4.2	  	  System	  and	  Hazard	  Identification	  	  As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  an	  initial	  step	  in	  CAST	  analysis	  is	  to	  define	  the	  system	  and	  hazard	  in	  the	  accident.	  	  System:	  	  The	  case	  system	  is	  the	  medical	  diagnostic	  analyzer	  of	  patient	  blood	  constituents.	  	  	  Hazard:	  	  The	  definition	  of	  hazard	  is	  defined	  below	  [7]:	  	  
Hazard:	   	   State	   of	   system	   conditions	   when	   interact	   with	   other	   condition	   in	  
environment	  of	  system,	  lead	  to	  accidents.	  	  The	  hazards	  relevant	   to	   the	  documented	  accidents	  of	   the	  case	  system	  are	   listed	   in	  Table	  5	  below.	  	  	  While	  there	  may	  be	  other	  hazards	  in	  the	  system,	  only	  those	  listed	  in	  Table	  5	  will	  only	  be	  discussed	  in	  this	  thesis.	  	  
Table	  5.	  	  Case	  System	  Hazards	  Hazard	  (H)	  H1:	   The	  system	  reports	  erroneous	  patients	  results	  to	  the	  user.	  H2:	   The	  system	  reports	  the	  patient	  results	  too	  late.	  H3:	   The	  system	   is	  unavailable	   for	   intended	  use	  due	   to	  premature	   failure	  or	  cartridge	  rejection.	  	  The	  H1	  hazard	  of	  reporting	  of	  erroneous	  patient	  results	  is	  clinically	  significant	  and	  can	   lead	   to	   medical	   accidents.	   	   As	   discussed	   in	   Chapter	   3,	   the	   erroneous	   low	  electrolyte	  reported	  result	   led	  to	  hazardous	  medical	   intervention.	   	  This	  resulted	  in	  an	  adverse	  event,	  which	  is	  an	  undesirable	  experience	  associated	  with	  the	  use	  of	  the	  medical	   product	   [40].	   	   	   This	   accident	   and	   similar	   ones	   eventually	   led	   to	   the	   case	  accident	  of	  the	  case	  system.	  	  	  	  H2	  is	  the	  hazard	  where	  the	  system	  reports	  the	  correct	  patient	  results	  but	  untimely,	  or	  too	  late	  for	  usage.	  	  Such	  delay	  may	  have	  medical	  consequences.	  	  Since	  the	  design	  intent	  of	  the	  case	  system	  is	  for	  Point	  of	  Care	  (POC)	  environments,	  there	  is	  a	  need	  for	  a	   quick	   turn	   around	   time	   (TAT)	   starting	   from	   inputting	   the	   patient	   sample	   to	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receiving	   the	   final	   results.	   	   This	   is	   a	   significant	   need	   of	   the	   user	   due	   to	   the	   time	  sensitivity	  of	   the	  patient’s	  health	  and	  subsequent	  medical	   treatment.	   	  Therefore,	  a	  hazard	  is	  present	  in	  having	  an	  undesired	  TAT	  for	  patient	  results.	  	  H3	   is	   the	  hazardous	   incident	   that	   the	  author	  experienced	   in	  Chapter	  1,	  where	   the	  whole	  diagnostic	  system	   is	  unavailable	  due	   to	  premature	  system	   failures.	   	  Normal	  mitigations	   require	   a	   new	   cartridge	   installation	   and	   calibrations,	   which	   require	  unnecessary	  resources	  and	  money,	  but	  more	  importantly	  extends	  the	  time	  to	  when	  the	  next	  available	  patient	  sample	  can	  be	  analyzed.	  	  Similar	  to	  H2,	  time	  is	  a	  sensitive	  factor	  and	  may	  provide	  a	  hazardous	  situation	  for:	  	  	   1. the	  medical	   staff	   because	   the	   patient’s	   status	   is	   unknown	   and	   there	   is	   low	  confidence	  in	  the	  correct	  course	  of	  medical	  intervention.	  	  2. the	  patient	  because	  there	  is	  a	  timely	  need	  for	  blood	  diagnostics.	   	  When	  this	  information	   is	   unavailable,	   the	   correct	   subsequent	   medical	   intervention	   is	  delayed.	  	  	  	  
4.3	  	  System	  Safety	  Constraints	  and	  Safety	  Requirements	  	  The	  next	  step	  in	  the	  CAST	  analysis,	  after	  hazards	  have	  been	  established,	  is	  to	  define	  safety	  constraints	  imposed	  by	  the	  hierarchical	  system	  of	  controls.	  	  Furthermore	  for	  each	  constraint,	  associated	  safety	  requirements	  must	  be	  established	   to	  set	  criteria	  	  to	  ensure	  the	  safety	  constraints	  (SC)	  are	  not	  violated.	  	  The	  safety	  requirements	  (SR)	  are	  listed	  below	  in	  Table	  6.	  	  	  	  
Table	  6.	  	  Case	  Study	  Safety	  Constraints	  and	  Requirements	  Hazard	  	   Safety	  Constraints	  (SC)	   Safety	  Requirements	  (SR)	  H1	   SC1:	  	  Accurate	  patient	  results	  must	  be	  reported	  to	  the	  medical	  staff.	   SR1:	   The	   system	   shall	   report	  accurate	   patient	   results	   within	   an	  acceptable	   total	   allowable	   error	   as	  defined	  by	  CLIA	  88.	  H2	   SC2:	  	  Patient	  results	  must	  be	  reported	  to	   the	   medical	   staff	   in	   a	   useable	  timeframe.	   SR2:	   	   The	   system	   shall	   have	   a	  patient	   result	   report	   turn-­‐around-­‐time	  of	  X.	  H3	   SC3:	   	  The	   system	  should	  be	   available	  for	  intended	  use	  as	  designed.	   SR3:	   The	   system	   shall	   have	   a	  minimal	   cartridge	   uptime	   of	   X%	  during	  its	  use	  life.	  	  The	  SC1	  constraint	  for	  H1	  indicates	  the	  analytical	  accuracy	  of	  the	  reportable	  patient	  results.	   	   	   As	   noted	   later	   in	   this	   section,	   a	   misdiagnosis	   of	   a	   patient	   result	   that	   is	  reported	   to	   the	   medical	   staff	   can	   lead	   to	   unnecessary	   and	   extremely	   dangerous	  medical	  consequences.	   	  Undesired	  results	  can	  leave	  the	  patient	  severely	  injured	  or	  deceased.	   	   	   The	   SR1	   addresses	   this	   constraint	   by	   strictly	   adhering	   to	   the	   CLIA	   88	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accuracy	   guidelines	   for	   total	   allowable	   error	   for	   each	   analytical	   parameter.	   	   The	  violation	  of	  this	  requirement	  was	  described	  in	  Chapter	  3.	  	  	  	  Patient	  results	  need	  to	  be	  reported	  at	  a	  usable	  timeframe.	  	  The	  delay	  of	  a	  reported	  patient	   result	   leaves	   the	  medical	   staff	   and	  patient	   in	  a	  potentially	  hazardous	   state	  (H2)	   since	   the	   patient	  maybe	   under	   a	   critical	   situation	   (i.e.	   surgery),	   and	   require	  immediate	  intervention.	  	   	   	  Any	  unnecessary	  delay	  to	  the	  needed	  medical	  treatment	  could	  cause	  injury	  or	  death	  to	  the	  patient.	  	  	  The	  ensuing	  requirements	  address	  this	  concern	   by	   necessitating	   that	   all	   patient	   samples	   are	   reported	   with	   an	   X	   turn-­‐around-­‐time.	  	  	  	  	  H3	   prevents	   patient	   diagnosis	   to	   be	   performed	   because	   the	   system	   is	   totally	  unavailable	   due	   to	   premature	   system	   shutdown.	   	   The	   shutdown	   may	   be	   due	   to	  physical,	   software,	   or	   sensor	   related	   issues.	   	   The	   inaccessibility	   of	   this	   diagnostic	  system	  creates	  a	  significant	  hazardous	  situation,	  as	   the	  patient	  status	   is	  unknown.	  	  Without	   correct	   blood	   diagnostics,	   the	   medical	   staff	   is	   literally	   “blind”	   to	   the	  patient’s	  status,	  and	  is	  unable	  to	  make	  a	  confident	  or	  correct	  medical	  decision.	  	  SR3	  can	  be	  designed	  into	  the	  system	  from	  the	  system	  level	  down	  to	  the	  component,	  so	  that	  cartridge	  life	  up	  time	  can	  be	  maximized	  and	  hazardous	  conditions	  thwarted.	  	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  case	  study,	  the	  hazard	  that	  will	  be	  analyzed	  is	  H1.	  The	  system	  reports	  erroneous	  patients	  results	  to	  the	  medical	  staff	   is	  the	  hazard	  that	  led	  to	  the	  medical	  casualty,	  and	  subsequent	  case	  accident.	  	  Furthermore,	  while	  not	  specifically	  analyzed,	  H2	   is	   plays	   an	   important	   factor	   into	   the	   case	   accident	   that	  will	   be	   later	  discussed.	  	  
4.4	  	  System	  Control	  Structure	  	  As	   described	   in	   Chapter	   2,	   a	   safety	   control	   structure	   is	   needed	   to	   investigate	   the	  accident	   to	   show	   the	   hierarchical	   relationship	   of	   control	   throughout	   the	   system.	  	  While	  CAST	  is	  applicable	  at	  the	  organization,	  environmental,	  and	  technical	  level,	  in	  this	   case,	   the	   physical	   system	   is	   the	   first	   control	   structure	   that	   needs	   to	   be	  investigated	   to	   understand	   the	   factors	   leading	   to	   the	   accident	   [7].	   	   Therefore	   the	  boundary	   of	   the	   CAST	   analysis	   and	   thesis	   will	   be	   the	   technical	   system.	  	  Organizational	  and	  environmental	  factors	  may	  be	  discussed,	  but	  are	  not	  in	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  thesis.	  The	  control	  structure	  of	  the	  technical	  case	  system	  has	  been	  generated	  to	   the	   author’s	   knowledge	   and	   interpretation	  of	   the	   case	   system	  and	   is	   located	   in	  Figure	  12	  below.	  	  The	  hyphenated	  red	  line	  denotes	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  thesis.	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As	  Figure	  12	   shows,	   the	   case	   study	  control	   structure	   is	   complex,	   containing	  many	  elements	  within	  multiple	   layers.	   	   It	   is	   noted	   that	   there	   are	  more	   elements	   to	   the	  control	   structure,	   but	   the	   shown	   elements	   are	   the	   critical	   factors	   for	   this	   thesis	  discussion.	  	  	  The	  basic	  control	  loop	  elements	  described	  in	  Chapter	  2	  are	  present,	  and	  the	   relationships	  between	  all	   elements	   are	  explicitly	   shown	  and	  enumerated.	   	   For	  the	   purpose	   of	   the	   thesis	   discussion,	   the	   control	   loops	  will	   be	   referred	   by	   a	   case	  sensitive	  4-­‐part	  naming	  convention.	   	  For	  example,	   the	  Fluidic	  Controller	  –	  Pump	  –	  Fluid	  Transport	  Control	  Process	  –	  Pump	  Motor	  Flag	  Signal	  loop,	  will	  be	  referred	  to	  as	  control	  loop	  “ss-­‐tt-­‐uu-­‐vv”.	  	  Similarly,	  each	  relationship	  between	  two	  elements	  will	  be	  defined	  as	  a	  single	  link	  (i.e.	  “tt”	  for	  the	  Pump	  to	  Fluid	  Transport	  Control	  Process).	  	  This	  nomenclature	  will	  be	  utilized	  throughout	  this	  thesis.	  	  	  	  The	   creation	  of	   the	   technical	   control	   structure	  began	  at	   the	  highest	   level	  with	   the	  user.	  	  The	  single	  straightforward	  but	  influential	  control	  loop	  α-­‐β-­‐γ-­‐δ	  predominately	  dictates	   the	   value	   delivery	   of	   the	   system.	   	   The	   Greek	   alphabet	   nomenclature	  was	  used	   to	   distinguish	   the	   origin	   of	   the	   control	   structure,	   and	   highest	   chain	   of	  command.	   	   After	   establishing	   the	   control	   structure	   origin,	   the	   controlled	   process	  element	  was	  evaluated	  further	  and	  functionally	  decomposed.	  	  Based	  on	  the	  author’s	  knowledge	  of	  the	  system	  architecture,	  the	  decomposition	  resulted	  in	  three	  separate	  controlled	   processes.	   	   The	   nomenclature	   of	   capitalized	   modern	   English	   Alphabet	  was	   used	   to	   distinguish	   the	   subordinate	   hierarchical	   level,	   and	   a	   commonality	  between	  the	  three	  levels	  since	  they	  work	  together	  to	  produce	  the	  higher	  level	  value.	  	  Finally,	  each	  of	  the	  three	  controlled	  process	  was	  further	  detailed	  with	  more	  specific	  controlled	   processes.	   	   This	   is	   denoted	   by	   usage	   of	   lower	   case	   modern	   English	  Alphabet,	  and	  the	  number	  of	  letter	  replicates	  helped	  dictate	  and	  group	  the	  detailed	  controlled	   process.	   	   For	   example,	   all	   single	   letter	   (i.e.	   a)	   denotes	   subjection	   to	   a	  different	   controller	   than	   a	   triple	   letter	   loop	   (i.e.	   aaa).	   	   This	   facilitated	   the	  understanding	  and	  management	  of	  the	  numerous	  loops	  and	  elements	  in	  the	  control	  structure.	  	  	  	  As	   mentioned	   earlier,	   the	   User	   Control	   Structure	   is	   the	   highest-­‐level	   view	   of	   the	  system	  hierarchy.	  	  Essentially,	  it	  captures	  how	  the	  users	  (nurse	  and	  lab	  technicians)	  interact	  with	  the	  case	  system.	  	  The	  graphical	  user	  interface	  (GUI)	  allows	  the	  user	  to	  request	  function	  such	  as	  sample	  process,	   input	  patient	   information,	  review	  patient	  data,	   configures	   system	   settings	   and	   performs	   additional	   calibrations.	   	   The	  GUI	   is	  the	  actuator	  that	  sends	  commands	  to	  the	  Controlled	  Process,	  in	  this	  case	  the	  General	  Master	   Controller	   (GMC),	   for	   desired	   functions.	   	   Verifications	   of	   the	   requested	  processes	  are	  fed	  back	  to	  the	  user	  in	  the	  form	  of	  visual	  and	  auditory	  information.	  	  	  	  Decomposing	   the	   General	   Master	   Controller	   in	   the	   User	   Level	   System	   Control	  Structure,	   the	   next	   layer	   of	   the	   control	   structure	   shows	   more	   details	   about	   the	  internal	   controls.	   	   At	   this	   layer,	   the	  GMC	   serves	   as	   the	   Controller,	   and	   acts	   as	   the	  “master”	   for	   three	   lower	   lever	   controlled	   processes:	   	   System	  &	   Oximetry	   Control	  (SOC),	  Fluidic	  Control	  (FC),	  and	  the	  EC	  Sensor	  Control	  (ESC).	  	  The	  SOC	  maintains	  the	  overall	   system,	  Oximetry	   and	   EC	   analytical	   data	   processing.	   	   The	   FC	   oversees	   the	  fluidic	   system	   and	   maintains	   the	   pump,	   valves,	   and	   mechanical	   aspirator.	   	   The	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analog	   ESC	   monitors	   and	   records	   the	   EC	   sensor	   data	   from	   patient	   samples,	   and	  system	  calibrants.	  	  	  Each	  of	  the	  three	  controllers	  has	  dedicated	  actuator	  and	  sensor	  elements	  and	  are	  control	  commands	  and	  confirmation	  signals,	  respectively.	  	  	  	  Finally,	   to	   add	   details	   to	   the	   above	   three	   controllers,	   a	   more	   detailed	   control	  diagram	   for	   the	   technical	   system	   was	   generated	   to	   capture	   the	   Intra-­‐Controller	  system.	   	   In	   this	   view,	   the	   direct	   controls	   of	   the	   actual	   components	   (mechanics,	  electrical,	   software)	   are	   exhibited.	   	   As	   illustrated,	   the	   SOC,	   FC,	   and	   ESC	   work	  together	  concurrently	  and	  successively.	  	  The	  emergent	  function	  of	  these	  interactions	  is	  the	  system	  end	  value,	  the	  safe	  analysis	  and	  reporting	  of	  the	  patient	  sample	  result.	  	  In	  addition,	  almost	  20	  control	  loops	  also	  maintain	  other	  system	  functionalities	  such	  as	  calibrations,	  washing,	  and	  networking	  capabilities.	  	  	  
	  
4.5	  	  Control	  Structure	  under	  Normal	  Intended	  Usage:	  	  Most	   of	   the	   control	   loops	   work	   together	   in	   tandem	   or	   concurrently	   throughout	  Figure	   13	   to	   Figure	   17.	   	   These	   control	   loops	   may	   work	   in	   series,	   parallel,	   or	  independent	  from	  one	  another.	   	  For	  ease	  of	  discussion,	  the	  normal	  process	  will	  be	  divided	   into	   five	   basic	   steps:	   	   Sample	  Preparation,	  Aspiration,	   EC	   Sample	  Process,	  Oximetry	   &	   Patient	   Reporting,	   and	   Wash	   &	   Calibration	   Cycle.	   In	   addition,	   each	  control	  loop	  element	  that	  is	  used	  in	  the	  each	  step	  will	  be	  highlighted	  to	  illustrate	  the	  process	  flow	  and	  interaction	  between	  the	  various	  loops.	  	  For	  normal	  typical	  patient	  blood	  analysis,	  the	  user	  initiates	  the	  sample	  process	  with	  a	  single	  selection	  on	  the	  GUI.	  	  This	  initiates	  the	  sample	  preparation	  process	  and	  the	  control	  structure	  initiates	  several	  control	  actions.	   	  These	  enabled	  control	  loops	  are	  highlighted	  in	  Figure	  13	  below.	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   Control	  Loop	   Controlled	  Function	  aa-­‐bb-­‐cc-­‐dd	   Patient	  sample	  introduction	  into	  system	  ee-­‐ff-­‐gg-­‐hh	   Introduction	   of	   pre-­‐sample	   air	   segment	   and	  calibrant	  solution	  ii-­‐jj-­‐kk-­‐nn	   Selection	  of	  the	  Oximetry	  process	  ii-­‐ll-­‐mm-­‐nn	   Mixing	  Process	  disabled	  oo-­‐pp-­‐qq-­‐rr	   Selection	  of	  EC	  process	  ss-­‐tt-­‐uu-­‐vv	   Fluid	  transport	  mechanism	  	  The	   ESC	   has	   only	   the	   control	   loop	   aaa-­‐bbb-­‐ccc-­‐ddd	   enabled	   for	   detection	   and	  positioning	  of	  the	  sample.	  	  	  	  Once	  the	  system	  is	  ready	  to	  accept	  a	  blood	  sample,	  the	  user	  then	  presents	  the	  blood	  sample	   to	   the	   system,	  and	   initiates	   the	   sample	  aspiration	  process	  by	   selecting	   the	  LCD	   Touchscreen.	   	   This	   enables	   control	   loop	   ss-­‐tt-­‐uu-­‐vv	   to	   draw	   the	   necessary	  volume	   of	   sample	   into	   the	   system,	  while	   control	   loop	   aaa-­‐bbb-­‐ccc-­‐ddd	   is	   actively	  monitoring	   and	  position	   the	   sample	   in	   the	   correct	  EC	   area.	   	   This	   is	   highlighted	   in	  Figure	  14	  below.	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important	   to	   note	   that	   at	   this	   time,	   that	   the	   patient	   results	   need	   to	   be	   reported	  immediately	  for	  the	  TAT	  requirement	  compliance.	  	  The	  results	  are	  displayed	  on	  the	  GUI	  of	   the	   system	  whereby	   the	  user	   can	  explicitly	   see	   the	   results.	   	   In	   addition,	   an	  electronic	  version	  of	  the	  data	  is	  sent	  to	  the	  HIS	  (if	  available)	  via	  control	  loop	  q-­‐r-­‐s-­‐t,	  and	   a	   paper	   copy	   is	   produced	   in	   loop	   u-­‐v-­‐w-­‐x	   for	   physical	   documentation.	   	   The	  direct	   value	   delivery	   to	   the	   end	   user	   is	   designated	   in	   Figure	   15	   and	   Figure	   16	   as	  hyphenated	  lines.	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  Once	   the	   patient	   results	   have	   been	   reported,	   the	   system	   undergoes	   a	   wash	   &	  calibration	   cycle.	   	   The	   FC	   removes	   now	   unusable	   patient	   blood	   sample	   from	   the	  system	   and	   sends	   it	   to	   the	  waste	   containment	  module	   (not	   shown).	   	   The	   FC	   also	  flushes	   the	   entire	   system	  with	   proprietary	   solutions	   to	   remove	   any	   contaminants	  and	   carryover	   from	   the	   sample.	   	   After	   the	   flushing,	   the	   system	   performs	   a	  calibration	  on	  all	   sensors	   via	   loops	   aaa	   to	   lll	   (EC)	   and	   i-­‐j-­‐k-­‐l	   (Oximetry)	   to	   ensure	  that	   the	   system	   was	   able	   to	   return	   to	   a	   normal,	   safe	   state.	   	   Once	   an	   acceptable	  calibration	  values	  are	  measured	  and	  verified	  by	   the	  SOC,	   the	  system	   is	  now	  ready	  for	  the	  next	  patient	  sample.	  	  This	  is	  illustrated	  in	  Figure	  17	  below.	  	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note,	  that	  if	  the	  sensors	  do	  not	  pass	  this	  calibration,	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  subsequent	  washing	  and	  calibrations	  are	  performed	  until	   sensor	  has	   recovered.	   	   If	   the	   sensor	  does	  not	  recover	  within	  a	  predetermined	  range,	  the	  original	  patient	  result	  is	  flagged	  with	  a	  message	  indicating	  questionable	  results	  and	  all	  future	  patient	  results	  for	  this	  sensor	  are	  disabled.	  	  	  
	   56	  
	  







Sample & Calibrant 
Fluid Introduction 
Control Process








































































































Mixing Control Processll mm
m

















































































































	   57	  
4.6	  	  Proximal	  Chain	  of	  Events	  	  Due	   to	   Health	   Insurance	   Portability	   and	   Accountability	   Act	   (HIPAA)	   and	   other	  confidentiality	   factors,	   specific	   information	   of	   the	  medical	   accidents	   could	   not	   be	  obtained	  or	  published.	   	  Therefore,	  a	  general	  outline	  of	   the	  accident	  was	  generated	  based	  on	  the	  limited	  data	  found	  on	  the	  FDA	  MAUDE	  database,	  informal	  deductions,	  and	  professional	  experience	  with	  the	  case	  system.	  	   1. Patient	  is	  prescribed	  by	  physician(s)	  to	  be	  continuously	  observed	  by	  routine	  BMP	  (Basic	  Metabolic	  Panel)	  diagnostic	  testing	  for	  precaution	  due	  to	  several	  reasons	  (i.e.	  during	  operation,	  post	  operation	  recovery,	  observation).	  	  BMP	  usually	  evaluates	  the	  electrolyte	  levels	  in	  a	  patients	  blood	  supply:	  	  	  Variations	   of	   BMP	   exist,	   but	   the	   case	   sensor	   is	   a	   standard	   routine	   assay	  across	  clinical	  practices.	  	  	  	   2. Medical	   staff	   (Nurse,	   lab	   technicians)	   performs	   the	   regular	   BMP	   testing	   as	  prescribed	  on	  the	  patient.	  	  3. The	   case	   system	   appears	   to	   function	   normally	   (i.e.	   no	   system	   warnings)	  during	   patient	   sample	   analysis	   and	   reports	   an	   erroneous	   low	   electrolyte	  result,	  indicating	  a	  potential	  threatening	  hypo-­‐electrolytic	  condition.	  	  There	  is	  no	  immediate	  error	  message	  attached	  to	  the	  patient	  result.	  	  4. Medical	  staff	  quickly	  reacts	  to	  low	  electrolyte	  patient	  result	  by	  with	  medical	  intervention	   with	   potentially	   administering	   aqueous	   electrolyte	   solution	  intravenously	  to	  the	  patient	  to	  increase	  the	  believed	  low	  electrolyte	  level	  to	  normal	  levels.	  	   5. Since	  the	  patient	  actually	  had	  normal	  electrolyte	  levels,	  the	  sudden	  increase	  in	   electrolyte	   raises	   the	   level	   beyond	   normal	   range	   and	   induces	   a	   hyper-­‐electrolytic	   condition.	   	   The	   patient	   then	   may	   undergo	   cardiac	   arrhythmia,	  muscular	  fibrillation,	  epileptic	  seizure	  and/or	  death.	  	   6. Post	   accident	   investigation	   confirmed	   that	   the	   case	   system	   reported	  erroneously	  low	  electrolyte	  results	  when	  compared	  to	  a	  laboratory	  reference	  diagnostic	  system.	  	  It	   is	  presumed	  all	   erroneously	   low	  electrolyte	  medical	   adverse	  events	  occurred	   in	  clinical	  hospital	  environments,	  with	  some	  in	  critical	  patient	  areas	  such	  as	  intensive	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care	  areas	  or	  in	  the	  operation	  area.	  	  The	  hospital	  environment	  is	  extremely	  dynamic	  with	   peaks	   and	   valleys	   of	   activities.	   	   The	   number	   of	   patients	   usually	   remains	  relatively	   constant,	   but	   the	   level	   of	   medical	   staff	   peaks	   during	   the	   daytime	   and	  decline	   during	   the	   night	   shifts.	   	   Therefore,	   while	   intended	   use	   of	   the	   case	   study	  system	   remains	   constant,	   the	   medical	   staff	   on	   duty	   responsibilities	   changes	  accordingly	  to	  schedule.	  	  
4.7	  	  Analysis	  of	  Loss	  at	  the	  Physical	  System	  Level	  	  It	   was	   found	   that	   a	   foreign	   material	   was	   an	   immediate	   cause	   that	   leads	   to	  erroneously	  diagnosing	  the	  low	  levels	  of	  a	  specific	  electrolyte	  in	  the	  blood.	  	  A	  foreign	  mass	  was	  present	  on	  the	  surface	  of	  the	  specific	  electrolyte	  membrane	  in	  study,	  and	  physically	  covered	  it.	  	  In	  normal	  working	  electrodes,	  the	  ion	  selective	  membrane	  of	  an	  electrochemical	  cell	  attracts	  the	  specific	  electrolyte	  ion	  in	  a	  patient	  blood	  sample	  (see	   left	   side	   of	   Figure	   18).	   	   By	   measuring	   the	   potential	   difference	   between	   the	  reference	  and	  working	  electrode,	   the	  value	  recorded	  can	  be	  related	   to	   the	  specific	  activity	  of	   the	  targeted	  electrolyte	   ion	   in	  blood.	   	  This	   is	   the	  eventual	  clinical	  result	  that	  is	  reported	  to	  the	  user.	  	  	  	  In	   the	   case	  of	   the	  accident,	   the	   foreign	  mass	  prevented	   the	   transport	  of	   the	  blood	  ions	   into	   the	   sensor,	   and	   thus	   affects	   the	   potentiometric	  measurement	   (see	   right	  side	  of	   Figure	  18).	   	   By	  blocking	   the	   correct	   ion	   transport	   flow	   into	   the	   sensor,	   an	  erroneous	  low	  result	  will	  be	  reported	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  normal	  electrolyte	  level	  in	  the	  blood.	  	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  18.	  	  Electrochemical	  Potentiometric	  Cell	  Efforts	  by	  the	  case	  company	  found	  that	  the	  removal	  of	  the	  foreign	  mass	  covering	  the	  membrane	   eliminates	   the	   erroneous	   low	   results	   of	   that	   particular	   sensor.	   	   It	  was	  also	  found	  that	  the	  sensor	  itself	  did	  not	  have	  failures	  and	  had	  the	  proper	  ion	  transfer	  capability.	  	  Therefore,	  the	  company	  then	  focused	  on	  activities	  to	  prevent	  the	  foreign	  mass	   from	   covering	   the	   sensor.	   	   The	   details	   of	   the	   foreign	   material	   will	   not	   be	  discussed	  further	  in	  this	  thesis,	  as	  it	  is	  not	  needed	  for	  the	  CAST	  analysis.	  	  While	  the	  immediate	  cause	  is	  a	  significant	  element,	  it	  does	  not	  really	  explain	  how	  such	  a	  fault	  was	  allowed	  to	  deviate	   in	   the	  product	  while	   the	  company’s	  design	  and	  production	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engineers	  thought	  they	  were	  producing	  a	  high	  quality	  product	  able	  to	  control	  fault	  system	   variations.	   	   The	   rest	   of	   the	   chapter	   applies	   the	   STAMP	  model	   to	   illustrate	  that	   the	   cause	   of	   the	   accident	   was	   an	   absence	   of	   control	   of	   the	   case	   system,	   not	  merely	  a	  component	  failure.	  	  	  
	  
4.8	  	  CAST	  Analysis	  	  The	  next	  step	  is	  to	  specifically	  investigate	  the	  control	  loops	  that	  may	  have	  initiated	  the	  recall.	  	  The	  objective	  is	  to	  look	  for	  violation	  of	  safety	  constraints	  that	  may	  have	  come	  from	  other	  control	  loops.	  	  From	  the	  main	  control	  structure	  located	  in	  Figure	  12,	  there	   were	   seven	   identified	   control	   loops	   across	   all	   three	   identified	   control	  structure	  layers	  that	  may	  have	  been	  a	  factor	  in	  the	  erroneous	  patient	  result	  hazard.	  	  They	  are	  listed	  below:	  	  
Control	  Layer	   Controlled	  Process	   Control	  Loop	  Intra	   Potentiometric	  recording	  	   eee-­‐fff-­‐ggg-­‐hhh	  Intra	   Electrical	  Signal	  Transformation	  	   mmm-­‐nnn-­‐ooo-­‐ppp	  Internal	   ESC	  data	  transfer	  to	  FSC	  	   I-­‐J-­‐K-­‐L	  Internal	   FSC	  data	  transfer	  to	  SOC	   E-­‐F-­‐G-­‐H	  Intra	   EC	  and	  Analysis	   m-­‐n-­‐o-­‐p	  Internal	   SOC	  data	  transfer	  to	  GMC	   A-­‐B-­‐C-­‐D	  User	  *	   GMC	  data	  display	  to	  Operator	   α-­‐β-­‐γ-­‐δ	  
*	  Outside	  scope	  of	  thesis	  	  	  Three	  control	  loops	  of	  interest	  were	  found	  in	  the	  intra-­‐controller	  layer,	  while	  others	  found	  in	  each	  of	  the	  higher	  layers	  (Internal	  and	  User	  Level).	  	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  thesis,	  only	  the	  first	  six	  located	  in	  list	  above	  will	  be	  further	  analyzed	  and	  discussed.	  	  The	  other	  one	  will	  not	  be	  discussed,	  and	  is	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  thesis.	  	  It	  will	  be	  assumed	  that	  all	  other	  loops	  were	  functioning	  correctly.	  	  	  	  The	   identified	  control	   loops	  of	   interest	  will	  now	  be	  analyzed	  for	   factors	  that	  could	  contribute	   to	   a	   hazardous	   state.	   	   	   Leveson	   established	   several	   classifications	   of	  control	   loop	   deficiencies	   that	   could	   lead	   to	   hazards.	   	   This	   captured	   in	   Figure	   19	  below	  from	  Leveson	  [7]	  with	  the	  encircled	  numbers.	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Figure	  19.	  	  General	  Control	  Deficiencies	  Leading	  to	  Hazards	  	  Four	  significant	  encircled	  categories	  in	  the	  above	  figure	  are	  briefly	  described	  below:	  	   1. Unsafe	  Inputs	  to	  the	  Controller:	  	  	  The	  delivery	  of	  unsafe	  information	  from	  an	  external	  system	  or	  user	  onto	  the	  controller	   that	   leads	   to	   hazardous	   state.	   	   The	   information	  may	   be	  missing,	  inadequate,	  or	  clearly	  wrong.	  	  	  	  2. Unsafe	  Control	  Algorithms	  in	  Controller:	  	  	  The	   execution	   of	   inadequate	   or	   unsafe	   logical	   programs	   by	   the	   controller	  onto	   the	   control	   loop.	   	   	   Since	   humans	   develop	   the	   programs,	   they	   are	  susceptible	  to	  error,	  logical	  flaws,	  or	  inadequate	  design.	  	  3. Incorrect	  Process	  Models	  on	  Controller	  and	  Sensor:	  	  	  Inaccurate	  model	   of	   the	   process	   by	   the	   Controller	   and	   Sensor	   that	   doesn’t	  reflect	   the	  actual	  process.	   	   Failure	  examples	   include	  missing	  data,	   feedback	  controls,	  and	  response	  delays.	  	  	  	   4. Inadequate	  Operation	  on	  the	  Actuator	  and	  Controlled	  Process:	  	  	  The	   inability	   to	  execute	  the	  control	  actions	  properly	  by	  the	  actuator	  and	  or	  controlled	   process.	   	   Common	   failures	   are	   transmission	   of	   control	   signals,	  component	  failure,	  or	  inadequate	  inputs	  from	  other	  entities	  in	  the	  system.	  	  	  	  In	   addition	   to	   the	   above	   categories,	   there	   are	   several	   other	   considerations	  illustrated	   in	   Figure	   19	   that	   can	   also	   elucidate	   potential	   causes	   of	   hazards.	   By	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superimposing	   the	   elements	   of	   the	   control	   loop	   of	   interest	   in	   Figure	   19,	   every	  element	  and	  linkage	  will	  be	  analyzed	  with	  the	  basic	  question	  “How	  could	  the	  ‘guide	  words’	   lead	   to	   the	   specific	   hazard?”	   	   	   This	  would	   be	   performed	   along	   the	   control	  loop	   on	   all	   elements,	   and	   continue	   will	   all	   relevant	   control	   loops	   of	   the	   focused	  hazard.	  	  	  	  Using	   this	   framework	   for	   the	   thesis	   CAST	   analysis,	   the	   intent	   is	   to	   identify	   the	  hazards	   that	   led	   to	   the	   case	   accident.	   	   The	   focus	   of	   the	   analysis	   will	   be	   for	   H1:	  	  Accurate	  patient	  results	  must	  be	  reported	  to	  the	  medical	  staff	  at	  all	  time,	  since	  this	  was	  the	  catalyst	  for	  the	  FDA	  recall.	  	  	  	  The	  identified	  hazards	  of	  the	  case	  accident	  will	  serve	   as	   the	   driver	   to	   the	   design	   requirements	   that	  will	   be	   generated	   in	   the	   next	  section.	  	  Furthermore,	  during	  the	  CAST	  analysis,	  additional	  hazards	  that	  could	  lead	  to	   other	   accidents	   will	   be	   documented	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   comparing	   against	   the	  original	  set	  of	  hazards	  identified	  by	  the	  standard	  FMECA	  methodology.	  	  	  To	  begin	  the	  analysis,	  the	  lowest	  control	  loop,	  eee-­‐fff-­‐ggg-­‐hhh,	  will	  be	  discussed	  first	  since	   this	   is	  where	   the	   hazards	   initiated.	   	   The	   results	   from	   this	   loop	   analysis	  will	  later	   show	   how	   these	   failures	   move	   up	   to	   higher	   levels	   of	   the	   control	   structure.	  	  Further	  discussion	  will	  discuss	  why	  each	  higher	   layer	   failed	   to	  control	   the	  hazard.	  	  As	  a	  reminder	  control	  loop	  of	  eee-­‐fff-­‐ggg-­‐hhh,	  it	  records	  the	  potentiometric	  readings	  directly	  off	  the	  patient	  sample,	  and	  is	  shown	  again	  at	  the	  bottom	  of	  Figure	  20.	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Table	  7.	  	  CAST	  Results	  Table	  for	  Control	  Loops	  
Note:	  Underlined	  items	  are	  relevant	  to	  case	  accident	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Table	  8.	  	  CAST	  Results	  Table	  for	  Control	  Loops	  Continued	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  As	   the	  above	   tables	  show,	  by	  going	   through	  each	  of	   the	  six	  control	   loop,	  and	   their	  elements,	   and	   analyzing	   areas	   of	   deficiencies,	   many	   potential	   hazards	   were	  identified.	  	  Over	  175	  hazards	  were	  generated	  through	  this	  analysis,	  and	  some	  were	  directly	  related	  to	  the	  case	  accident	  and	  primary	  contributor	  to	  patient	  injury.	  	  The	  following	  sections	  discuses	  the	  hazards	  found	  for	  each	  control	  loop.	  	  	  	  For	   H1	   and	   the	   case	   accident,	   there	   were	   nine	   hazards	   (underlined)	   that	   were	  identified	  that	  could	  have	  lead	  to	  patient	  injury.	  	  A	  contributing	  factor	  of	  the	  physical	  loss	  of	  the	  case	  accident	  was	  identified,	  as	  “inadequate	  transfer	  of	  ion	  to	  membrane”	  in	   the	   eee-­‐fff-­‐ggg-­‐hhh	   control	   loops	   and	   can	  describe	   the	  physical	   blockage	   of	   the	  membrane.	  	  This	  finding	  may	  seem	  biased	  to	  discovery	  since	  this	  analysis	  occurred	  post	  accident.	  	  A	  discussion	  on	  hindsight	  bias	  will	  be	  covered	  in	  the	  next	  section	  that	  addresses	   this	   situation.	   	   Another	   potential	   hazard	   discovered	   is	   that	   the	  potentiometric	  results	  do	  not	  have	  any	  immediate	  checks	  to	  verify	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  data.	  	  This	  could	  lead	  to	  erroneous	  clinical	  data	  upstream,	  and	  may	  be	  a	  factor	  in	  the	  case	  accident.	  	  	  	  From	   the	   above	   list,	   there	   are	   litanies	   of	   hazards	   easily	   identifiable	   in	   the	   next	  control	   loop,	   mmm-­‐nnn-­‐ooo-­‐ppp,	   that	   focus	   on	   the	   conversion	   of	   the	   analog	  potentiometric	   values	   into	   digital	   values.	   	   While	   analog	   to	   digital	   converter	   is	  mature	   technology,	   there	   are	   several	   hazards	   that	   are	   identified	   such	   as	   errors	   in	  the	   data	   handling,	   gaps	   in	   the	   conversion	   process,	   and	   unsafe	   process	   models.	  	  These	  hazards	  may	  not	  be	  covered	  in	  the	  original	  FMECA	  analysis	  and	  will	  be	  a	  part	  of	  the	  gap	  analysis	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  	  In	   the	  next	   loop,	   I-­‐J-­‐K-­‐L,	   the	  digital	  data	   is	  now	  requested	  by	   the	  FC	   from	  the	  ESC	  that	   will	   eventually	   be	   sent	   to	   the	   SOC.	   During	   this	   control	   loop	   analysis,	   it	   is	  recognized	   that	   the	   software	   engineering	   knowledge	   is	   limited	   for	   the	   author.	  	  	  However,	  there	  were	  several	  hazards	  easily	  identified	  using	  the	  guidelines	  in	  Figure	  19.	  	  It	  provided	  the	  structure	  necessary	  for	  a	  comprehensive	  hazard	  analysis.	  	  Some	  hazards	  identified	  were	  left	  nondescript	  such	  as	  inadequate	  data	  transfer.	  	  This	  may	  indicate	  missing,	   late,	   erroneous	   transfer	  processes	  which	  maybe	  an	  advantage	   to	  discover	  new	  conditions	  at	  which	  the	  control	  loop	  migrates	  to	  an	  unsafe	  state.	  	  Once	  the	  data	  is	  obtained	  by	  the	  FC,	  it	  is	  similarly	  transported	  to	  the	  SOC	  by	  control	  loop	  E-­‐F-­‐G-­‐H.	  	  The	  same	  data	  transfer	  hazards	  were	  identified	  in	  Table	  8.	  	  	  	  In	  control	  loop,	  m-­‐n-­‐o-­‐p,	  the	  transported	  digital	  data	  originally	  from	  the	  EC	  is	  now	  converted	  to	  usable,	  clinical	  data.	   	  The	  case	  study’s	  proprietary	  software	  algorithm	  performs	  this	  conversion	  and	  analyzes	  the	  results	  for	  quality.	  This	  analysis	  is	  where	  the	  CLIA	  88	  standards	  serve	  as	  for	  quality	  guidelines,	  such	  as	  total	  allowable	  error.	  	  	  In	  addition,	  this	  same	  control	  loop	  is	  later	  used	  for	  sensor	  integrity	  check	  during	  the	  calibration	  in	  the	  subsequent	  wash	  cycle,	  which	  will	  later	  be	  discussed	  in	  detail	  as	  a	  significant	   factor	   to	   the	   case	  accident.	   	  Both	   these	  hazards,	  plus	   an	  additional	  one	  related	  to	  the	  case	  accident	  are	  underlined	  in	  Table	  8.	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  In	   the	   last	   control	   loop	   for	   CAST,	   the	   GMC	   recalls	   the	   clinical	   data	   to	   report	   it	  upstream	  to	  the	  user	  immediately	  to	  satisfy	  SR2	  TAT	  requirement.	  	  The	  control	  loop,	  A-­‐B-­‐C-­‐D,	   is	   similar	   to	   the	   other	   control	   loops	   where	   data	   is	   transferred	   up	   the	  hierarchical	  structure.	   	   	  Therefore	  similar	  hazards	  were	  found	  for	  this	  control	  loop	  as	  were	  for	  the	  other	  data	  transfer	  control	  loops.	   	  It	  is	  noted	  that	  the	  adherence	  to	  the	   TAT	   requirement	   will	   play	   a	   significant	   role	   in	   the	   case	   accident	   and	   will	   be	  discussed	  in	  detail	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  	  It	   is	   at	   this	   point	  where	   the	   control	   structure	   is	   assumed	   to	  perform	  as	  designed.	  	  The	  GMC	   reports	   the	   “quality	   controlled”	   analyzed	  patient	   result	   in	   useful	   clinical	  form	   to	   the	   user	   in	   control	   loop	   α-­‐β-­‐γ-­‐δ	   within	   a	   desirable	   timeframe.	   	   After	  reporting	   the	   patient	   results	   to	   the	   user,	   the	   case	   system	   undergoes	   the	   normal	  design	   intended	  wash	  cycle	  and	  subsequent	   calibration	  as	  previously	  described	   in	  Figure	  17	  without	  issue.	  	  	  	  	  In	   conclusion,	   the	   CAST	   methodology	   was	   applied	   to	   the	   case	   accident,	   and	   an	  extensive	   amount	   of	   hazards	  were	   identified.	   	   Of	   the	   over	   175	   hazards	   identified,	  nine	  were	   found	   to	  play	  a	   contributor	   to	   the	  case	  accident.	   	   In	   the	  next	   chapter,	   a	  further	  discussion	  on	  the	  CAST	  results	  will	  be	  conducted	  and	  generate	  safety	  design	  requirements	  and	  recommendations	  for	  the	  case	  system.	  	  	  	  These	  recommendations	  and	   requirements	   in	   the	   system	  design	  will	  manage	   the	   hazards	   identified	   in	   this	  section	  and	  fulfill	  the	  last	  section	  of	  the	  CAST	  analysis.	  	  Lastly,	  a	  gap	  analysis	  will	  be	  performed	  on	  case	  accident	  CAST	  results	  and	  the	  original	  FMECA	  results	  that	  were	  initially	   performed	  on	   the	   case	   system.	   	   This	   section	  will	   discuss	   any	  deficiencies,	  advantages,	  or	  variations	  between	  the	  two	  risk	  methodologies.	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CHAPTER	  5.	  	  CAST	  DISCUSSION	  
	  
"A	   system	   is	   a	   network	   of	   interdependent	   components	   that	   work	   together	   to	   try	   to	  
accomplish	  the	  aim	  of	  the	  system.	  A	  system	  must	  have	  an	  aim.	  Without	  an	  aim,	  there	  is	  
no	   system.	   ...A	   system	   must	   be	   managed.	   The	   secret	   is	   cooperation	   between	  
components	   toward	   the	   aim	   of	   the	   organization.	   We	   cannot	   afford	   the	   destructive	  
effect	  of	  competition."	  
-­‐William	  Edwards	  Deming	  	  	  As	   discussed	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   the	   CAST	   approach	   to	   system	   safety	   was	  applied	   to	  a	   case	  accident.	   	  Using	   the	  control	   structure,	  various	  contributors	  were	  identified	   that	  migrated	   the	   system	   to	   an	  unsafe	   state.	   	   The	   following	   section	  will	  explore	   the	   findings,	   generate	   improvement	   recommendations,	   and	  perform	  a	  gap	  analysis	  with	  the	  original	  risk	  assessment.	  	  	  	  
5.1	  	  Evaluation	  of	  Control	  Structure	  Dynamics,	  Coordination	  and	  Conflicts	  	  	  Based	  on	  the	  methodology	  described	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  the	  CAST	  analysis	  was	  applied	  to	  a	  medical	  accident	  involving	  a	  medical	  diagnostic	  system	  in	  Chapter	  4.	  	  There	  were	  nine	   items	   of	   deficiencies	   in	   the	   system	   control	   structure	   and	   they	   can	   be	  categorized	  into	  three	  distinct	  areas:	  	   1. The	   EC	   sensor	   could	   not	   immediately	   detect	   the	   presence	   of	   a	   foreign	  material	  on	  the	  sensor	  surface.	  2. Inadequate	   control	   of	   verifying	   abnormal	   potentiometric	   results	   at	   lower	  control	  level	  (Loop	  eee-­‐fff-­‐ggg-­‐hhh).	  3. Higher	  GMC	  constraint	  of	  reporting	  patient	  report	  before	  lower	  level	  control	  loop	  could	  verify	  sensor	  integrity.	  	  While	   there	  were	  six	   control	   loops	   identified	  with	   the	  case	  accident,	   three	  control	  loops,	  eee-­‐fff-­‐ggg-­‐hhh	  ,	  m-­‐n-­‐o-­‐p	  and	  A-­‐B-­‐C-­‐D,	  were	  significant	  contributors.	  	  Not	  only	  did	   the	   individual	   loop	  contributed	  to	   the	  hazardous	  event	  but	   the	  combination	  of	  these	  hazards	  lead	  to	  a	  significant	  control	  conflict.	  	  The	  CAST	  analysis	  found	  minimal	  hazards	  in	  the	  other	  three	  control	  loops	  contributing	  to	  the	  case	  accident.	  	  Control	   loop	  eee-­‐fff-­‐ggg-­‐hhh	  failed	  to	  detect	   the	  presence	  of	  any	   foreign	  matter	  on	  the	  surface	  of	   the	  electrolytic	   sensors.	   	  An	  analysis	  of	   the	  original	  FMECA,	   later	   in	  this	   section,	   did	   not	   specifically	   identify	   the	   presence	   of	   foreign	  materials	   on	   the	  sensor	   surface	   as	   a	   potential	   hazard.	   Therefore,	   based	   on	   the	   requirements,	   the	  health	   of	   the	   sensor	  was	   acceptable	   and	  working	   correctly,	   although	   there	  was	   a	  superficial	  layer	  preventing	  adequate	  ion	  transfer	  from	  the	  blood	  to	  the	  membrane.	  	  Based	   on	   the	   author’s	   knowledge	   of	   the	   system	   and	   case	   accident,	   there	   is	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technology	   that	   engineers	   can	   use	   to	   detect	   the	   foreign	  mass.	   	   This	   hazard	   could	  have	  been	  mitigated	  with	  minimal	  efforts,	  if	  it	  were	  identified	  early	  on.	  	  In	  addition,	  there	  are	  no	  lower	  level	  control	  algorithms	  to	  verify	  the	  potentiometric	  data	   for	   analytical	   accuracy	   and	  precision.	   	  This	   is	   left	   solely	   to	   the	  upper	   control	  loop,	  m-­‐n-­‐o-­‐p	  to	  perform.	   	  Therefore	  there	  are	  no	  mitigations	  in	  the	  system	  design	  to	  accommodate	  this	  type	  of	  error	  at	  a	  lower	  control	  level.	  	  This	  is	  the	  first	  symptom	  of	   failed	   controlled	   actions	   that	   allowed	  a	   failure	   to	   continue	   to	  perpetuate	   in	   the	  overall	   system.	   	   A	   countermeasure	   to	   perform	  data	   verification	   at	   the	   lower	   level	  may	   be	   able	   to	   catch	   errors	   more	   quickly,	   adds	   an	   additional	   level	   of	   controlled	  action	  and	  improve	  the	  analytical	  accuracy	  of	  the	  result.	  	  However,	  it	  is	  unknown	  to	  the	   author	   whether	   this	   is	   achievable	   with	   the	   current	   system	   configuration	   and	  architecture.	  	  While	  the	  previous	  deficiencies	  were	  shortcomings	  in	  the	  design,	  the	  last	  identified	  area,	   however,	   is	   the	   most	   significant	   factor	   in	   the	   case	   accident.	   	   It	   shows	   a	  potential	  conflict	  of	  design	  constraints	  that	  led	  to	  an	  accident	  without	  a	  component	  failure.	   	  The	  system	  performed	  as	  designed	  but	  a	  hazardous	  opportunity	  emerged	  due	  to	  inadequate	  control	  actions	  from	  various	  levels	  that	  lead	  to	  an	  unsafe	  system	  state.	  	  As	  a	  reminder,	  the	  higher	  control	  loop,	  A-­‐B-­‐C-­‐D,	  requires	  that	  the	  patient	  results	  are	  reported	  to	  the	  user	  as	  soon	  as	  they	  become	  available,	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  the	  TAT	  constraint.	   	   Violation	   of	   this	   constraint	   can	   lead	   to	   patient	   injury.	   	   The	   reporting	  control	  action	  is	  therefore	  an	  overarching	  control	  action,	  and	  can	  supersede	   lower	  level	  constraints.	  	  For	  the	  lower	  level	  control	  loop	  m-­‐n-­‐o-­‐p,	  there	  is	  a	  constraint	  to	  ensure	  the	  patient	  result	  meets	  quality	  CLIA	  standards	   for	  accuracy	  and	  precision.	   	  This	  ensures	   that	  the	  measured	   patient	   result	   is	  within	   a	   certain	   total	   allowable	   error	   of	   the	   actual	  patient	   status.	   	   As	   described	   earlier,	   this	   is	   one	   of	   the	  main	   cruxes	   of	   the	   510(k)	  approval	   process	   that	   verifies	   the	   system	   accurately	   and	   precisely	   measures	   the	  blood	  constituent	  levels	  within	  an	  acceptable	  range.	  	  	  	  In	   addition,	   the	   lower	   control	   loop	   also	   verifies	   that	   the	   system	   sensors	  maintain	  physical	  and	  performance	  integrity.	  	  As	  indicated	  earlier,	  calibrations	  of	  the	  sensors	  are	  performed	  during	  the	  wash	  cycle	  after	  every	  patient	  sample.	  	  The	  intent	  of	  this	  process	  is	  to	  monitor	  any	  sensor	  deterioration	  that	  may	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  analytical	  results.	   	  The	  electrochemical	   sensor	  will	  degrade	  over	   the	  use	   life	  due	   to	  physical	  and	  chemical	   limitations	   in	   the	  design.	   	  Therefore	   the	  washing	  cycle	  helps	   sustain	  and	  maintain	   the	   life	   of	   the	   sensor.	   	   The	   case	   accident	   investigation	   found	   that	   it	  cannot	  effectively	  remove	  the	  foreign	  matter	  on	  the	  sensor	  surface	  with	  the	  current	  system	  configuration.	  	  The	  original	  design	  was	  to	  specifically	  wash	  and	  remove	  any	  leftover	   patient	   sample	   after	   analysis,	   and	   did	   not	   consider	   the	   need	   to	   address	  foreign	  material.	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Once	  the	  wash	  and	  calibration	  cycle	  is	  performed,	  the	  sensor	  measurement	  is	  then	  compared	  to	  the	  previous	  calibration	  value,	  and	  must	  maintain	  an	  internal	  specified	  performance	   range	   determined	   by	   the	   case	   company.	   	   If	   the	   calibration	   has	  significant	  drifts	  or	  variation	  and	  fails	  the	  acceptance	  criteria,	  a	  warning	  message	  is	  only	  then	  attached	  to	  the	  original	  result	   indicating	  questionable	  results.	  This	  error	  flagging	  time	  delay	  provides	  a	  window	  of	  hazardous	  opportunity.	  	  	  	  Figure	  21	  illustrates	  the	  timing	  sequence	  of	  patient	  reporting	  and	  sensor	  calibration	  that	  provided	  a	  hazardous	   condition.	   	  As	   stated	  earlier,	   the	  SR2	   indicates	   that	   the	  case	  system	  must	  report	  the	  patient	  result	  within	  the	  TAT	  requirements	  of	  receiving	  a	   sample.	   	   Figure	   21	   shows	   this	   TAT	   requirement	   as	   X	   time	   for	   patient	   result	   to	  reach	  the	  user.	   	  The	  figure	  also	  shows	  the	  data	  reporting	   is	  before	  the	  subsequent	  calibration	  in	  the	  wash	  cycle.	  	  
	  
Figure	  21.	  	  Case	  System	  Timing	  Cycles	  	  For	  normal	  system	  performance	  after	  reporting	  a	  result,	   the	   time	  required	   for	   the	  Wash	  Cycle	   and	  Sensor	   calibration	   is	   the	   same	  X	   time.	   	   Therefore	  while	  TAT	   is	  X,	  verification	  of	  the	  sensor	   integrity	   is	  an	  additional	  X	   length	  of	  time	  if	   the	  sensor	   is	  normal.	   	  Any	  deviations	  will	  have	  an	  additional	  of	  Z	  subsequent	  calibration	  retries,	  and	  result	  in	  Z	  *	  X	  time	  delay.	  	  	  Therefore	  there	  is	  a	  conflict	  in	  constraints	  in	  the	  hierarchical	  control	  structure.	  	  The	  higher	   control	   loop,	   A-­‐B-­‐C-­‐D,	   require	   the	   patient	   results	   as	   soon	   as	   they	   become	  available.	   	   	   By	   adhering	   to	   this	   requirement,	   they	   may	   violate	   the	   m-­‐n-­‐o-­‐p	   loop	  control	  calibration	  algorithm	  that	  lead	  to	  the	  above	  identified	  hazard:	  	  Higher	  GMC	  constraint	   of	   reporting	  patient	   report	   before	   lower	   level	   control	   loop	   could	   verify	  sensor	   verification.	   	   This	   is	   a	   clear	   violation	   of	   hierarchical	   control	   of	   the	   system,	  and	  a	  conflict	  of	  constraints.	  	  This	  supports	  Leveson’s	  claim,	  the	  most	  common	  form	  of	  deficiency	  occurs	  when	  the	  process	  model	  is	  incomplete	  in	  terms	  of	  not	  defining	  appropriate	  behavior	  [13].	  	  As	  it	  will	  be	  discussed	  later	  in	  this	  chapter,	  the	  process	  model	   of	   the	   controller	   failed	   to	   perform	   the	   correct	   controlled	   process	   in	   the	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context	  of	  the	  case	  accident.	   	  The	  patient	  reporting	  should	  have	  been	  delayed	  until	  the	  sensor	  could	  be	  verified	  for	  integrity	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  foreign	  material.	  	  	  If	  a	  patient	  result	  is	  reported,	  and	  the	  sensor	  fails	  the	  subsequent	  calibration,	  future	  patient	  results	  are	  mandatorily	  tagged	  for	  that	  specific	  sensor	  issues.	  	  Furthermore,	  only	  when	  the	  calibration	  cycle	  is	  complete	  will	  the	  warning	  message	  be	  attached	  to	  the	   original	   result,	   which	   is	   after	   the	   results	   are	   reported	   to	   the	   user.	   	   If	   all	   the	  successive	  calibration	  Z	  retries	  fails,	  and	  the	  sensor	  is	  disabled	  and	  cannot	  be	  used	  for	  further	  diagnosis.	  	  	  This	  lengthened	  time	  could	  provide	  a	  different	  type	  of	  hazard,	  similar	  to	  H3,	  to	  the	  user	   if	   the	  sensor	  was	  needed	  for	  another	  patient	  analysis.	   	  A	  question	  that	  arises	  then,	   is	  why	  not	  simply	  wait	  until	   the	   first	  wash	  calibration	   is	  completed	  to	  ensure	  sensor	  integrity?	  	  The	  answer	   lies	   in	   the	  consideration	  of	   the	  other	  control	   loop,	  A-­‐B-­‐C-­‐D,	  where	  the	  General	   Master	   Controller	   reports	   the	   patient	   results	   to	   the	   user.	   	   As	   mentioned	  earlier,	   time	   is	  a	   critical	   factor	   in	  healthcare	  and	   the	  TAT	   is	  a	   crucial	   requirement	  that	   must	   be	   maintained	   by	   the	   case	   system.	   	   Therefore,	   as	   soon	   as	   the	   patient	  results	  are	  ready,	  the	  system	  is	  designed	  to	  immediately	  send	  them	  to	  the	  medical	  staff	  regardless	  of	  the	  subsequent	  calibration	  outcome.	  	  The	  results	  are	  then	  used	  in	  a	  medical	  decision	  action	  on	  the	  patient.	  	  Since	  the	  intended	  use	  of	  the	  system	  is	  in	  critical	   areas	   of	   the	   hospital,	   the	   medical	   staff	   needs	   a	   fast	   TAT	   to	   react	   quickly	  emerging	  medical	  situations.	  	  Designing	  the	  system	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  TAT	  parameter	  first	  rather	  than	  analytical	  verification	  is	  a	  competitive	  business	  decision.	  	  In	  the	  POC	  environment,	  competing	  diagnostic	  analyzers	  of	  the	  case	  system	  have,	  in	  general,	  similar	  analytical	  accuracy	  and	  performance.	  	  This	  is	  verified	  by	  the	  adherence	  to	  the	  federal	  regulated	  CLIA	  88	  requirements.	   Therefore,	   a	   significant	   marketing	   leverage	   is	   the	   TAT	   where	   the	  users	  historically	  prefer	  systems	  with	  a	  faster	  TAT.	  	  	  Consequently,	  having	  a	  fast	  TAT	  is	   crucial	   in	   maintaining	   a	   competitive	   edge	   in	   the	   market.	   	   	   Therefore	   the	   case	  system	   designers	   and	   engineers	   developed	   a	   system	   and	   default	   configuration	   to	  meet	  this	  market	  demand.	  	  	  	  If	   the	   sensor	   calibration	   is	   suspect,	   the	   case	   system	   control	   structure	   assigns	   a	  warning	  message	   indicating	   a	   questionable	   patient	   data	   only	   after	   the	   calibration	  completes	  and	   fails	   the	  performance	  criteria.	   	  But	   this	  delay	   in	  syncing	   the	  sensor	  integrity	   check	   with	   the	   result	   may	   contribute	   to	   a	   hazardous	   situation.	   	   For	  example,	  if	  the	  patient	  was	  erroneously	  reported	  to	  have	  a	  low	  electrolytic	  level,	  the	  medical	   staff	   may	   need	   to	   quickly	   intervene	   by	   administering	   a	   high	   electrolytic	  solution	  to	  the	  patient.	  The	  medical	  staff	  may	  not	  see	  the	  patient	  results	  tagged	  with	  a	  warning	  message	  in	  time,	  or	  never	  see	  it	  at	  all.	  	  	  The	  patient	  may	  then	  experience	  a	  negative	   reaction	   to	   the	   erroneous	  medical	   treatment	   that	   could	   lead	   to	   injury	   or	  death.	  	  	  	  	  In	   addition	   to	   patient	   harm,	   there	   are	   further	   potential	   consequences.	   	   After	   the	  system	  verifies	  sensor	  malfunction,	  it	  flags	  the	  questionable	  patient	  result.	  	  Without	  
	   71	  
the	  knowledge	  of	  the	  case	  system	  and	  the	  time	  gap	  between	  sensor	  calibration	  after	  wash	  and	  flagging	  the	  data,	  an	  external	  investigator	  may	  then	  question	  why	  did	  the	  medical	   staff	   perform	   the	   harmful	   procedure	   based	   on	   suspicious	   data.	   	   This	  investigation	  on	  the	  adverse	  event	  may	  lead	  to	  false	  blame	  on	  the	  medical	  staff	  for	  administering	  the	  harmful	  procedure	  that	  lead	  to	  patient	  injury	  or	  death.	  	  	  Remedial	  actions	   may	   lead	   to	   more	   system	   training,	   reprimand	   or	   demotion,	   legal	   liability	  claims	  or	  even	  termination	  of	  the	  medical	  staff.	  	  These	  mitigations,	  however,	  do	  not	  solve	  the	  issue,	  and	  merely	  address	  the	  symptoms	  by	  focusing	  blame	  on	  the	  users.	  	  This	  is	  a	  common	  and	  reoccurring	  issue	  in	  accident	  analysis,	  where	  blame	  is	  falsely	  placed	   on	   the	   users	   and	   the	   real	   accident	   contributors	   are	   not	   understood	   and	  addressed	  [7].	  	  In	  summary	  a	  hazardous	  situation	  occurred	  due	  to	  the	  conflicting	  constraints	  in	  the	  hierarchical	   control	   structure.	   	   By	   allowing	   patient	   results	   to	   be	   reported	  immediately	   by	   the	   higher	   control	   level,	   it	   may	   undermine	   the	   subsequent	  calibration	   sequence	   at	   the	   lower	   system	   level.	   	   	   The	   CAST	   results	   facilitated	   in	  understanding	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  control	  structure,	  and	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  numerous	   control	   loops.	   	  By	  analyzing	   the	  potential	  hazards	  at	   each	   level,	   the	  divergence	   in	   constraints	   within	   the	   structure	   was	   readily	   observed.	   	   These	  constraining	  linkages	  maybe	  describe	  one	  of	  the	  medical	  adverse	  events	  described	  in	  the	  FDA	  MAUDE	  database.	  	  But	  due	  to	  privacy	  laws,	  this	  cannot	  be	  confirmed.	  	  A	  summary	  list	  of	  the	  analysis	  results	  and	  events	  is	  provided,	  but	  is	  not	  intended	  to	  suggest	  a	  linear	  chain	  of	  events.	  	  The	  intent	  is	  to	  show	  the	  numerous	  conditions	  that	  occurred	   before	   the	   accident	   and	   events	   may	   have	   happened	   sequentially,	   in	  parallel,	  or	  random.	  	  As	  described	  earlier	  there	  are	  several,	  dynamic	  situations	  that	  initiated	  the	  hazardous	  events.	  	  	  	  
• Foreign	  mass	  on	  sensors	  preventing	  adequate	  blood	  ion	  transfer.	  
• Obtain	  erroneously	  low	  potentiometric	  (analog)	  results.	  
• Erroneously	  low	  analog	  results	  converted	  to	  erroneously	  low	  digital	  results.	  
• Erroneously	  digital	  information	  sent	  to	  FC,	  then	  to	  SOC.	  
• SOC	  converts	  digital	  results	  to	  erroneously	  low	  clinical	  results.	  	  	  
• Erroneously	  low	  clinical	  result	  transferred	  upstream	  from	  SOC	  to	  GMC.	  
• GMC	  reports	  erroneously	  low	  clinical	  result	  to	  user	  (medical	  staff).	  	  	  
o Adverse	  medical	  decision	  is	  made	  based	  off	  erroneous	  result.	  
o Adverse	  medical	  procedure	  applied	  to	  patient.	  
o Adverse	  reaction	  to	  the	  procedure	  by	  the	  patient.	  
• Wash	  &	  Calibration	  Cycle	  begins	  after	  sample	  report.	  
• Calibration	   drift	   error	   checks	   on	   the	   sensor	   fail	   acceptable	   performance	  criteria.	  
• After	   X	   time	   after	   reporting	   result,	   the	   result	   is	   then	   flagged	  with	  warning	  message.	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By	  performing	  a	  CAST	  analysis	  on	  case	  accident,	  it	  elucidated	  several	  hazards	  that	  contributed	  to	  the	  case	  accident.	  	  Some	  of	  the	  hazards	  were	  due	  to	  inefficiencies	  in	  the	  lower	  control	  levels,	  and	  some	  are	  a	  direct	  incompatibility	  of	  competing	  constraints.	  	  With	  this	  knowledge	  of	  how	  these	  hazards	  happened,	  mitigations	  can	  be	  designed	  into	  the	  system	  to	  prevent	  future	  occurrences.	  
5.2	  New	  Design	  Requirements	  and	  Recommendations	  	  The	  next	  step	   in	  the	  CAST	  analysis	   is	  new	  system	  safety	  requirements	  can	  now	  be	  generated	   to	   prevent	   the	   identified	   CAST	   hazards.	   	   These	   requirements	   should	  control	   the	   hazards	   and	   prevent	   the	   system	   from	   migrating	   to	   an	   unsafe	   state.	  	  Based	  on	  the	  previous	  section,	  the	  following	  requirements	  were	  generated	  and	  are	  located	  in	  the	  table	  below.	  	  	  
Table	  9.	  New	  Design	  Requirements	  based	  of	  CAST	  Analysis	  #	   General	  Hazard	  Identified	  by	  CAST	   New	  System	  Design	  Requirement	  1	   The	   EC	   sensor	   could	   not	   detect	   the	  presence	   of	   a	   foreign	   material	   on	   the	  sensor	  surface.	   The	  system	  shall	  be	  able	  to	  detect	  the	  presence	   of	   foreign	   material	   on	   the	  sensor	   surface	   with	   X%	   confidence	  level.	  2	   Inadequate	   control	   of	   verifying	  abnormal	   potentiometric	   results	   at	  lower	  level.	   The	   system	   shall	   verify	   all	  potentiometric	   results	   for	   deviance	  at	   lower	  control	   levels	   in	  addition	  to	  the	  SOC.	  3	   Higher	   GMC	   constraint	   of	   reporting	  patient	  report	  before	  lower	  level	  control	  loop	  could	  verify	  sensor	  integrity.	   The	   system	   shall	   allow	   the	   sensor	  integrity	   verification	   in	   the	   wash	  cycle	   to	   complete	   before	   patient	  results	  are	  reported	  to	  the	  user.	  	  While	   there	   were	   nine	   hazards	   discovered	   during	   the	   CAST	   analysis	   that	   were	  related	   to	   the	   case	   accident,	   they	   were	   generalized	   into	   three	   categories	   as	  described	  in	  the	  previous	  section.	  	  The	  new	  system	  requirements	  were	  generated	  at	  this	   same	   high	   level	   with	   the	   potential	   to	   be	   further	   specified	   to	   the	   sub-­‐system	  level.	   	   Some	   of	   the	   sub-­‐system	   levels	   requirements	   and	   recommendations	  will	   be	  discussed	  in	  detail	  below.	  	  	  	  The	   CAST	   analysis	   showed	   that	   the	   case	   system	   requires	   a	   new	   functionality	   to	  detect	  foreign	  substances	  on	  the	  electrolytic	  sensor.	  While	  it	   is	  preferred	  to	  design	  the	  system	  to	  prevent	  foreign	  matter	  from	  occurring	  on	  the	  sensor	  at	  all,	  mitigation	  can	  be	   incorporated	   immediately	   to	  detect	   its	  presence	   in	  case	  this	   type	  of	  hazard	  emerged.	   	   Therefore	   the	  new	  developed	   requirement	   state	   that	   “the	   case	   systems	  shall	  be	  able	   to	  detect	   the	  presence	  of	   foreign	  material	  on	   the	  sensor	  surface	  with	  X%	  confidence	   level”.	   	  This	   indicates	  a	  new	  functional	  check	  on	   the	  sensor	   for	   the	  lower	   level	  ESC	  controller.	   	  A	   further	  derived	  subsystem	   level	   requirement	  and	  or	  specification	   may	   establish	   the	   sensor	   performance	   criteria.	   	   For	   example,	   the	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sensor	  may	  need	  to	  perform	  within	  a	  targeted	  electrical	  signal	  range	  to	  signify	  the	  presence	  of	   a	   foreign	   substance	  on	   the	   superficial	   layer.	   	  Another	   subsystem	   level	  requirement	  may	  establish	  the	  frequency	  of	  the	  check,	  definition	  of	  various	  severity	  levels,	  and	  their	  subsequent	  actions	  such	  as	  error	  flagging,	  initiating	  system	  washes,	  or	  alert	  the	  user	  of	  a	  potential	  compromised	  sensor.	   	  This	  detection	  capability	  will	  now	  allow	  the	  system	  to	  manage	  any	  issues	  with	  the	  ion	  transport	  process.	   	   	  With	  the	  author’s	  knowledge	  of	  the	  system	  and	  technology,	  this	  is	  a	  potential	  manageable	  design	  change	  that	  can	  be	  implemented	  into	  the	  current	  case	  system	  with	  minimal	  time	  and	  resources.	   	  For	  future	  development	  projects,	  this	  new	  safety	  requirement	  should	  still	  apply,	  but	  a	  focus	  on	  preventing	  the	  foreign	  matter	  introduction	  into	  the	  system	  needs	  to	  be	  considered.	  	  The	  second	  design	  requirement	  calls	  for	  system	  capability	  of	  verifying	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  sensor	  potentiometric	  results	  earlier	  in	  the	  sample	  process.	  	  It	  was	  found	  that	  the	   data	   verification	   was	   performed	   after	   initial	   acquisition	   and	   several	   data	  transfer	  transactions	  to	  a	  higher-­‐level	  control	  level.	  	  By	  emplacing	  an	  earlier	  voltage	  check	  prior	  to	  clinical	  conversion,	   it	  maybe	  able	  to	  detect	  erroneous	  errors	  earlier	  and	   flag	   the	   patient	   result	   as	   “questionable”.	   	   With	   the	   earlier	   requirement	   of	  detecting	   foreign	   substances	  on	   the	   sensor,	   acceptable	  potentiometric	   ranges	  may	  be	  established	  and	  used	  to	  verify	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  current	  results.	  	  This	  would	  add	  additional	   layer	   of	   safety	   control	   to	   prevent	   an	   isolated	   failure	   from	   becoming	   a	  systemic	   issue.	   	   This	   requirement	  may	   be	   a	   complementary	   design	   change	   to	   the	  previous	  one,	  but	  may	  require	  a	  more	  effort	  and	  resources	  based	  on	  the	  current	  case	  system	  configuration.	  	  	  	  The	  last	  new	  system	  requirement	  is	  needed	  to	  resolve	  the	  conflict	  and	  manage	  the	  various	  constraints	  across	  the	  case	  system	  control	  structure.	  	  Since	  the	  reporting	  of	  erroneous	  patient	  results	  is	  a	  pre-­‐established	  high	  level	  system	  hazard	  (H1)	  before	  the	  CAST	  analysis,	  and	  a	  significant	  contributor	  of	  the	  medical	  accidents	  to	  patients,	  the	   new	   system	   design	   requirement	   shall	   enforce	   the	   system	   to	   mandatorily	  complete	  the	  sensor	  integrity	  verification	  in	  the	  wash	  cycle	  before	  reporting	  results	  to	  the	  user.	  	  This	  will	  ensure	  the	  accuracy	  and	  integrity	  of	  the	  clinical	  data	  that	  will	  be	  used	  for	  subsequent	  medical	  procedures.	  	  	  	  After	  investigation	  of	  the	  case	  system	  by	  the	  author,	  there	  is	  already	  a	  design	  option	  in	   the	   case	   system	   configuration	   that	   allows	   the	   user	   to	   delay	   the	   patient	   result	  reporting	  until	   the	   sensor	   is	   calibrated	  and	  verified.	   	  However,	   the	  default	   system	  configuration	   is	   to	   report	   the	   patient	   results	   immediately	   to	   satisfy	   the	   market	  driven	  TAT	  requirement	  in	  derived	  by	  H2.	  	  The	  user	  has	  to	  take	  additional	  steps	  to	  enable	   the	   option	   to	   delay	   the	   patient	   result	   reporting	   until	   after	   the	  wash	   cycle.	  	  Based	   on	   the	   CAST	   findings	   and	   previous	   discussions,	   this	   is	   a	   counter-­‐intuitive	  default	  system	  configuration	  setting	  that	  may	  lead	  to	  a	  hazard.	  	  Since	  it	  was	  shown	  that	  there	  is	  a	  window	  for	  hazardous	  opportunity	  to	  occur	  (see	  Figure	  21),	  system	  safety	   could	   be	   improved	   by	   allowing	   the	   system	   to	   fully	   verify	   the	   sensor’s	  performance	  post-­‐analytical	  processes.	   	  Adherence	  to	  TAT	  requirements	  is	  critical,	  
	   74	  
but	   should	   be	   secondary	   to	   the	   accurate	   and	   precise	   analytical	   diagnostic	  performance	  of	  the	  case	  system.	  	  	  	  As	  mentioned	  earlier,	  competing	  analyzers	  have	  similar	  diagnostics	  performance	  as	  defined	  by	  regulation	  standards.	  	  Therefore,	  a	  primary	  differentiator	  is	  the	  TAT	  for	  patient	   results.	   	   The	   market	   demand	   has	   dictated	   that	   a	   faster	   time	   to	   result	   is	  desirable,	   and	   has	   significant	   impact	   on	   the	   case	   system’s	   success,	   market	  penetration	  and	  overall	  profitability.	  	  The	  business	  and	  social	  pressures	  to	  meet	  the	  TAT	  takes	  priority,	  and	  is	  apparent	  in	  the	  default	  configuration	  of	  the	  case	  system.	  	  The	   engineers	   of	   the	   case	   company	   did	   not	   intentionally	   compromise	   analytical	  safety,	   but	   maintained	   marketability	   and	   competitive	   edge	   by	   meeting	   the	   user	  needs.	  	  	  	  However	   there	   may	   be	   situations	   where	   TAT	   is	   a	   more	   frequent	   and	   significant	  safety	  concern	   than	  the	  analytical	  performance	  of	   the	  system.	   	  To	   further	  mitigate	  this	  dynamics	   in	  constraints,	   the	  ultimate	  case	  system	  configuration	  should	  be	   left	  for	  the	  specific	  end	  user	  (i.e.	  medical	  staff).	  	  	  The	  case	  company	  should	  still	  provide	  a	  default	   system	   configuration	   that	   allows	   the	   case	   system	   to	   complete	   sensor	  calibration	  and	  prevent	  the	  window	  of	  hazardous	  opportunity.	  	  A	  recommendation,	  but	  not	  a	  requirement,	  is	  to	  allow	  the	  user	  to	  opt	  out	  of	  the	  sensor	  integrity	  check,	  rather	   than	   having	   the	   user	   opt	   into	   the	   integrity	   check.	   	   This	   would	   enforce	   a	  conscientious	   acknowledgement	   of	   the	   user	   to	   make	   the	   critical	   safety	   trade	   off	  decision	  between	  sensor	  check	  and	  TAT.	   	  A	  clear	  warning	  on	   the	  consequences	  of	  selecting	  this	  configuration	  should	  be	  provided	  by	  the	  case	  system,	  and	  frequently	  communicated	   by	   the	   case	   company.	   	   This	   would	   alleviate	   the	   case	   company	   of	  potential	   liability	   issues	   and	   allow	   the	   user	   in	   the	   context	   of	   their	   specific	  environment	   to	  make	   the	   safety	   tradeoff.	   	   The	   new	   recommended	   default	   system	  configuration	  could	  have	  prevented	  some	  of	  the	  medical	  accidents	  that	  catalyzed	  the	  FDA	  recall.	  	  However,	  due	  to	  privacy	  concerns,	  this	  cannot	  be	  confirmed.	  	  	  	  While	  overall	  safety	  should	  not	  ideally	  be	  a	  user-­‐selected	  option,	  a	  safety	  tradeoff	  is	  necessary	  with	  the	  current	  case	  system	  design.	  	  The	  recommendation	  for	  the	  user	  to	  have	  the	  option	  of	  selecting	  out	  of	  the	  sensor	  integrity	  check	  may	  appear	  to	  reduce	  safety	  in	  terms	  of	  analytical	  integrity.	  	  But	  there	  is	  a	  safety	  tradeoff	  in	  the	  time	  delay	  of	  needed	  medical	  information	  and	  may	  at	  times	  be	  more	  significant.	  	  In	  a	  non-­‐case	  accident	  example	  is	  the	  patient	  may	  have	  unknown	  cerebral	  hypoxia	  where	  there	  is	  a	  reduced	  oxygen	  supply	  to	  the	  brain	  and	  irreversible	  brain	  damage	  occurs	  within	  five	   minutes	   [41].	   	   Time	   to	   patient	   diagnosis	   therefore	   plays	   a	   critical	   role	   in	  adverting	   patient	   injury.	   	   The	   administering	   of	   oxygen	   to	   this	   patient	  may	   be	   life	  saving	   if	   the	   patient	   does	   in	   fact	   have	   low	   oxygen	   levels,	   and	   a	   faster	   time	   to	  oxygenation	  is	  desired.	  	  If	  the	  case	  system	  erroneously	  reports	  low	  levels	  of	  oxygen	  in	  the	  patient,	  the	  administering	  of	  unnecessary	  oxygen	  to	  the	  patient	  for	  a	  certain	  time	   is	   generally	   harmless.	   	   Therefore,	   the	   delay	   in	   patient	   reporting	   can	   play	   a	  significant	   safety	   factor	  more	  so	   than	  analytical	   integrity.	   	   	   It	   is	  noted	   that	  oxygen	  toxicity	   is	   plausible,	   but	   the	   levels	   of	   administered	   oxygen	   is	   assumed	   to	   be	   at	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normal	  clinical	  levels.	  This	  condition	  dynamic	  is	  a	  tradeoff	  that	  the	  users	  may	  need	  to	  analyze	  during	  the	  configuration	  of	  the	  case	  system.	  	  	  	  It	  is	  acknowledged	  that	  the	  current	  design	  is	  limited	  in	  providing	  complete	  safety	  in	  terms	  of	  TAT	  and	  sensor	  verification.	  	  This	  has	  been	  a	  difficult	  socio-­‐technical	  issue	  to	   analyze	   in	   terms	  of	  priority	   and	   significance.	   	   	   The	   author	  notes	   that	   this	   issue	  may	  never	  be	  resolved	  with	  the	  current	  case	  system	  configuration.	  	  The	  total	  safety	  of	   the	   system	  needs	  be	   considered	  but	  potentially	   juxtaposes	  market	   competition,	  profitability,	   and	   overall	   success	   of	   the	   case	   system.	   	   It	   is	   recommended	   that	   this	  issue	   needs	   to	   be	   communicated,	   debated,	   and	   analyzed	   extensively	   amongst	   the	  executive	  and	  technical	  stakeholders	  for	  any	  new	  diagnostic	  system	  development.	  	  Since	  time	  is	  an	  essential	  factor	  to	  the	  system	  performance	  and	  calibration,	  another	  subsequent	  design	  recommendation	  based	  on	  the	  CAST	  results	  is	  to	  reduce	  the	  time	  required	  for	  sensor	  calibration	  (i.e.	  X	  time	  in	  Figure	  21).	   	  While	  there	  is	  a	  physical	  and	   chemical	   limitation	   due	   to	   the	   sensor	  membrane	   diffusion	   rate,	   there	  maybe	  alternative	  methods	  to	  improve	  upon	  wash	  calibration	  sequence	  that	  would	  reduce	  the	   overall	   time.	   	   This	   may	   be	   reducing	   the	   volume	   of	   electrolyte	   ion	   selective	  membrane,	   alternating	   surfactant	   components	   in	   the	  wash	   solution,	   or	   increasing	  the	   solution	   flow	   in	   the	  wash	   cycle.	   	   These	   recommendations	  may	  not	   be	   feasible	  with	   the	   current	   case	   system,	   but	   should	   be	   considered	   for	   future	   diagnostic	  analyzers.	  	  	  	  Another	   safety	   design	   recommendation	   is	   to	   perform	   a	   quick	   sensor	   calibration	  immediately	  before	  the	  aspirating	  any	  blood	  sample.	  	  As	  mentioned	  earlier,	  with	  the	  current	   system	   design,	   sensor	   calibrations	   normally	   occur	   only	   in	   the	  wash	   cycle	  after	  sample.	   	   If	  no	  sample	  is	  programmed	  for	  greater	  than	  a	  pre-­‐established	  time,	  the	   case	   systems	  proprietary	   control	   algorithms	  perform	  an	   automatic	   calibration	  sequence.	  	  However,	  between	  these	  scheduled	  events,	  a	  foreign	  substance	  could	  be	  over	   sensor	   membrane	   preventing	   correct	   ion	   transport	   process.	   	   	   Therefore,	   by	  performing	  a	  calibration	  immediately	  prior	  to	  all	  samples,	  any	  sensor	  performance	  deviations	  could	  be	  caught	  and	  potentially	  prevent	  erroneous	  results	  to	  be	  reported.	  	  If	  this	  scenario	  occurred,	  the	  system	  could	  adjust	  in	  several	  ways:	  	  	  
• Prevent	  the	  user	  from	  inputting	  sample	  that	  would	  be	  otherwise	  wasted	  on	  a	  questionable	  sensor.	  	  	  
• Accept	   the	  patient	   sample,	  but	   immediately	   flag	   the	   results	  as	  questionable	  until	  the	  wash	  calibration	  can	  verify	  sensor	  integrity.	  	  	  
• Accept	   the	   patient	   sample,	   but	   disable	   the	   deviated	   sensor	   from	   reporting	  any	  results	  and	  inform	  user	  of	  the	  compromised	  sensor.	  	  As	  mentioned	  earlier,	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  foreign	  substance	  on	  the	  electrochemical	  sensor	  was	  a	  significant	   factor	   in	   the	  case	  accident.	   	  A	   recommendation	   for	   future	  system	  development	   is	   to	  design	   features	   that	  would	  prevent	   the	   foreign	  material	  from	  manifesting	  at	  all.	  	  This	  would	  prevent	  the	  situations	  such	  as	  the	  case	  accident	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from	  ever	  occurring,	  and	  ensure	  the	  safety	  of	  the	  analytical	  diagnosis	  of	  the	  patient.	  	  However,	  this	  may	  not	  be	  feasible	  with	  the	  current	  case	  system,	  and	  these	  types	  of	  efforts	  should	  be	  performed	  in	  new	  developing	  projects.	  	  	  	  	  Furthermore,	   after	   observing	   the	   tremendous	   benefit	   from	   a	   CAST	   analysis	   from	  half	   of	   the	   loops	   in	   the	   control	   structure	   with	   a	   single	   hazard	   (H1),	   it	   is	  recommended	  to	  continue	  the	  CAST	  analysis	  on	  other	  system	  hazards	  on	  all	  control	  loops.	   	   This	   would	   discover	  more	   hazards	   from	   the	   systems,	   and	   lead	   to	   a	   more	  safety	   design	   requirements	   and	  mitigation	   features.	   	   With	   a	   fully	   complete	   CAST	  analysis	   on	   the	   entire	   control	   structure,	   a	   comprehensively	   safe	   system	  would	   be	  developed.	  	  	  	  Finally,	   due	   to	   the	   scope	   and	   objective	   of	   this	   thesis,	   the	   CAST	   analysis	  was	   only	  performed	   on	   the	   technical	   system.	   	   CAST	   can	   be	   applied	   on	   a	   grander	   scale	   to	  discover	   factors	   to	   socio-­‐technical	   hazards.	   	   Examples	   of	   this	   are	   controls	   in	   the	  production	   processes,	   feedback	   cycles	   between	   design	   and	   manufacturing	  departments,	   quality	   audit	   control	   loops,	   and	   interactions	   between	   executive	  management	  and	  technical	  bodies.	   	  This	   is	  applicable	  to	  a	  company’s	  organization,	  between	   companies	   and	   regulatory	   bodies,	   and	   all	   the	   way	   up	   to	   government	  legislation.	   	   Leveson	   developed	   a	   general	   safety	   control	   structure	   in	   a	   regulated,	  safety	  critical	  industry	  that	  describes	  these	  connections	  and	  is	  illustrated	  in	  Figure	  22	  below.	  	  A	  complete	  CAST	  analysis	  on	  the	  entire	  socio-­‐technical	  control	  structure	  will	   elucidate	   many	   more	   hazards.	   	   By	   understanding	   the	   control	   issues,	  requirements	  to	  maintain	  the	  system	  at	  a	  safe	  state	  will	  ultimately	  provide	  a	  safer,	  more	  effective	  medical	  product	  to	  the	  end	  user.	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   1. 	  Patient	  Result	  Reporting	  Time	  
• Establish	   the	   case	   system	   settings	   so	   that	   the	   default	   configuration	  prohibits	   the	   reporting	   of	   patient	   results	   until	   after	   the	   sensor	  calibration	   in	   the	   wash	   cycle	   is	   complete.	   	   The	   tradeoff	   is	   it	   will	  increase	  the	  current	  TAT	  length	  two	  fold.	  
• If	  shorter	  TAT	  is	  more	  critical,	  allow	  the	  user	  the	  ability	  to	  “opt	  out”	  of	  this	  configuration	  setting.	   	  This	  would	  force	  the	  user	  to	  acknowledge	  and	  accept	  the	  inherent	  risk	  with	  faster	  TAT.	  	  	  2. Design	  control	  algorithms	  in	  the	  lower	  level	  controllers	  (specifically	  Control	  loop	  eee-­‐fff-­‐ggg-­‐hhh)	  to	  verify	  the	  absence	  or	  presence	  of	  foreign	  material	  on	  the	  surface	  of	  all	  electrolytic	  membranes.	  	  	  3. Initiate	  a	  sensor	  calibration	  immediately	  before	  the	  patient	  sample.	  	  	  4. Decrease	   the	   overall	   Wash	   Cycle	   and	   Sensor	   Calibration	   time,	   thereby	  reducing	  the	  “window	  of	  hazardous	  opportunity”.	  	  	  5. As	   mentioned	   earlier,	   the	   control	   structure	   presented	   was	   limited	   to	   the	  thesis	  boundary.	  	  Therefore,	  perform	  CAST	  analysis	  with	  more	  resources	  and	  more	  information	  of	  the	  system.	  6. Continue	   and	   complete	   a	   full	   CAST	   analysis	   on	   all	   control	   loops	   in	   the	  technical	  system.	  7. Perform	  a	  full	  CAST	  on	  the	  socio-­‐technical	  control	  structure.	  8. For	  new	  system	  development,	  implement	  design	  to	  prevent	  the	  foreign	  mass	  from	  appearing	  on	  the	  electrochemical	  sensor.	  	  	  These	  new	  design	  requirements	  were	  driven	  by	  the	  application	  of	  the	  CAST	  analysis.	  	  	  The	   past	   discussions	   have	   showed	   CAST	   can	   be	   used	   to	   design	   safety	   into	   the	  complex	  medical	  case	  system.	  	  The	  next	  question	  that	  emerges	  is	  how	  do	  the	  CAST	  results	   compared	   to	   the	  original	   risk	   analysis	  performed	  by	   the	   case	   company.	   	  A	  gap	   analysis	   on	   the	   CAST	   and	   industry	   standard	   FMECA	   methodology	   will	   be	  performed	  later	  in	  the	  chapter.	  	  	  	  
5.3	  Hindsight	  Bias	  Discussion	  	  As	  noted	  in	  the	  last	  chapter,	  the	  hazards	  for	  the	  medical	  accident	  were	  identified	  in	  the	  CAST	  analysis.	   	  It	  may	  seem	  it	  is	  a	  biased	  investigation	  since	  the	  CAST	  analysis	  was	   performed	   post	   accident	   with	   the	   author’s	   knowledge	   of	   the	   case	   accident.	  	  However,	  the	  methodology	  of	  the	  CAST	  dispels	  hindsight	  bias	  that	  may	  occur.	  	  Hindsight	   is	   the	  ability	   to	   look	  back	  on	  a	  sequence	  of	  events	   that	   lead	   to	  a	  known	  outcome	  [42].	  	  This	  retrospective	  lens	  allows	  the	  analyst	  to	  understand	  the	  nature	  of	  the	   situation,	   the	   people	   involved,	   and	   the	   context	   at	  why	   specific	   decisions	  were	  made	  at	   that	   time.	   	  By	   focusing	  on	  the	  cause-­‐consequence	  equivalence,	   this	  allows	  the	  analyst	  to	  focus	  only	  on	  a	  linear	  chain	  of	  events	  that	  lead	  to	  the	  undesired	  event.	  	  It	  assumes	  a	  “bad”	  process	   leads	  to	  a	  “bad”	  outcome.	   	  However,	   this	  simple	  cause-­‐consequence	   is	   problematic	   as	   the	   chain	   of	   events	   leading	   to	   an	   accident	   is	   not	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unequivocally	  clear	  in	  complex	  worlds.	  	  Sometimes	  “bad”	  processes	  may	  not	  lead	  to	  a	  bad	  consequence.	   	  Sometimes	  “good”	  processes	   lead	  to	  undesired	  outcomes,	   like	  adhering	  to	  the	  TAT	  requirement.	  	  This	  powerful	  but	  biased	  perspective	  deters	  the	  ability	  to	  objectively	  understand	  the	  problem	  by	  converting	  ambiguous,	  complicated	  complexities	  into	  a	  simple,	  linear	  chain	  of	  events.	  	  	  	  One	  of	  the	  strengths	  of	  the	  CAST	  analysis	  is	  that	  uses	  a	  systems	  approach	  to	  accident	  investigation.	   	   By	   utilizing	   a	   non-­‐linear	   approach	   to	   understand	   why	   the	   control	  structure	   performed	   what	   it	   thought	   was	   the	   correct	   action,	   CAST	   helps	   to	  objectively	  understand	  all	  the	  factors	  in	  the	  events	  leading	  to	  the	  incident.	  	  	  By	  using	  this	   holistic	   tactic,	   it	   deters	   the	   linear	   hindsight	   bias,	   false	   blame	   on	   people,	   and	  elucidates	  the	  real	  flaws	  in	  the	  system.	  	  	  	  With	   the	   case	   accident,	   it	   was	   the	   case	   systems	   programmed	   logic	   to	   avoid	   a	  hazardous	  condition	  by	  reporting	  patient	  results	  as	  fast	  as	  it	  could	  that	  undermined	  lower	   level	   controls	   such	   as	   sensor	   calibration	   sequences.	   	   This	   “good”	   process	  should	   have	   resulted	   in	   a	   “good”	   outcome,	   but	   it	   did	   not.	   	   By	   address	   the	   TAT	  requirement,	   the	   system	   developers	   did	   not	   intentionally	   compromise	   safety	   of	  analytical	   performance.	   	   The	  CAST	   analysis	   therefore	   provides	   the	   investigator	   or	  analyst	   (i.e.	   the	   author)	   an	   unbiased	   approach	   to	   risk	   analysis	   due	   to	   its	   rigid	  established	   structure	   of	   control	   loop	   examination	   as	   seen	   in	   Figure	   19.	   	  With	   the	  unprejudiced	  guidewords,	  a	  non-­‐partisan	  analysis	  of	  the	  accident	  can	  be	  performed,	  and	  hazards	  objectively	  identified.	  	  	  	  
5.4	  Gap	  Analysis	  of	  CAST	  and	  FMECA	  	  As	  mentioned	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  the	  case	  company	  performed	  an	  extensive	  FMECA	  on	  the	  case	   system.	   	   This	   effort	   complied	  with	   the	   FDA’s	   510(k)	   submission,	   specifically	  regulation	  21	  CFR	  820.30(g)	  on	  performing	  a	  risk	  assessment	  on	  the	  new	  medical	  system.	  	  	  It	  is	  a	  reminder	  to	  the	  reader	  that	  this	  FMECA	  technique	  is	  recommended	  in	   ISO	  14971,	   and	   that	   the	  FDA	  approved	   risk	   assessment	   for	   the	   case	   system	   for	  U.S.	   market	   introduction.	   	   The	   case	   company	   complied	   with	   all	   current	   federal	  regulations	  to	  risk	  and	  hazard	  analysis.	  	  	  	  The	   FMECA	   analysis	   was	   performed	   on	   all	   levels	   of	   the	   system,	   including	   most	  notably	  at	  the	  system	  level.	  	  The	  author	  reviewed	  the	  original	  FMEA	  analysis,	  and	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  risk	  analysis,	  less	  than	  70	  system	  level	  hazards	  were	  identified.	  	  For	  confidentiality	  reasons,	  the	  actual	  FMECA	  findings	  will	  not	  be	  displayed	  for	  the	  case	  system.	   	   However,	   the	   identified	   system	   level	   hazards	   were	   classified	   in	   the	  following	  categories:	  	  	  
• Electrical	  safety	  (14)	   • Storage	  conditions	  (3)	  
• Biohazard	  exposures	  (9)	  	   • Preventative	  maintenance	  (2)	  
• Chemical	  hazards	  (3)	   • User	  operations	  (3)	  
• Noise	  (1)	   • Packaging	  &	  labeling	  (3)	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• Handling	  (3)	  	   • Transportation	  (3)	  
• Operating	  conditions	  (4)	   • System	  operation	  (1)	  
• Calibration	  Processes	  (6)	   • Patient	  Error	  Handling	  (6)	  
• Sensor	  Performance	  (4)	   • Data	  Process	  (4)	  	  These	   original	   FMECA	   findings	   were	   generated	   over	   the	   life	   of	   the	   development	  cycle.	   	   Several	   members	   representing	   all	   disciplines	   of	   engineering,	   science,	   and	  business	   conducted	   the	   risk	   analysis.	   	   As	   indicated	   by	   FMECA	   structure	   and	  methodology,	  single	  failure	  events	  are	  only	  documented	  to	  understand	  its	  effect	  to	  the	  system	  and	  hazards	  that	  occur	  without	  failures	  cannot	  be	  discovered.	  	  	  	  After	   careful	   review,	   there	   were	   only	   a	   few	   specific	   FMECA	   findings	   that	   were	  related	  to	  the	  case	  accident.	  	  They	  are	  generalized	  in	  Table	  10	  below.	  	  	  	  
Table	  10.	  	  Identified	  FMECA	  Hazards	  of	  Case	  Accident	  






Severity	   Frequency	   Detectability	   Current	  
Design	  
Controls	  1	   Sensor	  calibration	  drifting	   Inaccurate	  Measurement	   Working	  electrode	  membrane	  degradation	  
Hazardous	   Moderate	   Highly	  Frequent	   Dynamic	  internal	  proprietary	  calibration	  program	  2	   Sensor	  do	  not	  calibrate	  after	  sample	  
Inaccurate	  Measurement	   Slow	  response	  of	  sensor	   Hazardous	   Highly	  Frequent	   Frequent	   Dynamic	  internal	  proprietary	  calibration	  program	  3	   Failure	  pattern	  do	  not	  detect	  sensor	  malfunction	  
Inaccurate	  Measurement	   Sensor	  calibration	  limits	  are	  not	  optimized	  
Hazardous	   Frequent	   Frequent	   Historical	  analytical	  performance	  design	  4	   Incorrect	  Calibration	  Retry	   Delayed	  patient	  results	   Sensor	  malfunction	   High	   Moderate	   N/A	   Disable	  sensor	  after	  Z	  retries	  	  As	  Table	  10	  indicates,	  there	  were	  only	  four	  identified	  FMECA	  items	  that	  have	  causal	  linkage	  to	  the	  case	  accident.	  	  While	  FMECA	  #1	  did	  forecast	  a	  possible	  degradation	  of	  the	   working	   electrode	   membrane	   that	   affects	   the	   sensor	   calibration,	   it	   did	   not	  encapsulate	   the	  possibility	  of	  a	  physical	  blockage	  of	   the	   ion	  transfer	  as	  a	  potential	  hazard,	   which	   led	   to	   the	   case	   accident.	   	   The	   FMECA	   #1	   specifically	   identified	   a	  condition	  when	  the	  membrane	   integrity	   itself	  degrades	  to	   the	  point	  where	  the	   ion	  transfer	  is	  ineffective	  in	  accurately	  diagnosing	  the	  patient’s	  blood	  status.	  	  The	  cause	  could	   be	   physical	   deterioration,	   chemical	   corrosion	   of	   the	   sensor	   and	   or	  contaminants	   physically	   damaging	   the	   membrane.	   	   The	   FMECA	   result	   thus	  described	  a	  specific	  type	  of	  hazardous	  condition	  (i.e.	  component	  failure)	  that	  could	  occur	   at	   the	   lower	   level.	   	   Therefore,	   this	   type	   of	   analysis	   requires	   intimate	  knowledge	  of	  the	  technical	  system,	  such	  as	  an	  expert	  in	  sensor	  and	  electrochemistry	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for	  this	  particular	  FMECA	  item.	  	   	  As	  mentioned	  earlier,	  this	  was	  a	  limiting	  factor	  of	  this	  methodology.	  	  The	  CAST	  analysis	  offers	  a	  systems	  level	  viewpoint	  of	  this	  hazard.	  	  As	  Table	  7	  shows	  for	  control	  loop	  eee-­‐fff-­‐ggg-­‐hhh,	  the	  potential	  identified	  hazard	  is:	  	  	  
“Inadequate	  transfer	  of	  ion	  to	  membrane	  (physical,	  chemical,	  biological,	  electrical)”	  	  By	  focusing	  on	  the	  broader	  function	  of	  the	  controlled	  process	  of	  the	  control	  loop	  (i.e.	  ion	   transfer),	   it	   compels	   the	  analyst	   to	   take	  a	  broader	  view	  on	   the	   causal	   analysis	  when	  determining	   inadequate	   conditions.	   	   Decoupling	   the	   controlled	   process	   (ion	  transfer)	   from	   the	   physical	   form	   of	   the	   actuator	   (i.e.	   electrochemical	   sensor	  membrane),	   allows	   the	   analyst	   to	   identify	   a	   multitude	   of	   hazards	   at	   the	   various	  elements	   in	   Figure	   19.	   	   Hazards	   can	   include	   physical	   component	   failures	   of	   the	  sensor	   as	   previously	   found	   with	   FMECA,	   but	   also	   hazards	   without	   component	  failure,	  such	  as	  material	  deposits	  on	  the	  surface	  of	  the	  sensor.	  	  As	  mentioned	  earlier	  in	  the	  case	  accident	  investigation,	  the	  membrane	  was	  found	  to	  be	  in	  perfect	  physical	  working	   condition,	   but	   the	   ion	   transfer	   was	   inadequate.	   	   Therefore,	   a	   hazardous	  condition	   was	   present	   without	   a	   component	   failure.	   	   By	   focusing	   on	   what	   could	  adversely	   affect	   the	   ion	   transfer	   function,	   the	   analyst	   may	   define	   hazards	   that	  include	   physical	   blockage	   (i.e.	   foreign	   mass),	   chemical	   neutralization	   of	   the	   ion	  affinity,	   biological	   contaminants,	   and	  or	   electrical	   interference.	  By	   focusing	  on	   the	  function	   of	   the	   control	   loop	   on	   this	   particular	   element,	   CAST	   provided	   an	  implementation-­‐	   neutral	   approach	   to	   identifying	   hazards,	   and	   did	   not	   require	   the	  specialized	   knowledge	   of	   the	   system	   (i.e.	   electrochemistry	   technology).	   	   This	  approach	  allowed	  more	  hazards	  to	  be	  discovered	  with	  fewer	  resources.	  	  	  FMECA	  #2	  identified	  a	  potential	  failure	  mode	  that	  the	  sensor	  does	  not	  calibrate	  after	  sample,	   and	   linked	   the	   cause	   to	   a	   slow	   response	   of	   the	   sensor.	   	   The	   FMECA	   item	  specifically	  focused	  again	  on	  the	  component	  (i.e.	  sensor),	  and	  failed	  to	  recognize	  the	  functionality	   issue:	   inadequate	   ion	   transfer	   in	   terms	   of	   time	   requirements.	   	   	   It	  assumed	   that	   the	   component	   failure	   identified	   in	   FMECA	   #1	   –	   membrane	  degradation	  -­‐	  was	  the	  cause	  of	  no	  calibration.	   	  It	  did	  not	  take	  into	  account	  that	  the	  sensor	  may	  be	  in	  perfect	  working	  condition,	  which	  was	  true	  in	  the	  case	  accident,	  but	  it	   was	   the	   controlled	   timing	   process	   of	   the	   ion	   transfer	   that	   was	   the	   issue.	   	   	   In	  addition,	   there	  may	  be	  other	  previous	  or	  exogenous	   factors	   that	  may	  have	  caused	  the	  sensor	  to	  not	  calibrate	  after	  sample.	  	  Finally	  since	  it	  was	  a	  single	  failure,	  isolated	  view,	  it	  assumed	  that	  all	  previous	  processes	  were	  correct.	  	  	  	  The	  CAST	  results	  also	  identified	  a	  similar	  hazard	  in	  control	  loop	  m-­‐n-­‐o-­‐p	  as	  a	  “delay	  in	   feedback	   to	   the	   (SOC)	   controller”.	   Similar	   to	   the	   above	   CAST	   discussion,	   this	  analysis	   focused	   on	   the	   malfunction	   that	   causes	   the	   hazard,	   as	   oppose	   to	   the	  component	  failure.	   	  This	  opened	  up	  more	  possibilities	  and	  sets	  the	  mind	  frame	  for	  the	  analyst	  to	  determine	  possible	  system-­‐level	  causes.	  	  While	  this	  certainly	  included	  a	  physically	   “slow	   sensor”	   as	   FMECA	  #2	   indicated,	   the	  broader	  CAST	  analysis	   can	  further	  find	  more	  hazards	  such	  as	  inadequate	  wash	  cycle,	  inadequate	  component	  of	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calibration	  solution,	  and	  or	  a	  physical	  barrier	  on	  the	  sensor	  (i.e.	  foreign	  mass).	  	  This	  neutral	  approach	  again,	  guided	  the	  analyst	  to	  take	  a	  systems	  approach	  to	  investigate	  possible	  hazards.	  	  	  	  In	  addition	  to	  “delay	  in	  feedback”,	  another	  CAST	  finding	  was	  the	  “inadequate	  input”	  into	  the	  controller.	  	  	  This	  potential	  condition	  questioned	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  incoming	  data	   input	   (i.e.	   sensor	   calibration)	   and	   the	   analyst	   can	   investigate	   potential	  erroneous	   exogenous	   factors	   (such	   as	   electrical	   interference)	   or	   as	   in	   the	   case	  accident,	  upstream	  influences.	  	  If	  the	  sensor	  failed	  to	  detect	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  foreign	  substance,	   this	   failure	   is	   passed	   along	   to	   ensuing	   sequences	   as	   shown	   in	   Figure	  12.	  	  Case	  System	  Control	  Structure.	  	  	  With	  the	  information	  to	  detect	  the	  foreign	  matter,	  it	  can	  be	  coupled	  to	  this	  hazard	  to	  verify	  any	  input	  as	  adequate	  or	  not.	  With	  these	  types	  of	  upstream	   and	   multiple	   hazards	   identified,	   system	   level	   mitigations	   can	   be	  implemented.	   	   The	   structure	   of	   the	   single	   fault,	   isolated	   view	   of	   the	   FMECA	  methodology	   prevented	   this	   type	   of	   analysis.	   	   With	   a	   systems	   approach	   CAST	  method,	  the	  case	  accident	  may	  have	  been	  averted.	  	  	  	  A	   failure	  mode	  was	   identified	   in	   FMECA	  #3	   if	   the	   case	   system	   could	   not	   detect	   a	  failure	  pattern	  during	  the	  sensor	  calibration	  sequence.	  	  The	  identified	  cause	  was	  the	  calibration	   limits	  were	  not	   optimized.	   	   	   The	   case	   accident	   still	   occurred	   since	   this	  analysis	  assumed	  the	  incoming	  data	  input	  was	  adequate,	  as	  was	  similarly	  found	  in	  FMECA	  #2.	   	  CAST	  also	  identified	  this	  hazard	  in	  control	  loop	  m-­‐n-­‐o-­‐p	  as	  “erroneous	  low	   result	   failed	   future	   case	   sensor	   calibration	   limits	   and	   delayed	   patient	   result	  error	  message”	  (see	  Table	  8).	   	   	  As	  previously	  mentioned,	   if	  a	  CAST	  approach	  were	  taken,	   the	   analyst	   could	   have	   questioned	   the	   validity	   of	   the	   incoming	   data	   and	  questioned	  whether	  an	  upstream	  failure	  was	  passed	  along	  to	  the	  current	  calibration	  process.	  	  The	  original	  FMECA	  focused	  only	  on	  optimizing	  the	  algorithmic	  limits,	  but	  failed	  to	  identify	  the	  importance	  of	  whether	  that	  calibration	  data	  was	  even	  good	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  process.	  	  It	  did	  not	  consider	  whether	  there	  were	  potential	  upstream	  errors,	   hence	   why	   the	   case	   accident	   still	   occurred	   with	   the	   FMECA	   #3	   hazard	  identified.	  	  The	  final	  FMECA	  #4	  item	  relevant	  to	  the	  case	  accident	  was	  the	  number	  of	  calibration	  retries	  that	  occurs	  if	  the	  system	  detects	  a	  deviated	  sensor.	  	  The	  limited	  tries	  allows	  time	  for	  the	  sensor	  to	  return	  to	  a	  normal,	  safe	  state,	  but	  is	  also	  emplaces	  a	  constraint	  to	  allow	  the	  system	  to	  disable	  the	  errant	  sensor	  and	  continue	  to	  use	  the	  other	  stable	  sensors.	  	  This	  hazard	  was	  not	  a	  part	  of	  the	  CAST	  analysis	  since	  the	  Wash	  Cycle	  was	  assumed	  to	  work	  as	  intended.	   	  However,	  this	  hazard	  would	  have	  been	  identified	  if	  the	  CAST	  analysis	  were	  performed	  for	  the	  entire	  control	  structure	  for	  all	  hazards.	  	  	  	  The	   case	   company	   was	   dutiful	   in	   risk	   analysis	   and	   completed	   a	   FMECA	   effort	   in	  accordance	   to	   FDA	   guidelines.	   Then	   why	   did	   the	   case	   accident	   still	   occur?	   	   As	  mentioned	  the	  structure	  of	  FMECA	  only	  analyzes	  a	  single	  fault,	  based	  on	  the	  linear	  chain	  of	  events	  scenario.	   	  The	  original	  FMECA	  analysis	  did	  identify	  sensor	  failures,	  but	   it	   focused	  more	   on	   the	   actuator	   (i.e.	   electrochemical	   sensor)	   rather	   than	   the	  controlled	  process	  (i.e.	  ion	  transfer).	  In	  addition,	  it	  assumed	  the	  incoming	  data	  input	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into	  the	  controller	  was	  “good”	  without	  question.	  	  By	  doing	  so,	  a	  much	  narrow,	  low-­‐level	   analysis	   was	   performed,	   and	   therefore	   limited	   amounts	   of	   hazards	   defined.	  	  Furthermore,	   the	   FMECA	   methodology	   did	   not	   consider	   the	   implications	   of	   the	  business	   demands	   of	   TAT	   performance	   on	   the	   sensor	   verification	   process.	   	   This	  conflict	   of	   constraints	   cannot	   be	   identified	   by	   FMECA	   because	   there	   were	   no	  component	  failures.	   	   	  The	  design	  of	  the	  system	  failed	  to	  avert	  the	  case	  accident	  for	  this	  reason.	  	  	  In	  short,	  the	  reductionist	  view	  of	  FMECA	  has	  limitations	  in	  discovering	  more	  complex	  hazards.	  	  	  	  For	   comparison,	   the	   author	   performed	   the	   CAST	   analysis	   of	   H1	   and	   was	   able	   to	  identify	  over	  175	   individual	  system	  hazards,	  with	  nine	  directly	  related	   to	   the	  case	  accident.	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  175	  hazards	  found	  were	  only	  for	  the	  six	  identified	  control	  loop	  of	  almost	  20	  possible	  control	  loops.	  	  The	  CAST	  analysis	  produced	  significantly	  more	   system	   level	   hazards	   than	   the	   70	   found	   via	   the	   industry	   standard	   FMECA	  methodology	   in	   less	   than	  half	  of	   the	   identified	   loops	   in	   the	  control	   structure.	   	  The	  sheer	   voluminous	   findings	   indicate	   that	   the	   systems	   thinking	   model	   in	   the	   CAST	  methodology	  was	  more	  effective	  in	  discovering	  hazards.	  	  	  Furthermore,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  number	  of	  hazards,	  the	  type	  hazards	  identified	  were	  significant.	   	   This	   CAST	   analysis	   was	   able	   to	   identify	   single	   component	   factors	  (inability	  to	  detect	  foreign	  material	  on	  sensor)	  that	  were	  a	  critical	  factor	  in	  the	  case	  accident.	  	  Moreover,	  this	  non-­‐reductionist	  approach	  allowed	  the	  analyst	  to	  consider	  upstream	  failures,	  and	  how	  it	  affected	  the	  downstream	  dynamics	  with	  the	  potential	  to	   migrate	   the	   system	   to	   an	   unsafe	   state.	   	   Therefore,	   this	   case	   accident	   and	  subsequent	   CAST	   analysis	   illustrated	   an	   example	   were	   there	   were	   inadequate	  system	  control	  of	  variables,	  and	  proves	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  loss	  of	  safety	  was	  a	  control	  issue.	  	  	  	  Finally,	  the	  systems	  lens	  was	  able	  to	  identify	  additional	  hazards	  that	  did	  not	  include	  a	  component	  failure,	  a	  limitation	  of	  the	  FMECA	  practice.	  	  The	  control	  loop	  template	  in	   Figure	  19	  provided	   a	   guideline	   for	   easily	   recognizing	   system	   level	   hazards	   and	  conflicting	   constraints	   amongst	   the	   various	   control	   loops.	   	   Viewing	   safety	   as	   a	  control	  problem	  help	   elucidated	  many	   system	   level	  hazards.	   	  Therefore,	   the	  CAST	  application	  to	  risk	  analysis	  can	  provide	  a	  more	  rigid	  evaluation	  for	  a	  variety	  hazards	  that	  occur	  with	  and	  without	  failures.	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  the	  last	  gap	  analysis	  comparison,	  as	  mentioned	  earlier,	  the	  FDA	  approved	  FMECA	  technique	   required	   significant	   amount	   of	   company	   resources	   to	   execute.	   	   From	  professional	   experience	   and	   knowledge	   of	   the	   case	   company,	   FMECA	   is	   a	   long,	  arduous	   process	   (from	   months	   to	   years)	   requiring	   representation	   from	   every	  discipline	   of	   engineering	   and	   business.	   	   In	   addition,	   during	   the	   FMECA	   process,	  there	  is	  less	  structured	  approach	  to	  identify	  hazards	  when	  compared	  to	  CAST.	  	  This	  was	   a	   considerable	   effort	   and	   cost	   for	   the	   case	   company,	   yet	   the	   initial	   findings	  failed	   to	   identify	   the	   significant	   contributor	   case	   accident	   of	   conflicting	   system	  control	  actions.	  	  	  In	  contrast,	  the	  CAST	  analysis	  was	  performed	  solely	  by	  the	  author	  with	  considerable	  less	  time	  and	  resource	  and	  was	  able	  to	  identify	  more	  than	  twice	  
	   84	  
the	  number	  of	  hazards.	   	  The	  analysis	  was	  only	  performed	  on	  a	  half	  of	   the	   loops	   in	  the	  control	  structure.	  	  It	  is	  assumed	  that	  only	  more	  hazards	  will	  be	  identified	  when	  all	   loops	   of	   the	   control	   structured	   is	   analyzed,	   with	   additional	   resources,	   and	  focusing	  on	  other	  hazards	  beside	  H1.	  	  	  	  As	  mentioned	  earlier,	  the	  case	  accident	  was	  a	  multifold	  issue	  that	  included	  a	  single	  component	   failure	   (inability	   to	   detect	   foreign	  mass	   on	   the	   sensor	   surface),	   and	   a	  scenario	  of	  competing	  control	  actions	  (TAT	  and	  sensor	  verification	  during	  the	  wash	  calibration	  conflict).	  	  The	  latter	  of	  the	  issue	  did	  not	  incur	  any	  failures	  of	  the	  system,	  but	  was	  an	  incompatibility	  of	  system	  controls	  that	  migrated	  the	  system	  to	  an	  unsafe	  state.	   	   While	   limitedly	   effective	   and	   regulatory	   approved,	   FMECA	   was	   unable	   to	  detect	   this	   type	   of	   hazard	   by	   its	   reductionist	   design.	   	   Its	   linear	   chain	   of	   events	  modeling	   was	   limited	   to	   only	   single	   fault	   analysis.	   	   The	   use	   of	   systems	   thinking	  model	   to	   hazard	   analysis,	   such	   as	   CAST,	   was	   be	   able	   to	   identify	   more	   hazards,	  including	   non-­‐linear	   scenarios.	   	   The	   results	   from	   the	   CAST	   analysis	   of	   the	   case	  accident	  illustrated	  a	  superior	  method	  to	  recognize	  a	  multitude	  and	  disparate	  types	  of	  hazards	  more	  effectively	  than	  FMECA,	  with	  less	  time,	  cost,	  and	  resource	  invested.	  	  	  In	  addition	  the	  safety	  tradeoff	  between	  TAT	  and	  sensor	  integrity	  was	  and	  still	  is	  a	  complicated	  challenge.	  	  	  	  The	  default	  system	  configuration	  to	  delay	  syncing	  the	  sensor	  calibration	  to	  the	  patient	  results	  poses	  a	  significant	  hazardous	  condition.	  	  However,	  the	  adherence	  to	  the	  TAT	  constraint	  is	  critical	  in	  certain	  context	  of	  the	  intended	  value	  delivery.	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  business	  aspect	  and	  increased	  profitability	  of	  a	  quicker	  TAT	  may	  have	  influenced	  and	  impacted	  the	  engineering	  design	  for	  system	  safety	  and	  priorities.	  	  This	  is	  a	  critical	  discussion	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  held	  amongst	  principal	  stakeholders	  for	  new	  diagnostic	  development.	  	  	  	  Some	  of	  the	  design	  requirements	  and	  recommendations	  derived	  from	  the	  CAST	  analysis	  can	  be	  immediately	  implemented	  into	  the	  current	  case	  system.	  	  The	  default	  system	  configuration	  can	  be	  re-­‐optimized	  to	  prevent	  a	  window	  of	  hazardous	  opportunity.	  	  If	  the	  user	  desires	  to	  address	  the	  other	  conflicting	  constraint	  of	  a	  fast	  TAT,	  that	  flexibility	  is	  present	  and	  available.	  	  Furthermore,	  these	  requirements	  and	  recommendations	  for	  improved	  safety	  can	  be	  used	  for	  future	  development	  of	  new	  diagnostic	  analyzers.	  	  With	  these	  hazards	  identified,	  the	  knowledge	  gained	  may	  be	  utilized	  to	  prevent	  tragic	  incidents	  such	  as	  the	  case	  accident.	  	  	  	  	   	  
	   85	  
CHAPTER	  6.	  	  Conclusions	  	  
	  
“The	  scientific	  man	  does	  not	  aim	  at	  an	  immediate	  result.	  He	  does	  not	  expect	  that	  his	  
advanced	  ideas	  will	  be	  readily	  taken	  up.	  His	  work	  is	  like	  that	  of	  the	  planter	  —	  for	  the	  
future.	  His	  duty	  is	  to	  lay	  the	  foundation	  for	  those	  who	  are	  to	  come,	  and	  point	  the	  way.	  
He	  lives	  and	  labors	  and	  hopes.”	  
-­‐Nikola	  Tesla	  	  This	  thesis	  has	  discussed	  the	  evolution	  in	  medical	  technology	  and	  specifically	  the	  need	  for	  safe	  and	  effective	  diagnostic	  systems.	  	  With	  innovation	  in	  technology,	  come	  increasing	  concerns	  of	  maintaining	  system	  safety.	  	  Traditional,	  linear	  risk	  analysis	  methodologies	  recommended	  by	  the	  regulatory	  bodies	  may	  not	  be	  capable	  of	  identifying	  complex	  hazards	  with	  multiple	  failures,	  or	  hazards	  that	  occur	  sans	  failures.	  	  A	  new,	  systems	  approach	  to	  safety	  is	  needed	  to	  adapt	  to	  the	  increasing	  complexities	  and	  emerging	  dynamics	  of	  this	  technology.	  	  Based	  on	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  CAST	  analysis	  to	  a	  real	  life	  case	  accident	  involving	  a	  medical	  diagnostic	  analyzer,	  the	  systems	  approach	  was	  superior	  to	  the	  industry	  standard	  FMECA	  practice	  in	  identifying	  hazards.	  	  It	  was	  able	  to	  detect	  significant	  contributors	  to	  the	  case	  accident	  in	  form	  of	  failures	  (foreign	  material	  on	  the	  sensor),	  and	  non-­‐failures	  (a	  conflict	  in	  controlling	  actions).	  	  From	  these	  identified	  hazards,	  new	  system	  safety	  requirements,	  such	  as	  establishing	  safer	  control	  settings,	  were	  generated	  to	  control	  the	  system	  from	  migrating	  to	  an	  unsafe	  state.	  	  This	  is	  the	  ultimate	  value	  that	  the	  CAST	  analysis	  can	  provide	  for	  the	  design	  and	  development	  of	  complex	  medical	  systems.	  	  	  The	  CAST	  approach	  was	  able	  to	  distinguish	  more	  than	  twice	  the	  number	  of	  system	  level	  hazards	  with	  considerable	  less	  time	  and	  resources.	  	  Multiple	  failure	  hazards	  and	  hazards	  that	  occurred	  without	  component	  failures	  due	  to	  conflicting	  system	  control	  actions	  were	  confirmed.	  	  The	  CAST	  methodology	  was	  able	  to	  increase	  not	  only	  the	  quantity	  of	  hazards	  found,	  but	  identify	  complex	  and	  non-­‐linear	  hazards.	  	  The	  current	  FMECA	  is	  incapable	  of	  producing	  these	  results	  based	  on	  its	  inherent	  design	  and	  structure.	  	  In	  conclusion,	  the	  answer	  to	  the	  research	  question	  of	  this	  thesis	  confirms	  that	  the	  CAST	  and	  the	  STAMP	  approach	  was	  more	  effective	  in	  designing	  safety	  in	  medical	  diagnostic	  systems	  than	  the	  current	  industry	  standard	  practice	  of	  FMECA.	  	  The	  quantity	  and	  quality	  of	  hazards	  discovered	  with	  the	  CAST	  methodology	  are	  overall	  more	  productive	  in	  generating	  effective	  safety	  design	  requirements	  and	  recommendations	  in	  preventing	  medical	  accidents.	  	  A	  holistic	  approach	  in	  risk	  analysis	  can	  provide	  more	  value	  than	  the	  current	  linear	  techniques.	  	  With	  this	  systems	  methodology,	  the	  case	  accident	  could	  have	  been	  averted.	  	  Further	  expanding	  the	  CAST	  practice	  to	  other	  areas	  of	  medical	  technology	  development	  may	  prohibit	  future	  massive,	  disastrous	  medical	  accidents	  similar	  to	  those	  that	  gave	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birth	  to	  the	  FDA.	  	  Finally,	  the	  systems	  way	  will	  prevent	  history	  from	  repeating	  itself,	  and	  lead	  to	  new	  heights	  of	  safer	  and	  more	  effective	  medical	  care	  and	  innovation.	  	  Finally,	  after	  this	  thesis	  experience,	  it	  further	  confirms	  to	  the	  author	  that	  the	  system	  thinking	  is	  a	  valuable	  mental	  model	  and	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  applications	  in	  addition	  to	  safety.	  	  	  	  This	  is	  justified	  in	  the	  System	  Design	  and	  Management	  program,	  professional	  work	  experience,	  and	  in	  personal	  activities.	  	  Understanding	  the	  dynamics	  and	  interfaces	  of	  system	  components,	  one	  can	  design	  the	  system	  accordingly	  to	  produce	  value	  and	  benefit	  to	  many	  stakeholders.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  enables	  the	  adage	  “Think	  globally,	  and	  act	  locally.”	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